

# Historical Dictionary of Nietzscheanism

*Second Edition*

Carol Diethe

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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

Full details of the translations of Nietzsche's works used in this volume are given in the first section of the bibliography. Each major work by Nietzsche has an entry in the dictionary under the English title. The following abbreviations will be used when quoting from Nietzsche's works:

<i>A-C</i>	<i>The Anti-Christ</i>
<i>BGE</i>	<i>Beyond Good and Evil</i>
<i>BT</i>	<i>The Birth of Tragedy</i>
<i>CW</i>	<i>The Case of Wagner</i>
<i>D</i>	<i>Daybreak</i>
<i>DD</i>	<i>Dithyrambs of Dionysus</i>
<i>EH</i>	<i>Ecce Homo</i>
<i>GS</i>	<i>The Gay Science</i>
<i>HH</i>	<i>Human, All Too Human</i>
<i>HC</i>	<i>"Homer's Contest"</i>
<i>NW</i>	<i>Nietzsche contra Wagner</i>
<i>OGM</i>	<i>On the Genealogy of Morality</i>
<i>OTLNS</i>	<i>"On Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense"</i>
<i>TI</i>	<i>Twilight of the Idols</i>
<i>UM</i>	<i>Untimely Meditations</i>
<i>WP</i>	<i>The Will to Power</i>
<i>Za</i>	<i>Thus Spoke Zarathustra</i>

## Chronology

- 1844** Friedrich Nietzsche born in Röcken, Saxony, 15 October.
- 1846** Birth of sister, Elisabeth, on 10 July.
- 1849** Death of father, Karl Ludwig Nietzsche, on 27 July.
- 1858–1864** Attends Schulpforta near Naumburg.
- 1864–1865** Attends Bonn University.
- 1865–1868** Attends Leipzig University.
- 1869–1879** Professor of philology at Basel University.
- 1870** Fights in Franco-Prussian War (wounded after two months).
- 1872** Publication of *The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music*.
- 1873–1875** Publication of *Untimely Meditations*.
- 1878** Publication of *Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits*.
- 1879** Publication of *Assorted Maxims and Opinions* (subsequently volume 2, part 1, of *Human, All Too Human*).
- 1880** Publication of *The Wanderer and His Shadow* (subsequently volume 2, part 2, of *Human, All Too Human*).
- 1881** Publication of *Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality*.
- 1882** Publication of *The Gay Science* (subtitle added 1877: “*la gay scienza*”).
- 1883** Publication of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All or None*, parts 1 and 2.
- 1884** Publication of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, part 3.

- 1885** Publication of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, part 4.
- 1886** Publication of *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*.
- 1887** Publication of *On the Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic*.
- 1888** Publication of *The Case of Wagner: A Musician's Problem*. Completion of *Dithyrambs of Dionysus* (published in 1891), *The Anti-Christ* (published in 1894), *Nietzsche contra Wagner: A Psychologist's Brief* (published in 1895), and *Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is* (published posthumously in 1908).
- 1889** Publication of *Twilight of the Idols, or How to Philosophize with a Hammer*. Nietzsche's mental collapse in Turin, 3 January. Nursed by mother (Franziska Nietzsche) and sister (Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche).
- 1897** Death of mother on 20 April.
- 1900** Death of Nietzsche, 25 August.
- 1935** Death of sister on 8 November.

**AESTHETICS/ART.** It is not an exaggeration to say that Nietzsche's philosophical mood can be gauged at any given time by the position he takes on art. In his early work in particular, he enthused over the public art of the ancient **Greeks**, notably the tragic dramas that placed such a stamp on the conduct of their civic life. He regarded the Germany of his day as culturally impoverished and sought to reintroduce **aristocratic values** to invigorate the **culture** of the nation. Nietzsche is often accused of aestheticism because, in *The Birth of Tragedy*, he avowedly creates "a **metaphysics** of art"; however, this must be seen in relation to his discovery of "the primordial phenomenon of **Dionysian art**" (*BT*, 24) and set within the context of his developing views on Dionysus. His views on art would change dramatically as his thought developed.

In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche argues that illusion is vital for the artist, who understands the tragic view of **life** and is able to communicate it to man in a form that he can bear and that circumvents the claims of religion. Thus, art is able to reveal to man the meaning of **suffering**; by identifying with the tragic hero, he can continue as a moral being in the face of **nihilism** and the death of **God**. With **Greek tragedy** and **musical** dissonance in mind, Nietzsche poses the question as to how aesthetic pleasure can be stimulated through "the ugly and the disharmonic" and provides the answer (already mentioned in an earlier section of the same work): "it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally justified" (*BT*, 5 and 24). He goes on to add, "The Dionysian, with its primordial joy experienced even in pain, is the common source of music and tragic myth" (*BT*, 24). The same argument is found in *The Gay Science*: "As an aesthetic phenomenon our existence is still *bearable* for us" (*GS*, II: 107). As he explained in the third of his *Untimely Meditations*, art provided a stimulus for activity as well as respite from the feelings of terror at existence. Nietzsche writes, "The greatness and indispensability of art lie precisely in its being able to produce the *appearance* of a simpler world, a shorter solution to the riddle of life. No one who suffers from life can do without this appearance, just as no one can do without sleep" (*UM*, IV: "Richard Wagner in Bayreuth," 4).

In *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche makes several critical statements on the harmful aspects of placing art center stage in our

becoming, and he no longer approves of such things as allusion, **veils**, and **masks**: artists “of all ages . . . are the glorifiers of the religious and philosophical errors of mankind” (*HH*, I: “From the Souls of Artists and Writers,” 220). In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, his attention is very much focused on self-creativity: man himself is to become a work of art, while self-**knowledge** is the goal in *On the Genealogy of Morality*. By then, Nietzsche had also become disenchanting not just with **German culture** under **Otto von Bismarck** but also with **Arthur Schopenhauer** and **Richard Wagner**, the men he had viewed as geniuses when he wrote *The Birth of Tragedy*, and his harsh words on aesthetics are now often aimed at them. When he wrote his final works, Nietzsche, though still entirely dedicated to eradicating metaphysics from **morality**, returned to the Dionysian: “—For art to exist, for any sort of aesthetic activity or perception to exist, a certain physiological precondition is indispensable: *intoxication* [*Rausch*]” (*TI*, “Expeditions of an Untimely Man,” 8). Ignoring the way Nietzsche placed emphasis on the **body**, **Martin Heidegger** insisted on a metaphysical interpretation of Nietzsche’s aesthetics. Refer to Philip Pothen, *Nietzsche and the Fate of Art* (2002).

**AFFIRMATION.** Nietzsche’s “cheerful” doctrine (or “**gay science**”) is spelled out most fully in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, where, in the face of **pessimism** after the death of **God**, we should “say yes” to life, whatever it brings. Zarathustra declares, “I have become one who blesses and one who says Yes . . .” (*Za*, II: “Before Sunrise”). This love of one’s fate or *amor fati* is the basis for the theory of **eternal eternal**, which the *Übermensch* will embrace willingly, with no regrets, affirming his life in every single detail (even the misfortune of having to share the planet with **herd** man). Zarathustra, the teacher of eternal return, sweeps away all **time** distinctions for this optimistic *Weltanschauung*:

All “it was” is a fragment, a riddle, a dreadful chance—until the sacred will says to it: “But I willed it thus!”

Until the creative will says to it: “But I will it thus! Thus shall I will it”! (*Za*, I: “Of Redemption”).

Nietzsche attacked **Christianity** for engendering a **slave morality** that “says no on principle” to everything that is “other” (*OGM*: I: 10).

All Nietzsche's writings stress that, in the face of **nihilism**, we are free to exult in **life** itself, but from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* on, life affirmation must be linked to the **will to power**, as that is the essence of life. See also *LEBENSPHILOSOPHIE*.

**DIE AKTION (ACTION)**. Weekly journal for politics, literature, and **art**. Founded in Berlin, 1911, by the left-wing activist Franz Pfemfert, the journal published articles in favor of Nietzsche's views, often by **Expressionist** writers who were happy to publish in either *Die Aktion* or the less political *Der Sturm*. During the war, *Die Aktion* held back from the tendency to make a "German" hero out of Nietzsche retrospectively. In an article in *Die Aktion* of 1915 titled "*Die Deutschsprechung Friedrich Nietzsches*" ("Making Friedrich Nietzsche Germanic"), Pfemfert bitterly criticized the patriotic "Nietzsche-German" peddled by **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche**. The article provided chapter and verse from *Ecce Homo* to prove Nietzsche's internationalist credentials. *Die Aktion* ceased publication in 1932.

**AMOR FATI (LOVE OF FATE OR DESTINY)**. A concept intimately bound up with the **will to power** and the opposite of **ressentiment**. In his vision of what the *Übermensch* might be, Nietzsche proposed a strong individual who would seize control of his own destiny and **affirm life** in all its aspects. Through such affirmation, life becomes an artifact that can be *made*—so it is up to the individual to create his or her destiny, a desperately painful process: "But my creative will, my destiny, wants it so. Or, to speak more honestly: my will wants precisely such a destiny" (*Za*, II: "On the Blissful Islands"). **Theodor Adorno**, in *Minima Moralia* (1951), criticized Nietzsche's *amor fati* as vexatious since any affirmation of life in a concentration camp was unthinkable. A counterargument to this is that Nietzsche spoke for himself on this issue: "*Amor Fati*: that is my innermost **nature**" (*NW*: "Epilogue," 1); in addition, he could not be expected to foresee an event such as the Holocaust. Refer to Ōkōchi Ryōgi, "*Nietzsches Amor Fati im Lichte von Karma des Buddhismus*" ("Nietzsche's *Amor Fati* in the Light of Buddhist Karma") in *Nietzsche-Studien*, 1 (1972).

**ANDREAS-SALOMÉ, LOU (1861–1937)**. Lou Salomé was born and brought up in St. Petersburg; she married Frederica C. Andreas in

November 1882, without him and without saying farewell. He never saw either of them again and never forgave Elisabeth for her hand in the debacle. It has been suggested that some at least of his misogyny is a displaced revenge attack on both his sister and Lou Salomé.

Lou Andreas-Salomé brought out her psychological interpretation of Nietzsche's works in *Friedrich Nietzsche in seinen Werken*, 1894 (translated as *Nietzsche*, 1988). It received a mixed reception. Noteworthy is Lou Andreas-Salomé's statement that Nietzsche retained a religious attitude in spite of his overt atheism; this would become a common perception of Nietzsche's thought among some intellectuals who were unwilling to take Nietzsche's pronouncement on the death of **God** at face value. She went on to write a number of novels, including *Ruth* (1895) and *Ma* (1901), in which the freedom of the female protagonist to live **life** according to her own lights is a notable feature, indicating that she was receptive to Nietzsche's advice to her (as in a letter dated the end of August 1882) to "become who you are." This citation from Pindar had already found its way into *The Gay Science* (GS, III: 270). Andreas-Salomé's short story *Fenitschka* (1898) deals indirectly with her encounter with Nietzsche. Besides her assessment of Ibsen's female characters in *Henrik Ibsen's Frauen-Gestalten* (*Henrik Ibsen's Female Characters*, 1892), Andreas-Salomé also wrote many articles and reviews. The four essays in *Die Erotik* (1910) are on female **sexuality**. She met **Sigmund Freud** at the Psychoanalytic Congress in Weimar in 1911 and thereafter became his colleague and collaborator. The archive dedicated to Lou Andreas-Salomé is in Göttingen, where she died. Refer to Erich Podach, *Friedrich Nietzsche and Lou Salomé. Ihre Begegnung 1882* (1937); Rudolph Binion, *Frau Lou: Nietzsche's Wayward Disciple* (1968); Ernst Pfeiffer, *Friedrich Nietzsche, Paul Rée, Lou von Salomé. Die Dokumente ihrer Begegnung* (1970); Biddy Martin, *The (Life)Styles of Lou Andreas-Salomé* (1991); H. F. Peters, *Lou Andreas-Salomé: Femme fatale und Dichtermuse* (1995), and Carol Diethe, *Nietzsche's Women: Beyond the Whip* (1996). See also FRIENDSHIP.

**ANIMALS.** Nietzsche described man as an animal with primitive instincts that he tamed at his peril. To support this view, he used animal imagery with a distinct symbolism. The **blond beast** represents the

ancient, noble warrior whose rapaciousness is preferable to the decadence of modern man (especially the Christian). Zarathustra's special animals are the eagle and the serpent. The eagle (*Adler*), as a bird of prey (*Raubvogel*), must be set alongside the blond beast or beast of prey (*Raubtier*) (*OGM*, 1:11). In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*—and in *On the Genealogy of Morality*—the eagle preys on lambs, not out of malice but out of strength. Nietzsche's point is that it is just as useless to brand the eagle "evil" for being strong as it is to brand the lamb "good" for being weak, though in *On the Genealogy of Morality*, the example of the lamb is a template for the man of **ressentiment** (*OGM*, I: 13). Zarathustra tells the **higher men** that they must be stouthearted and have "eagles' courage" to stare into the abyss: "Not courage in the presence of witnesses, but hermits' and eagles' courage" (*Za*, IV; "Of the Higher Man," 4). His eagle and serpent comfort him after he has realized the immensity of the task of teaching the doctrine of **eternal return**.

The dog that barks dementedly at the shepherd (Zarathustra) who has swallowed a snake (*Za*, III: "Of the Vision and the Riddle," 2) is probably based on Nietzsche's childhood memory of when his father fell down some steps and set the dog barking. The accident, which damaged Carl Ludwig Nietzsche's brain (though he might already have been ill), was to prove fatal. Nietzsche was left with a (justified) fear that brain disease might be endemic in his family. The serpent that has embedded itself in the shepherd's throat is an allegorical motif to denote the burden that Zarathustra must take on himself before he can become the *Übermensch*. That Zarathustra is the shepherd is clear when he later recalls "how that monster crept into my throat and choked me!" (*Za*, III: "The Convalescent," 2).

The lion (*Löwe*)—which probably inspired the image of the blond beast—symbolizes courage. At the beginning of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Zarathustra names three metamorphoses of the spirit—"how the spirit shall become a camel, and the camel a lion, and the lion at last a **child**" (*Za*, I: "Of the Three Metamorphoses"). A camel is a beast of burden and represents the weight-bearing spirit, heavily laden with the superfluous and weakening things that **Christianity** has taught it, such as "to love those who despise us," while the lion is needed "to create freedom for itself and a sacred No even to duty." But only a child can say "a sacred Yes" (*Za*, I: "Of the Three

Metamorphoses”). As usual with Nietzsche’s symbols, the image of the lion has several layers of meaning. The rampant lion traditionally evokes mettle and can represent male vigor; Nietzsche could also be making a **veiled** and sardonic reference to his unsuccessful proposal (May 1882) to **Lou Andreas-Salomé** at the lion’s grotto (*Löwengarten*) in Lucerne. Zarathustra’s lion is destined to metamorphose into a child, another way of saying that man will have the chance of a new beginning as *Übermensch*. The roar that heralds the arrival of the gentle lion (together with a flock of doves) at the end of the book provides Zarathustra with the sign he needed that his “great noon-tide” has begun (*Za*, IV: “The Sign”).

There are many more animal images in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. The ass introduced in part 4 of *Zarathustra* is also a symbolic beast, evoking the humiliation of Christ’s entry into Jerusalem on an ass (Mark 11.7) while also demonstrating the stupidity of Zarathustra’s guests, who have begun to worship the ass (*Za*, IV: “The Awakening,” 1–2). Zarathustra finds them on their knees before the gray ass, in a parody of the golden calf worshipped by the Israelites during the absence of Moses on Mount Sinai (Exodus 32). Zarathustra’s ass has become a yea-sayer, braying “yea” (in German, “IA,” “hee haw,” sounds like “JA”) in answer to the **higher men**, whose litany is a spoof on the **neo-Pietist** way of prayer.

The fate-spinning spider and the cat with hidden claws are evoked at various times in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and elsewhere, sometimes in connection with **woman** and her guile and at other times as pure **metaphor**, as in the description of the passing clouds as “stealthy cats of prey” (*Za*, III: “Before Sunrise”). Meanwhile, an adder’s bite gives Zarathustra the chance to explain his parable that it is better to curse one’s enemy than to love him (*Za*, I: “Of the Adder’s Bite”). Nietzsche usually uses animal imagery to provide a humorous but telling example of the lesson he wishes to convey, which is that man must remember that he, too, is an animal who must retrieve his instinctual **life** or else succumb to *décadence*.

**THE ANTI-CHRIST (DER ANTICHRIST) (1895)**. Subtitled *Curse on Christendom*, Nietzsche wrote this late work as a first installment of a planned four-part *Umwertung aller Werte* (**Revaluation of All Values**). He had mentioned at the end of *On the Genealogy of Morality* that

he was planning “*The Will to Power: Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values*” (*OGM*, III: 27), and a note dated 26 August 1888 shows that he still intended to write a work titled *The Will to Power*, but soon afterward he appears to have shelved the idea, probably because he had cannibalized much of the available material for use in both *The Twilight of the Idols* (at that moment under preparation for print) and *The Anti-Christ*. Nietzsche now referred to the first part of *The Revaluation of Values* as “that incredibly serious work,” meaning *The Anti-Christ* (Nietzsche to his publisher, Constantin Georg Naumann, 18 September 1888). Although by September 1888 Nietzsche had abandoned the project of turning his notes into *The Will to Power*, his sister **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche**, who published a truncated and inaccurate version of Nietzsche’s chaotic late notebooks posthumously in 1901, insisted from then on that *The Will to Power* was an entirely separate work from *The Revaluation of Values*, “part 1” of which had already been published as *The Anti-Christ*. One of Nietzsche’s original plans for the four parts of *The Revaluation of Values* was as follows:

Book I: The Anti-Christ; Attempt at a Critique of Christianity

Book II: **The Free Spirit**; Critique of Philosophy as a **Nihilistic Movement**

Book III: The Immoralist; Critique of the Most Disastrous Kind of Ignorance, **Morality**

Book IV: **Dionysos**; Philosophy of the Eternal Future

This plan, dated 17 March 1887, reveals an overlap with much of the material subsequently published by Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche as *The Will to Power*, especially in view of Nietzsche’s projections for books 2 and 3 of both works. Elisabeth periodically lamented the (entirely spurious) “lost Dionysus” manuscript for several decades. Yet, however questionable an editor Nietzsche’s sister was, we have to thank her for overseeing the publication of *The Anti-Christ* in 1895 and for dissuading her mother, **Franziska Nietzsche**, from destroying the manuscript on religious grounds.

In spite of the common view that *The Anti-Christ* was a work written when Nietzsche was losing his mental powers prior to his collapse in early 1889, there is no reason to believe that the vitriolic attack on **Christianity** in it is anything other than a culmination of sober deliberation. In the original German, the title *Der Antichrist* offers two translations, “The Anti-Christ” and “The Anti-Christian,”

and probably both are intended. Nietzsche palpably enjoys hurling insults at Christianity throughout the short work. A fatal flaw in Christianity is that it stresses the meaningless of this **life** in comparison with the life to come: “Ah this humble, chaste, compassionate mendaciousness!” (A-C: 44). Paradoxically, in the middle section of the work, Nietzsche provides a moving portrait of Jesus Christ, the unique teacher, a man vastly superior to his followers and completely lacking in **ressentiment**, even in so near a matter as the manner of his own death. Nietzsche declares that the disciples were the first to resent the crucifixion, and ever since, the spirit of revenge has dominated Christian **morality**, encouraging negative values and preventing life **affirmation**.

In his lament that the whole Greco-Roman civilization existed “*in vain*” (A-C: 59), Nietzsche brands the **Jewish** tradition as chief instrument in the downfall of the great Roman Empire and its elite; Judaism, as a **slave** religion dominated by the priest, was the ideal bed from which Christianity could spring. Nietzsche constantly reminds his readers that Jesus, his disciples, and the early Christians were all Jews, as well as Saint Paul, who is singled out as the great destroyer of Rome: “What he divined was that with the aid of the little sectarian movement on the edge of Judaism one could ignite a ‘world conflagration,’ that with the symbol ‘God on the Cross’ one could sum up everything down-trodden, everything in secret revolt, the entire heritage of anarchist agitation in the Empire into a tremendous power” (A-C: 58). The book draws to a close with a triumphant flurry: “I call Christianity the *one* great curse, the *one* great intrinsic depravity, the *one* great instinct for revenge for which no expedient is sufficiently poisonous, secret, subterranean, *petty*—I call it the *one* immortal blemish of mankind . . .,” and ends with the reminder, more for Nietzsche than for us, that it is time for a “Revaluation of values!” (AC: 62). But Nietzsche had run out of time.

**ANTI-SEMITISM.** Nietzsche was completely hostile to anti-Semitism, which is one of the reasons why he broke off his **friendship** with **Richard Wagner**. As he wrote in his late essay *Nietzsche contra Wagner*, “Since Wagner returned to Germany he succumbed step by step to everything I despise—even to anti-Semitism” (NW: “How I Detached Myself from Wagner”). Throughout his oeuvre,

Nietzsche criticized the prevalence of anti-Semitism in Germany; for example, in *Beyond Good and Evil* he suggested, “It would perhaps be a good idea to eject the anti-Semitic ranters from the country” (BGE, VIII: 251). Nevertheless, he made a number of remarks that could be used as ammunition for **National Socialism** if taken out of context. For example, Nietzsche was actually *attacking* the typical German attitude to the **Jews** when he used the phrase “Let in no more Jews!” (BGE, VIII: 251). It was Nietzsche’s misfortune that his sister **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** had married an inveterate anti-Semite, **Bernhard Förster**; this raised her credit with the **National Socialists** as they gained power, making Förster, who died in 1889, into a posthumous hero. Her unscrupulous treatment of Nietzsche’s literary estate included a rapprochement between the National Socialists and the *Nietzsche-Archiv* that inevitably tarnished Nietzsche’s reputation by association. *See also* HITLER, ADOLF.

**APOLLO/APOLLONIAN.** In ancient **Greek** mythology, Apollo was the sun god who ordered **rationalism** and self-discipline in human **nature**. As such, he was the embodiment of male beauty. In Nietzsche’s *The Birth of Tragedy*, Apollo is the counterpart of **Dionysus**, and both are used as shorthand for the psychic modes of creative experience, with the Apollonian representing clarity of expression through a dreamlike state that incorporates illusion and the Dionysian expressing surrender to orgiastic chaos. Yet, however much Nietzsche tried to make Apollo the counterpart of Dionysus, he remains insipid in contrast to the dynamic, passionate Dionysus.

Nietzsche’s original understanding of Apollo was inspired by the ancient Indian concept of Maya (illusion), which taught that the reality of the cosmos is simply what Isvara (the personal expression of Brahma) has called into being. **Arthur Schopenhauer** refined this by positing that the **veil** of Maya is a protective device for human beings who could otherwise not withstand the force of **nihilism**. Nietzsche surmised that the Homeric Greeks were able to transcend the horror of **life** by an **artistic** form of “wish fulfillment”: “Self-deception is at the heart of the Apollonian solution to **pessimism**” (Julian Ingle, *Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Art*, 1992).

Crucified,” and to Cosima, on 3 January 1889, the day he collapsed, he sent a letter that began “To Princess Ariadne, my beloved.”

*Ariadne* was also the title of the *Jahrbuch* of the *Nietzsche-Gesellschaft*, intended as a yearbook, but it actually appeared only once, in 1925 (*Nietzsche-Gesellschaft* Press, Munich). The editorial committee consisted of **Ernst Bertram**, **Hugo von Hofmannsthal**, **Lev Shestov**, Heinrich Wölfflin, and Friedrich Würzbach. In addition to articles by Bertram, Hofmannsthal, Shestov, **André Gide**, and **Thomas Mann**, the volume contains *Das trunkene Schiff*, a translation into German of Arthur Rimbaud’s *Bateau Ivre*, and Friedrich Würzbach’s report on the delegation of the *Nietzsche-Gesellschaft* to the Fifth International Philosophy Congress held in Naples in May 1924.

**ARISTOCRATIC VALUES OR THE NOBLE IDEAL (*DIE ARISTOKRATISCHEN WERTE/DAS VORNEHME IDEAL*)**. Nietzsche argued that the noble or aristocratic individual of antiquity was characteristically unreflecting: not weakened by emotions such as **pity**, he possessed hardness of spirit and courage and believed in a natural order of rank. Such men were the creators of values out of **pathos of distance** or acknowledged superiority to those below. In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche explains how aristocratic values determined who was “good,” meaning “the noble, the mighty, the high-placed and the high-minded” (*OGM*, I: 2), while a “bad” person was originally just humble or poor “with no derogatory implication” (*OGM*, I: 4). (Nietzsche uses the word *schlecht*, but in English the same argument can be made with the word “villain” from “villein,” a feudal serf.) The sovereign individual of prehistory was someone who could make a promise and “confers an honor when he places his trust” (*OGM*, II: 2). Nietzsche believed that **Christianity**, by preaching humility, had systematically destroyed aristocratic values; this has led to the development of **ressentiment** in the mass or **herd**, where all spontaneity and joy has been expunged from **life**: “Only those who suffer are good, only the poor, the powerless, the lowly are good . . . whereas you rich, the noble and powerful, you are eternally wretched, cursed and damned!” (*OGM*, I: 7). The antidote is for a **re-valuation of values** to take place and for **master morality** to replace **slave morality**. See also BLOND BEAST; THE GREEKS.

**ART (DIE KUNST) AND ARTISTS.** *See* AESTHETICS.

**THE ASCETIC IDEAL (DAS ASKETISCHE IDEAL).** According to Nietzsche, the ascetic ideal arises when **suffering** is given significance. It comprises all that conventional religions preach to engender suffering in man, who, blindly obeying the **slave morality** that declares such things as pity, humility, and weakness to be “good,” is racked with guilt because he can never achieve the correct level of self-abasement and is doomed to suffer agonies of guilt, simply from acting **naturally**. Formerly, man had no problem with suffering itself: the problem arose when he needed a *reason* for it, and “*the ascetic ideal offered man a meaning!*” (*OGM*, III: 28). According to the ascetic ideal, the enjoyment of **bodily** pleasures and pursuit of **aristocratic values** are “sinful” and “evil.” Nietzsche points out that “good” and “evil” are not fixed **truths**; there are no moral facts but only interpretations of the same, and “an ascetic **life** is a self-contradiction” (*OGM*, III: 11). Nietzsche concedes that the ascetic ideal’s imposition of a set of negative values, with the consent of the majority of a given population, indicates that it is remarkably virulent. The ascetic ideal gives substance, meaning, and power to the **ascetic priest**. Nietzsche’s solution is for man to embrace **nihilism** and abandon **ressentiment**. *See also* SEXUALITY.

**THE ASCETIC PRIEST (DER ASKETISCHE PRIESTER).**

Nietzsche argues that it is a paradox that the ascetic priest derives his authority and power from the fundamentally sterile **ascetic ideal**. “It must be a necessity of the first rank that makes this species continually grow and prosper when it is *hostile to life—life itself must have an interest* in preserving such a self-contradictory type” (*OGM*, III: 11). Hence, Nietzsche surmises that the **will to power** is in operation through this system. Throughout *On the Genealogy of Morality*, he describes the damaging effect the ascetic priest has on the psychological development of a people. Nietzsche’s chief targets are priests of the **Judeo-Christian** tradition, who have denigrated the **bodily** instincts and **drives** and encouraged followers to believe in a **God** who will reward present unhappiness with future bliss. Within this system of **ressentiment**, the weak will become powerful in heaven, and the

*eines Unpolitischen*, 1918 (*Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man*, 1983), and the two men were close colleagues in the early 1920s but went separate ways after World War I, with Mann diverting his attention to the ailing Weimar Republic and Bertram turning to the right in politics. After World War II, Bertram was investigated for his involvement with **National Socialism**, the chief cause of suspicion being that he had written a book on Nietzsche, who was regarded with deep mistrust by the occupying powers. The fault lay not with Nietzsche, however, but with Bertram's "*völkisch* appropriation of Nietzsche and his transfiguration into a Germanic right-wing prophet" (Steven Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany*, 1992). Refer to Inge Jens, ed., *Thomas Mann und Ernst Bertram: Briefe aus den Jahren 1910–1955* (1960). See also VOLK.

**BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL (JENSEITS VON GUT UND BÖSE, 1886)**. Subtitled *Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, Beyond Good and Evil* contains Nietzsche's full-scale attack on **socialism**, **democracy**, and **feminism** as well as his claim to be a good **European** in the **cultural** rather than the political sense. Nietzsche's rhetoric is directed against the cultural degeneration of his day, but he first attacks the Stoics for their wrong-headed "love of truth," which actually amounts to self-tyranny and is, unlike all claims made by the Stoics, against **nature**. Stoical practice is also a manifestation of the **will to power**, for "philosophy is this tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power . . ." (*BGE*, I: 9). Further mentions of the will to power stress its efficiency as a **force** (*BGE*, II: 36) and highlight its capacity to "play the master," whether in the Stoics' "indifference and statuesque coldness towards the passionate folly of the emotions" or in the reduction of emotion to the average mean, "the Aristotelianism of morals" (*BGE*, V: 198). Nietzsche berates philosophers for hiding behind "**masks** and subtlety" (*BGE*, II: 25) to generate misunderstanding. A person who cannot be direct in his dealings builds up a mask that is then projected by others back onto his persona. A central purpose for Nietzsche in this work is to establish how seriously philosophers have mistaken what is "true." We are nothing but our memory and our mental states, combined with the society to which we belong. **Perspectivism**, with Nietzsche, always has this dimension of an assumed **historical** and cultural context.

Some of the passages in this work are notoriously misogynist. From his opening words in the preface, “Supposing **truth** to be a **woman** . . .” (*BGE*: preface), Nietzsche provokes his reader into a debate on **feminism**, attacking the **eternal feminine** and woman’s incapacity for truth: “—her great art is the lie, her supreme concern is appearance and beauty” (*BGE*, VII: 232). Oriental seclusion is Nietzsche’s answer to women’s demand for equal rights (*BGE*, VII: 238/9). In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche constantly challenges accepted values, like those enshrined in the terms “good” and “evil.” He highlights the fact that in **slave** and **master morality**, values are reversed: in slave morality, those who are evil inspire fear; in master morality, those who are good inspire fear, while the bad man “is judged contemptible” (*BGE*, IX: 260). Nietzsche condemns the best efforts of English **utilitarians** (commonly viewed as well-meaning) for producing “European vulgarity, the plebianism of modern ideas” (*BGE*, VIII: 253), while in France, those with taste reject “the raving stupidity and the noisy yapping of the democratic bourgeois” (*BGE*, VIII: 254). Today, the word “**democratic**” is so overlaid with merit that Nietzsche would scarcely recognize it. For Nietzsche, democracy heralded a weakening of civilization and signaled a decline in the political organization of the state and in man himself. The result was the “*collective degeneration of man*” (*BGE*, V: 203; italics in the original). He praises the **Jews** for keeping their race strong and pure “by means of virtues which one would like to stamp as vices” (*BGE*, VIII: 251)—that is, by resistance to change. Nietzsche believed that we have reached an impasse: the only way to go beyond **nihilism** is to create new **values** that reach beyond the false or simplistic categories of good and evil.

**THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY (DIE GEBURT DER TRAGÖDIE, 1872).** Nietzsche’s first work of note. Originally subtitled *Out of the Spirit of Music*, Nietzsche altered the title to *The Birth of Tragedy Or: Hellenism and Pessimism* in 1886. Although some have viewed this as Nietzsche’s best work, it aroused bitter controversy when it was first published. **Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff** produced a devastating critique that **Erwin Rohde** attempted to refute. Nietzsche wrote *The Birth of Tragedy* at a time when he was most under the spell of **Arthur Schopenhauer** and **Richard Wagner**.

R. J. Hollingdale comments, “The Wagnerian-Schopenhauerian outlook dominates Nietzsche’s first book, *The Birth of Tragedy*, which begins as a study of the **Greeks** and ends as a polemic for Wagnerian opera” (R. J. Hollingdale, *Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy*, 1999). Nietzsche had heard a performance of the introduction to *Tristan and Isolde* in Munich in 1865 and had been struck by Wagner’s use of dissonance to reflect in **music** the chaos and pain of reality. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche seeks to distinguish between two modes of experiencing **aesthetics**. The **Apollonian** is the calm state of lightness and clarity that we experience in certain lucid dreamlike states. It is expressed in Greek sculpture, epic poetry, and Doric architecture—any art form that requires formal control coupled with lightness of feeling. The **Dionysian**, associated from the first page with the art of music, is the state of wild intoxication in which we gain mystical insight into the unified source of all being. Schopenhauer thought music was a **symbol** of the will and could not be represented, but Nietzsche was sure that it could and should, as a necessary part of its manifestation. Music quintessentially represents the *Urgund*, as it is an art that can exist only through performance. Whereas Apollo’s music, set to the lyre, needs words and is thus an imitation of the original, Dionysian music springs from a deep instinctual original base (“*das Ur-Eine*”) that incorporates change and flux as well as the flow of **life**. Here, man can experience *Rausch*:

In the Dionysian dithyramb man is incited to the greatest exaltation of all his **symbolic** faculties; something never before experienced struggles for utterance—the annihilation of the **veil** of *maya*, oneness as the soul of the race and of **nature** itself. (*BT*, 2)

Nietzsche established that Dionysian man should recognize within himself the primeval impulses that make him human, however licentious or “immoral” these appear to be on the surface. At some point, he argues, Dionysian abandonment, embracing both ecstasy and cruelty, was supplanted by Apollonian restraint: the ancient Greeks respected their gods and made religion and aesthetics part of their cultural norm, internalizing much of the dynamism that accompanied the dichotomy between Apollo and Dionysus. For Nietzsche at that time, dynamism meant contest, as he set out in an essay written at this time, *Homer’s Contest*. Greek culture had reached its pinnacle in the

**tragedies** that marked the annual public celebration of Dionysus. He believed that Dionysus continued to be the only hero in drama right through to the plays of Euripides, at which point a new **rationalism** emerged, inspired by **Socrates**. In fact, Nietzsche blamed Socrates for the extinction of attic **Greek tragedy**, at its zenith in the work of Aeschylus and his peers, who combined the Apollonian and the Dionysian to the highest degree: Apollonian elements of dialogue and character portrayal are set against a fundamentally Dionysian state of primeval being. In 1886, Nietzsche added an “Attempt at a Self-Criticism” as a preface to the book, where he admitted that he had not used his own **language** sufficiently and that it had been a mistake to bring in Wagner and modern themes.

As regards reception, *The Birth of Tragedy* undoubtedly damaged Nietzsche’s career. He was meant to be an expert on philology; his colleagues expected scholarship from him, not intuition. The book became immensely popular only around the fin de siècle, when it coincided with the rise of the **sexuality** debates and the publication of **Sigmund Freud**’s first book, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900). On its own terms, *The Birth of Tragedy* fails, as the dichotomy between Dionysus and Apollo is not convincing; indeed, in his later work, Nietzsche jettisoned Apollo or, rather, merged his creative function into that of Dionysus. From his comments in the *Will to Power*, it is clear that Nietzsche recognized this and belatedly tried to rationalize his procedure:

I was concerned with nothing except to guess why precisely Apollinism [*sic*] had to grow out of a Dionysian subsoil; why the Dionysian Greek needed to become Apollinian; that is, to break his will to the terrible, multifarious, uncertain, frightful, upon a will to measure, to simplicity, to submission to rule and concept. (*WP*, IV: 1050)

Refer to Karlfried Gründer, *Der Streit um Nietzsches “Geburt der Tragödie”* (*The Quarrel over Nietzsche’s “Birth of Tragedy,”* 1989).

**BISMARCK, OTTO VON (1815–1898)**. German statesman. From the Junker class, Bismarck was appointed prime minister of Prussia by King William I in 1862. From then on, it became his mission to detach Prussian interests from those of the unwieldy but hegemonic Austro-Hungarian Empire; this was engineered by means of the short-lived

Russian symbolism was constituted, comprising chiefly Blok, Bely, and **Vyacheslov Ivanov** and manifesting a mystical Christian eroticism that also combined a **Dionysian** appreciation of **music**.

For Blok, full of prescience about coming disasters, events came with a musical accompaniment: he was haunted by noises announcing the end of the world. Although he welcomed the 1905 Revolution and was disappointed by its failure, his stance on events in 1917 was fundamentally apocalyptic. There is an underlying sadness in his farcical first play, *Balaganchik (The Puppet Show)*, published in the journal *Torches* in April 1906 and first performed in St. Petersburg in December that same year. The production, staged by Vsevolod Meyerhold, was greeted with a mixed reception, the tragedy of Pierrot and Columbine containing rather too many allusions to the eternal triangle of Blok, his wife, and Bely for comfort. Blok's tragic view of life was confirmed by journeys to Italy (1909), Brittany (1911), and Biarritz (1913). He took a savage pleasure in hearing of the sinking of the *Titanic*, finding it reassuring that the chaotic elements were able to assert their control over rational man. In a final talk on the mission of the poet given in 1921, he stated that the poet should stand at the seashore or in the depth of a forest to listen to the sounds that emanate from chaotic nature. He should then find a harmonious way of imparting these sounds amongst men. Blok's "swan song" thus pays indirect homage to Nietzsche by stressing the need for **art** to mediate between two types of music, the Dionysian and the **Apolonian**. Refer to Raoul Labon, "Alexandre Blok et Nietzsche," *Revue d'études slaves* 27 (1951).

**THE BLOND BEAST (DIE BLONDE BESTIE)**. Nietzsche used this image in two works: four times in *On the Genealogy of Morality* and once in *Twilight of the Idols*. It is by no means a recurrent **metaphor** for Teutonic belligerence; in fact, the contrary is true, as the passages written by Nietzsche make plain. In section 1 of the first essay of *On the Genealogy of Morality*, the phrase is used three times to represent rapacious but natural man of the noble type familiar to the ancient **Greeks**:

At the centre of all these noble races we cannot fail to see the beast of prey, the magnificent *blond beast* avidly prowling round for spoil and victory; this hidden centre needs release from time to time, the beast

must out again, must return to the wild:—Roman, Arabian, Germanic, Japanese nobility, Homeric heroes, Scandinavian Vikings—in this relationship they were all alike. . . . The deep and icy mistrust which the German arouses as soon as he comes to power, which we see even today—is still the aftermath of that inextinguishable horror with which Europe viewed the raging of the blond Germanic beast for centuries. . . . We may be quite justified in retaining our fear of the blond beast at the centre of every noble race and remain on our guard: but who would not, a hundred times over, prefer to fear if he can admire at the same time, rather than *not* fear, but permanently retain the disgusting spectacle of the failed, the stunted, the wasted away and the poisoned? (*OGM*, I: 11)

In the second essay of *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche uses the phrase once more to describe how the oldest form of “state” emerged from tyranny:

I used the word “state”: it is obvious what is meant by this—some pack of blond beasts of prey, a conqueror and a master race, which, organized on a war footing and with the power to organize, unscrupulously lays its dreadful paws on a populace . . . (*OGM*, II: 17)

Returning to the concept once more in his late work, Nietzsche commented that the Church was responsible for emasculating the Germanic nobility:

In the early Middle Ages, when the Church was in fact above all a menagerie, one everywhere hunted down the fairest specimens of the “blond beast”—one “improved,” for example, the noble Teutons. But what did such a Teuton afterwards look like when he had been “improved” and led into a monastery? Like a caricature of a human being, like an abortion . . . (*TI*: “The ‘Improvers’ of Mankind”: 2)

Although not everyone would agree with Nietzsche that “*not* to fear” is a hideous sign of *décadence*, his remarks clearly lament modern man’s lack of fire in his belly; they certainly do not support the interpretation that Nietzsche approved of a racially superior blond and blue-eyed type, the corruption peddled by the **National Socialists** along with their general misappropriation of Nietzsche’s concept of the **will to power**. In fact, the blondness of the beast harks back to Zarathustra’s lion. That said, Nietzsche scholars often find that their first task is to correct the widespread but erroneous impression that Nietzsche’s works directly incite violence and **war**, led on by the slogan of the “blond beast.” *See also* ANIMALS.

**THE BLUE RIDER.** *See* DER BLAUE REITER.

**BODY.** Nietzsche's chief objection to the **ascetic ideal** was that it taught man to despise his own body. Philosophers have nearly always followed the example of the **ascetic priest** in living a desensitized **life**. Nietzsche resolutely refused to accept the split of body from mind propounded by **René Descartes**, and, in his early works at least, he tried to adhere to the notion that consciousness always has a physiological explanation and is in any case a sign of decline, not advance, in man: "To *have* to combat one's instincts—that is the formula for **décadence**: as long as life is *ascending*, happiness and instinct are one" (*TI*, "The Problem of Socrates": 11). In his later works, Nietzsche's emphasis on **perspectivism** led him to deny the stability of the subject. In *The Will to Power*, Nietzsche makes "the body and physiology the starting point" (*WP*, III: 492) for a reconnoiter of the subject. *See also* DRIVE; NATURE/NATURAL.

**BÖLSCHKE, WILHELM (1861–1939).** German biologist. Bölsche, who mixed with the circle around **Richard Dehmel** in Berlin, took an early critical stance toward Nietzsche in his hostile article "*Die Gefahren der Nietzscheschen Philosophie*" ("The Dangers of the Nietzschean Philosophy"), which appeared in *Die freie Bühne* (1893). In his seminal work *Das Liebesleben in der Natur (Love-Life in Nature)*, 1898–1901, Bölsche argues for the interconnection of all living things, regarding propagation of even the humblest cellular structures as "love," and therefore the hope of the planet. His work influenced the thinking of **Lou Andreas-Salomé** in her discussions of female **sexuality**, especially the notion that "evolution is optimism" (Angela Livingstone, *Lou Andreas Salomé*, 1984). For Bölsche, whose other major work was *Die naturwissenschaftlichen Grundlagen der Poesie (The Scientific Bases of Poetry)*, 1887, Nietzsche's antipositivism was a cardinal error. Although Bölsche was rigorously positivistic in his approach, he agreed with the **Darwinist** scientist **Ernst Haeckel** that each cell might have a psychic capacity and therefore that there is an unknowable world behind the one that the scientist discovers.

**BORGES, JORGE LUIS (1899–1986).** Argentinian writer. Borges is famed for his short stories, such as the collection *Ficciones* (1962;

Wagner in Bayreuth” (the fourth of the *Untimely Meditations*), since he seems to be unaware of Nietzsche’s later vitriol against Wagner. Like Nietzsche himself, Chamberlain was closely involved with the circle round Wagner, albeit at a slightly later date; he enthusiastically endorsed Wagner’s project of recreating a German *Volk* in tune with a mythological past **German culture**.

Chamberlain, who wrote in German and died in Bayreuth, published his groundbreaking *Die Grundlagen des 19. Jahrhunderts* (*The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*) in 1899. In this work, he mentions Nietzsche only en passant, in a footnote where Nietzsche’s thought is compared to that of **Baruch Spinoza**. The work consciously elaborates a myth of Teutonic racial superiority within a general discussion of creativity. In 1900, Georg Tanzscher, in his *Friedrich Nietzsche und die Neuromantik. Eine Zeitstudie* (*Friedrich Nietzsche and New Romanticism: A Study of the Period*), warned against the Nietzsche-inspired trend toward individualism and subjectivity in such writers as Chamberlain and a host of others (such as **Hugo von Hofmannsthal** and **Stefan George**).

**CHILD.** In the opening section of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, **Zarathustra** declares that the spirit must go through three metamorphoses, from the camel to lion to child. With regard to the child, Zarathustra wants man to become innocent, not in the humbling sense demanded in **Christian** doctrine but so that he can learn to be the *Übermensch*: “A child is concealed in the true man: it wants to play” (*Za*, I: “Of Old and Young Women”). All Zarathustra’s **symbolic** references to the child are targeted at the weakening effect of the Christian image of the child. Nietzsche is also alluding to the newly converted “*Erweckten*,” or neo-**Pietists**, who believed the Christian should be as a child before God, following a command from Jesus that we should “become as little children” before we can enter the Kingdom of God (Matthew 18:3). Nietzsche must have heard his mother **Franziska Nietzsche** reciting this biblical reference on hundreds of occasions. Zarathustra sarcastically echoes it verbatim to his followers, the **Higher Men** (*Za*, IV: “The Ass Festival,” 2); this is one of the reasons why Nietzsche’s sister **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** initially found part 4 of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* too blasphemous to publish.

What Nietzsche produces through his child imagery in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is a dynamic symbol of untarnished energy: “The child is innocence and forgetfulness, a new beginning, a sport, a self-propelling wheel, a first motion, a sacred Yes” (*Za*, I: “Of the Three Metamorphoses”). Hence, the metamorphosis of the spirit, in its final stage of a child, will be light-hearted and liberated. No longer burdened by the central statement in the Lord’s Prayer, “thy will be done” (Matthew 6:9–13), the spirit “now wills *its own will*” (*Za*, I: “Of the Three Metamorphoses”). This is a fundamental premise of the **will to power**.

**CHRISTIANITY.** Nietzsche was from a deeply religious household and did not abandon his faith until 1864. From then on, throughout his oeuvre, though especially in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, he tells the world of his contempt for **Christianity** with increasing stridency, finally lodging his harshest invective in the last work published in his lifetime, *The Anti-Christ*. Nietzsche treated the figure of Christ **symbolically** and reserved his fiercest criticism for the writers of the gospels, who “put words” into Jesus’ mouth, insisting that Christ was sacrificed for man’s sins. A disgusted Nietzsche declares, “What atrocious paganism!” (*A-C*: 41). But there was worse to come:

On the heels of the “glad tidings” came the *worst of all*: those of Paul. In St. Paul was embodied the antithetical type of the “bringer of glad tidings,” the genius of hatred, of the vision of hatred, of the inexorable logic of hatred. (*A-C*: 42)

Nietzsche believed that church dogma relied on people accepting the **ascetic ideal** as peddled by the **ascetic priest**. By this means, Christianity had managed to produce a **slave morality** founded on **resentment** that was essentially **life-denying**. This was Nietzsche’s chief objection to it. To counteract Christianity, Nietzsche concentrated on stressing new qualities such as *amor fati*, which would enable people to be in touch with their own instincts and **affirm** life. His call for a **revaluation of all values** was aimed at enabling people to decide for themselves what was good and what was evil. Such a person, who could accept the death of **God** in a positive way and remain free and strong in the presence of the ascetic ideal, creating his own **morality**, would be a potential *Übermensch*. See also LUTHER, MARTIN; PIETISM.

**COGNITION.** *See* KNOWLEDGE.

**CONCEPT (DER BEGRIFF).** In his early (unpublished) essay *On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense*, written in 1873, Nietzsche describes concepts as a framework we use to structure **language**; a weaker man will cling to the framework for security, but the stronger man will smash the frame and rebuild it after his own fashion: “The liberated intellect will now be guided by intuitions rather than by concepts” (*OTLNS*). Nietzsche’s primary understanding of the term is more physiological than philosophical. In *The Gay Science* (*GS*, V: 355), Nietzsche says that self-consciousness and words go hand in hand, and in *Beyond Good and Evil*, he writes: “Words are sounds designating concepts; concepts, however, are more or less definite images designating frequently recurring and associated sensations, groups of sensations. To understand one another it is not sufficient to employ the same words; we have also to employ the same words to designate the same species of inner experiences, we must ultimately have our experience *in common*.” (*BGE*, IX: 268).

Although Nietzsche rejected the traditional treatment of the term *Begriff*, or “concept,” to define the essential nature of a thing (roundly slandering the **Kantian Ding an sich**), he frequently makes use of the word either to convey the meaning of an abstract idea, where he imports his **perspectivism** (as with “**knowledge**” or “**truth**”), or else to convey his own **metaphysic** of “fluid meaning.” In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche explains how concepts deceive and ultimately avoid definition. For example, the concept “punishment” has not evolved in a straight, logical line but as a result of the **will to power** having impressed its mastery on something less powerful. The development of a thing or tradition or organ is unpredictable. It does not follow any logical progression since “the form is fluid, the ‘meaning’ [*Sinn*] more so . . .” (*OGM*, II: 12). As a result, Nietzsche continues, “the concept ‘punishment’ presents, at a very late stage of culture [e.g., in **Europe** today], not just one meaning but a whole synthesis of ‘meanings’ [*Sinnen*].” In brief, the genealogy of a concept makes its meaning indefinable; “only something that has no **history** can be defined” (*OGM*, II: 13). The meaning of a concept is at most the value attached to it at a given time. *See also* METAPHOR.

**CONRAD, MICHAEL GEORG (1846–1927).** German writer. Conrad was a teacher at the *Deutsche Schule* (German School), first in Geneva and then in Naples, before establishing himself as a writer in Munich, where he founded the journal *Die Gesellschaft* (*Society*) with Wolfgang Kirchbach in 1885 (publication continued until 1902) and *Die Jugend* (*Youth*) in 1896 (this ceased publication in 1940). In *Der Übermensch in der Politik* (1895), Conrad was hostile toward Nietzsche, although the book's political discussion of the *Übermensch* has little to do with Nietzsche's visionary creation. Like many critics, Conrad deplored the reduction of Nietzsche's thought to banalities without quite realizing that he might be accused of the same thing; however, he vigorously promoted Nietzsche's work in his two journals. His futuristic novel *In purpurner Finsternis* (*In Purple Darkness*), published in 1895, has a Polish hero, "Zarathustra-Nietzischki," a clear reference to the rumor, propagated by Nietzsche himself, that he stemmed from Polish ancestors. The book is full of a wildly visionary "Zarathustratismus," a word Conrad coined within it.

**CONRADI, HERMANN (1862–1890).** German writer and early Nietzsche enthusiast. Conradi read *Beyond Good and Evil* in 1886 but was much more impressed by *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, which he read in Leipzig, where he frequented the circle of the Danish Wagner admirer Rosalie Nielsen. His poem *Triumph des Übermenschen* (1887) hails *Daseinsfreude* (joy in existence); his novel *Phrasen* (1887), based on his experiences as a student at Leipzig University, documents, albeit unwittingly, the way Nietzschean themes and terminology were being carried over into German literature. He was angered and dismayed by the hostile criticism of his school friend **Johannes Schlaf**, who in 1887 labeled Nietzsche a "parasite" (*Allgemeine Deutsche Universitätszeitung*). Conradi's realist novel *Adam Mensch* (1889) showed great promise, but he died in the following year, aged only 28.

**CONSCIENCE AND BAD CONSCIENCE.** Nietzsche's most consistent explanation of conscience and bad conscience is found in *On the Genealogy of Morality*, where he states, "Bad conscience is a sickness" (*OGM*, II: 19). In prehistory, the system of debt (*Schuld*)

involved payment, and guilt and sin were not part of any transaction. Once **slave morality** had taken hold in **Judaism** and **Christianity**, the **ascetic priests**, eager to seize power for themselves, persuaded the **herd** of its superiority to those of higher rank; it was “good” to be humble and “bad” to fight. The humble would be rewarded for their privations in heaven, provided they acknowledged the reality of sin (also called *Schuld*). Conscience developed as a characteristically negative reaction of **ressentiment** to anything outside this new moral code. Now that the priests had begun to dictate slave values, the denial of man’s **natural drives** crept into **morality**. For Nietzsche, man’s conscience, internalizing this negativity, is the instinct for **cruelty** turned back on itself so that man is harmed and weakened. In this state, he succumbs to the **ascetic ideal**, which teaches him that his own guilt (at being human) has caused his **suffering**:

Man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness—this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of “bad conscience.” (*OGM*, II: 16)

Bad conscience over sins that can never be redeemed places man under terrible and permanent pressure, but at least, Nietzsche remarks sardonically, he is “saved” (*OGM*, III: 28). A cheerful and **affirmative** acknowledgment of the death of **God** is Nietzsche’s remedy.

**CONSCIOUSNESS.** *See* BODY.

**CONTEST.** *See* HOMER’S CONTEST.

**THE COSMICS.** *See* DIE KOSMIKER.

**CROCE, BENEDETTO (1889–1952).** Italian philosopher. Croce was a private scholar in Naples and briefly held a post as minister of public instruction from 1920 to 1921, which he had to relinquish because of his refusal to accept the politics of fascism. The fact that protofascist Italian thinkers and writers such as **Gabriele D’Annunzio** and **Giovanni Papini**, as well as the iconoclast **Filippo Tommaso Marinetti**, had all embraced Nietzscheanism was sufficient to make the young Croce wary of Nietzsche, although he was

receptive to the ideas of the Nietzschean **Henri Bergson**, especially the concept of *élan vital*. Croce was most influenced by **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel**, especially Hegel's belief that ideas do not represent reality—they *are* reality; however, unlike Hegel (and like Nietzsche), Croce rejected all forms of transcendence found in **German idealism**. Gradually, after a careful reading of *The Birth of Tragedy*, which he then discussed in an article titled “*Rezensione a F. Nietzsche, Le origini della tragedia*” (“Review of Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy*”), which appeared in 1907 in the periodical he had founded, *La Critica*, Croce sought to provide an unbiased critique of Nietzsche. In the light of hindsight, this can be seen to represent the liberal-scholastic tradition in Italian philosophy, as distinct from the irrational and chauvinistic avant-gardism that helped to found the ideological basis for the growth of fascism. Croce's most celebrated work is *Estetica*, 1908 (*Aesthetics*, 1922).

**CRUELTY (DIE GRAUSAMKEIT)**. A fundamental feature of man's condition. Nietzsche cautions that there is no point in being sheepish about “the great Circe ‘Cruelty’” (*BG*, VII: 229), for it arouses in man the type of intoxication that makes **art** possible. Although we turn from the notion in despair, cruelty is part of man's condition, and our body determines our reaction to it. Attic tragedy helped man to deal with his conflicting emotions toward cruelty and **suffering** by allowing him to identify with the tragic hero and thus purge himself of all harmful affects. Nietzsche argued that even **knowledge** can be tainted with cruelty, as when the man of knowledge “compels his spirit to knowledge which is *counter* to the inclination of his spirit and frequently also to the desires of his heart . . .—in all desire to know there is already a drop of cruelty” (*BGE*, VII: 229).

**CULTURE (DIE KULTUR)**. In the early essay “**David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer,**” written in 1873 just after **German** victory in the Franco-Prussian War and published as the first of the *Untimely Meditations*, Nietzsche complains that the Germans have lost sight of what German culture is. Having gained victory through military prowess, the Germans risk smothering their *Geist*: “It can only be the result of confusion if one speaks of the victory of German culture, a confusion originating in the fact that in Germany, there no

longer exists any clear conception of what culture is” (*UM*, I: “David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer”: 1). This complaint became more strident in Nietzsche’s later works; in *Ecce Homo*, he describes the **nationalism** enshrined in the national anthem, “*Deutschland, Deutschland über alles*,” as “this most *anti-cultural* sickness.” Nietzsche saw culture as a unifying principle, and his enthusiasm for **Europe** was grounded largely in his perception that a new European cultural unity was struggling to emerge; it goes without saying that he shunned any political or **democratic** unity.

– D –

**DANCE.** For Nietzsche, a method of liberating both mind and **body**. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the Nietzschean message that we should laugh, sing, and dance is repeatedly spelled out. Such levity will counteract the **heavy knowledge** of **eternal return**: “Better to dance clumsily than to walk lamely” (*Za*, IV: “Of the Higher Man,” 19). It is doubtful whether Nietzsche himself had ever learned to dance, but *The Birth of Tragedy* makes it plain that he had a grasp of its orgiastic potential. During the Modernist period, from 1890 right through to World War II, exponents of “modern” dance, as opposed to ballet, ballroom, or folk dancing, foremost among them the Russian impresario Serge Diaghilev, interpreted “Nietzschean dance” as free movement to **music**, often involving the dancer in a rapture similar to that which possessed the dancers at the festivals of **Dionysus**.

Diaghilev’s *Ballets Russes*, which he founded in 1909 and directed for two decades, took Europe by storm from its headquarters in Monte Carlo. The group’s artists included Igor Stravinsky and **Vaslav Nijinsky**. A more controversial interpretation of Nietzsche’s call for the freeing of the **drives** and instincts would be found in the theory and practice of the Parisian performance artist **Valentine de Saint-Point**. Another convinced Nietzschean was **Isadora Duncan**, who brought a flowingly expressive dance to Germany at the beginning of the century. However, the German-born Mary Wigman (orig. Marie Wiegmann) was considered the prima donna of modern dance. A student of the convinced Nietzschean **Rudolf Laban**, Wigman was renowned for her *Ausdruckstanz* (expressive dance). Her career took

anthology of Nietzsche's work in 1901, were apt to read evolutionism into Nietzsche's thought: "He has completed the work which Darwin and the other evolutionists commenced" (Thomas Common, *Nietzsche as Critic, Philosopher, Poet and Prophet*, 1901).

Recent philosophical studies have reexamined Nietzsche's hostility toward **natural science** and, in particular, his deliberate marginalization of Darwin. John Richardson claims that in spite of his overt attempt to dismiss Darwin's work, Nietzsche's thinking is "deeply and pervasively Darwinian" (John Richardson, *Nietzsche's New Darwinism*, 2004). See also NATURE/NATURAL; NATURAL SCIENCE.

**DAYBREAK (MORGENRÖTHE, 1881)**. Subtitled *Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality*, this work, comprising a preface and five sections or books, was begun in Riva, Northern Italy, in 1880, when the newly retired Nietzsche was tired and ill; writing to Georg Brandes on 10 April 1888, he called the work his "Dynamometer," written with least strength and health. It was published in July 1881 "without creating any impression on the contemporary intellectual world whatsoever" (Michael Tanner, *Daybreak*, Introduction), and it has remained Nietzsche's least-read major work. In it, Nietzsche, relishing his unbridled freedom from professional duties, allows himself to ramble through his ideas at his most shrill, although many themes in *Daybreak*, such as hostility to the German **state** and **Christianity**, continue the critique of society he had begun in the *Untimely Meditations* and *Human, All Too Human*. Such critique is also the standard fare of Nietzsche's next work, *The Gay Science*, and *Beyond Good and Evil*.

Essentially, *Daybreak* prepares the ground for Nietzsche's further deliberations on **morality**, especially in *On the Genealogy of Morality*, published six years later, although *Daybreak* lacks the organization of the latter. Nietzsche proposes that morality began with customs and was based on fear and the desire for power: "Originally everything was custom, and whoever wanted to elevate himself above it had to become a law-giver and medicine man and a kind of demi-god . . ." (*D*, I: 9). Nietzsche rules out the **metaphysical** argument that awards man the divine spark, thus setting him above the animal kingdom, the proof of which is morality. The contrary argu-

ment is true: morality belongs to the **animals**, insofar as it consists of customs and is determined by power.

In *Daybreak*, Nietzsche is prone to attack personalities in a way that can deflect attention from his intended point. He enters the fray with an assault on **Immanuel Kant**, who mendaciously held that the “truth” could be known and who, in turn, had been bitten by the tarantula, **Jean-Jacques Rousseau** (*D*, Preface: 3). The latter’s moral pronouncements on the origins of “good” and “bad” are, for Nietzsche, completely self-contradictory (*D*, III: 163). **Martin Luther** and Saint Paul attract scurrilous disdain, Luther for his creed “*credo quia absurdum est*” (I believe, although it is absurd) (*D*, Preface: 3) and Saint Paul for just being himself. The Bible is torpedoed for containing “the history of one of the most ambitious and importunate souls, of a mind as superstitious as it was cunning, the history of the apostle Paul . . .” (*D*, I: 68). **Socrates** and **Plato** are castigated for being “innocently credulous in regard to that most fateful of prejudices, that profoundest of errors, ‘that right knowledge *must be followed* by right action’—in this principle they were still the heirs of the universal madness and presumption that there exists knowledge as to the essential nature of an action” (*D*, II: 116). For a man who claims that nothing can be conclusively known, Nietzsche sometimes adopts a dogmatic tone that all but belies his point. Even so, numerous pithy insights are scattered in this work, as well as rhapsodic passages of great beauty and occasional prophecy, as in the final passage:

*We aeronauts of the spirit! . . . Will it perhaps be said of us one day that we too, steering westward, hoped to reach an India—but that it was our fate to be wrecked against infinity? Or, my brothers. Or?—* (*D*, V: 575)

Not only does Nietzsche correctly infer that air travel is just around the corner (Louis Blériot’s flight from Calais to Dover in 1909), but his metaphor encapsulates our desire to escape the confines of earthbound existence. For truly, if we can do *that*, if only in our own minds, then we are, as Nietzsche maintains, free.

**DÉCADENCE.** In contrast to the designation “decadence” for a sensuous style of art and writing in the late 19th century (such as that of Charles Baudelaire), Nietzsche’s use of the French word *décadence*

acted as a label for all that was weakening in contemporary society and **culture**. **Christianity**, **democracy**, **socialism**, and **feminism** were all signs of decadence and all anathema to Nietzsche, as they contributed to the poisonously weak **morality** of his day (which was also decadent). All things decline, and in that sense, decadence is a natural process. It is when decadence interferes with **life** that it becomes an obstacle. For example, in the late work *The Anti-Christ*, Nietzsche, having lambasted “the holy lie,” examines its purpose and concludes that Christianity has no “holy ends”:

Only *bad ends*: the poisoning, slandering, denying of life, contempt for the **body**, the denigration and self-violation of man through the **concept** sin—consequently its means too are bad. (A-C: 56)

For Nietzsche, perhaps the worst effect of *décadence* was its downgrading of cultural excellence. Because of the many things Nietzsche opposed, contemporary **European** culture was bound to disappoint him, certainly when held against the yardstick of the fearless, **aristocratically** inspired **art** of the ancient **Greeks**. He thought that the spirit of contest that characterized Greek **tragedy** was vital to the production of healthy art. In *Homer’s Contest*, he writes approvingly, “Combat and the pleasure of victory were acknowledged” (HC in OGM), unlike the complacent attitude to mediocre art in his own day.

Of course, Nietzsche’s list of *décadents* is virtually inexhaustible, beginning with Plato and other “priests of *décadence*” (A-C: 55), but his prime target was **Richard Wagner**, even though, between the years 1868 and 1876, he had been determined to see Wagner as the salvation, not just of Western music but of art itself. After 1878, Nietzsche completely turned against his former friend and mentor in the most vigorous language. In *The Case of Wagner* (1888), he dissects Wagner’s ailments and describes his as neurotic: “Wagner est une névrose” (CW, 5). Wagner became sick through dabbling in the philosophy of decadence: firstly, **Schopenhauerian pessimism**, then **nationalism** and **anti-Semitism**, and finally Christianity. In *Nietzsche contra Wagner*, also written in 1888, Nietzsche writes a less polemic and therefore more convincing account of why he thought that Wagner was, as Hollingdale puts it, “part of the artistic decadence of the latter half of the nineteenth century” (R. J. Hollingdale, *Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy*, 1999).

**DECONSTRUCTION.** **Poststructuralist** critical practice. Partly based on Nietzsche's **perspectivism**, which asserts that there is no such thing as the unified subject, deconstruction represents a philosophy of pure textuality. The widely perceived difficulty in the method stems from the fact that the chief exponents of poststructuralism—**Jacques Lacan**, **Jacques Derrida**, and **Michel Foucault**—were not literary critics by discipline (though according to David Lodge in *After Bakhtin*, 1990, it was Derrida's "deepest desire . . . to write fiction"). Deconstruction was first popularized by Derrida, who was in turn directly influenced by **Martin Heidegger's** attack on the Cartesian notion of the self. For example, Nietzsche had written in his unpublished posthumous notes, "The 'subject' is the fiction that many similar states in us are the effect of one substratum" (*WP*, III: 485). In deconstructive criticism, the only certainty in interpreting a text is the **language** itself; this, rather than the author's intention, is placed under scrutiny, and a variety of meanings that lurk within a text are teased out, with particular reference to **metaphorical** layers of meaning.

**DEHMEL, RICHARD (1863–1920).** German poet. Dehmel wrote with ecstatic flair to demonstrate his belief in mystic priapic eroticism, although he remained committed to **socialism**, as many of his poems demonstrate. He was also a fervent patriot and was awarded the Iron Cross after World War I. His circle of friends in Berlin included Otto Julius Bierbaum, **Detlev Liliencron**, **Stanislaus Przybyszewski**, **Bruno Wille**, **Wilhelm Bölsche**, **Julius Hart** and his brother Heinrich, **Arno Holz**, and **Johannes Schlaf**. Dehmel and Przybyszewski became dissatisfied with the last two named for their theories ensuring the bleakness of the **Naturalist movement**. Dehmel's encounter with Nietzsche precipitated a weeklong "possession," after which he and Przybyszewski strove for a literary renaissance of sensuality and paganism, construing this to be true Nietzscheanism. Dehmel's admiration for Nietzsche had its limits, however: he criticized the latter's vision of the *Übermensch*: "To feel oneself the equal of everyone else, that is true earthly and divine wisdom; the feeling of superiority or inferiority, that is all-too-human" (unpublished letter to Friedrich Binde, 1896). Dehmel's article "*Das Geheimnis Friedrich Nietzsches*" ("Friedrich Nietzsche's Secret") (*Neue deutsche Rundschau*,

(although Nietzsche's syphilis has never been proved conclusively). He was fortunate to find an amanuensis in the young Eric Fenby, the Delian **Peter Gast**. In an article titled "Delius the Unknown," the late Deryck Cooke wrote, "Consciously, he [Delius] put into practice Nietzsche's heroic **nihilism**: he never expressed a single regret, but lived out his Nietzschean beliefs to the end, in the fearless stoicism with which he faced his shocking affliction, the terrible pain it brought him, and his wretched death" (*The Delius Society Journal*, Spring 2005). Delius set to music various songs by Nietzsche, in particular, "Zarathustra's Night Song," "The Wanderer and his Shadow," "The Lonely One," "The Wanderer," and "Towards New Seas." The first of these, for baritone and orchestra, was first performed in London in 1899; Delius subsequently used it as the finale for the *Mass of Life* (*Messe des Lebens*, 1904–1905) for solo, choir, and orchestra; the first complete performance was held in 1909. Nietzsche was also the inspiration behind *Requiem* (1914–1916). Delius remains an obscure musician, and his works, like the wonderful *Mass of Life* or the even more neglected *Fennimore and Garda* (1910; premiered in Berlin in 1919), are largely unknown to the music public. Refer to Eric Fenby, *Delius as I Knew Him* (1936).

**DEMOCRACY.** In his early and late work, Nietzsche consistently opposed democracy, believing that it brought about a leveling down in society, but in his middle period he was more flexible. His early essays show his belief that the glory of a **state** often comes about at the expense of the weak, but he thought this was a price worth paying since the whole state benefited. His model was the system of government of ancient **Greece**, in part because of the place that was awarded to heroic myth and **art** in that society. He rethinks his strategy in *Human, All Too Human*, resigning himself to the fait accompli of democracy and wishing merely that outstanding individuals will be allowed to "refrain from politics and to step a little aside" (*HH*, I: "A Glance at the State," 439). In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche returns to the attack, declaring "the democratic movement is not merely a form assumed by political organization in decay but also a form assumed by man in decay" (*BGE*, V: 203). Nietzsche distinguished between democracy and liberal democracy; his **grand politics** uphold **aristocratic values**. Keith Ansell-Pearson writes, "What

Nietzsche understands by liberal democracy is a society which is based, among other things, on a secularisation of **Christian** values, including a levelling equality, a cult of **pity** and compassion, and an emphasis on privacy and a devaluation of politics as an arena of conflict” (Keith Ansell-Pearson, *An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker*, 1994). It is significant that Nietzsche’s confrontation with grand politics never strays far from his general concern with the regeneration of **culture**, as he stresses in *Twilight of the Idols*, “Politics devours all seriousness for really intellectual things” (*TI*, “What the Germans Lack”: 1). Refer to Lawrence Hatab, *A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy: An Experiment in Postmodern Politics* (1995).

**DEPTH (TIEFE)**. Depth (often translated as “profundity”) was not always a positive attribute for Nietzsche, who praised levity and disliked any affectation of seriousness that made things more ponderous and weighty than need be—“in all taking things seriously and thoroughly [*Tief- und Gründlich-Nehmen*], indeed, there is already a violation, a desire to hurt the fundamental will of the spirit . . .” (*BGE*, VII: 229). He used such words **metaphorically**, and a double meaning is sometimes implied, as in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, where the term is bound up with the weighty vision of **eternal return**:

*Woe says: Fade! Go!*  
*But all joy wants eternity,*  
*Wants deep, deep, deep eternity!* (Za, IV: “The Intoxicated Song,” 12)

In *The Case of Wagner*, Nietzsche accuses **Richard Wagner**’s music of deception by referring to its depth and weight at the same time: “Is a more profound [*eine tiefere*], a weightier effect to be found in the theatre? Just look at these youths—rigid, pale, breathless . . . Wagner’s **art** has the pressure of a hundred atmospheres: stoop! What else can one do?” (*CW*: 8).

**DERRIDA, JACQUES (1930–2004)**. French philosopher. Born in Algiers, Derrida was educated at the *École Normale Supérieure* in Paris and at Harvard. After four years at the Sorbonne (1960–1964), he taught at the *École Normale Supérieure*. Derrida developed a critique of Western philosophy that, following **Martin Heidegger**, he saw as full of “presence,” that is, logocentric assumptions. He did not

agree with Heidegger's premise that it might be possible to return to "some primordial state of Being when **language** was in touch with the ultimate **truths** of experience" (Christopher Norris, *Derrida*, 1987) and developed instead his method of **deconstruction**, a textual strategy based on a philosophical interpretation of the sign. He insisted that no sign is innocent of its antecedents, which are *toujours déjà* (always already) present, an insight that has much in common with Nietzsche's view, in *The Gay Science*, that we can never step aside from our accumulated experiences and hence will never know the nature of true "reality" (*GS*, I: 57). Following Nietzsche, Derrida criticized traditional hermeneutics that purport to reveal "the truth," preferring to accentuate **perspectivism**.

Derrida's most important works are *De la grammatologie*, 1967 (*Of Grammatology*, 1976), and *L'écriture et la différence*, 1967 (*Writing and Difference*, 1978). His most famous work on Nietzsche is *Éperons: Les Styles de Nietzsche*, 1978 (*Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles*, 1979), where, in spite of the title, the emphasis on **metaphor** owes much to Heidegger, who is liberally quoted. In *Spurs*, Derrida analyzes Nietzsche's description, in *The Gay Science*, of his sighting of a sailing ship, its white sails like a giant butterfly. As Nietzsche stands in the midst of foaming breakers, his thoughts travel to women and their "effect at a distance" (*GS*, II: 60). Derrida playfully inserts another layer of meaning. The sails remind *him* (Derrida) of **veils**, found in a later section of *The Gay Science*, where Nietzsche, speaking of the veiled realities of **life**, declares, "Yes, life is a **woman!**" (*GS*, IV: 339). (In French, *la voile*, "sail," and *le voile*, "veil," can produce a pun.)

Although the elegance and wit of postmodern discourse reaches its height in Derrida's exegesis, it is a moot point how much of Nietzsche's meaning is really elucidated, for all the stylish rhetoric on Nietzsche's style. That said, no postmodern Nietzschean critique could be considered complete without a reference to Derrida's *Spurs*. Refer to Ernst Behler, *Derrida-Nietzsche, Nietzsche-Derrida* (1988). See also THE NEW NIETZSCHE.

**DESCARTES, RENÉ (1596–1650).** French philosopher and mathematician. Descartes' *Discours de la méthode* (*Discourse on Method*, 1637) contained the famous dictum *cogito, ergo sum* (I think,

*Deutschland über alles*’ was, I fear, the end of German philosophy” (TI, “What the Germans Lack”: 1). *See also* EUROPE; VOLK.

**DILTHEY, WILHELM (1833–1911).** German hermeneutic philosopher. Dilthey was appointed professor of philosophy in Berlin in 1882. He is best known for his attempt to separate natural scientific analysis, which deals with laws, from social scientific analysis, which deals with motives and intentions. His own position, as set out in his *Einführung in die Geisteswissenschaften* (*Introduction to the Human Sciences*, 1883), was antinaturalistic and consistent with *Lebensphilosophie*. Dilthey envisaged a wide new discipline, “*Geisteswissenschaft*” (“human sciences”), that would comprise **history**, religion, literature, politics, **art**, law, economics, and philosophy. This new discipline would help man to give some meaning to his own life by raising his level of historical consciousness. Dilthey thought that Nietzsche’s lonely struggle toward the attainment of this historical consciousness had caused him go mad. At the beginning of the 20th century, Dilthey’s “irrationalism” was challenged, but the importance of his methodology is now recognized.

**DIODEGENES LAËRTIUS.** Third-century **Greek** historian of philosophy. In November 1866, Nietzsche’s professor of philology at Leipzig, **Friedrich Wilhelm Ritschl**, set the topic “*De Laërtii Diogenis Fontibus*” (“Sources of Diogenes Laërtes”) for an essay competition that Nietzsche won. Nietzsche’s essay was published in four parts in 1868–1869. This early success, together with his work on Theognis, impressed Ritschl so much that he recommended Nietzsche for the chair of philology in Basel when it became vacant in 1869.

**DIONYSUS/DIONYSIAN.** **Greek** god of **music** and wine, also known as Bacchus to the Romans. The licentious revels associated with him in Greece were known as *Bacchanalia*. Nietzsche builds his central argument around Dionysus in *The Birth of Tragedy*, where “the Dionysian” is used as a **symbol** to indicate a psychic state of **aesthetic** experience, in this case ecstatic abandonment, or *Rausch* (intoxication), which is often set off against the counterpart dreamlike state of lucid, controlled creativity as represented by **Apollo**. Both states are found in **Greek tragedy**, but Nietzsche gives precedence to the

Dionysian over the Apollonian. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche argued that the Greeks needed a counterbalance to the feeling of **nausea** they experienced when they glimpsed the meaningless of **life**, and this was provided in their art. The Greeks used art as a safety valve that enabled them to act without being inhibited by the terror of existence: “Now the slave is a free man . . . each one feels himself not only united, reconciled, and fused with his neighbor, but as one with him, as if the **veil** of Maya had been torn aside and were now merely fluttering in tatters before the mysterious primordial unity” (*BT*, 1).

Nietzsche never lost sight of the figure of Dionysus in his writing, returning to a definition of him in the late work *Twilight of the Idols* as a “wonderful phenomenon” who revealed to us the psychology of the Greeks:

For it is only in the Dionysian mysteries, in the psychology of the Dionysian condition, that the *fundamental fact* of the Hellenic instinct expresses itself—its “will to life.” What did the Hellene guarantee to himself in these mysteries? *Eternal life*, the eternal recurrence of life; the future promised and consecrated in the past; the triumphant Yes to life beyond death and change; *true* life as collective continuation of life though procreation, through the mysteries of **sexuality**. (*TI*, “What I Owe to the Ancients” 4)

At the end of *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche identified himself with Dionysus: “I, the last disciple of the philosopher Dionysos [*sic*] . . .” (*TI*, “What I Owe to the Ancients” 4). Several of the final notes he scribbled before he went insane are signed “Dionysus,” though a few are also signed “The Crucified,” with a couple signed for good measure as “The Anti-Christ,” and one “Nietzsche Caesar,” showing a **suffering** Nietzsche still intent on drawing out the dual structure of the relationship between Dionysus and Apollo. Ironically, in view of Nietzsche’s own insanity, the Greeks believed that those who did not welcome Dionysus would be overwhelmed with intoxication and madness.

A fashion for Dionysian cultic myth was prevalent in the **symbolist movement**, as in the circle round **Stefan George** in Germany and **Vyacheslav Ivanov** in Russia. When presenting a gift to the *Nietzsche-Archiv*, **Benito Mussolini** could think of nothing more fitting than a statue of Dionysus (see the photo spread). Refer to William J. McGrath, *Dionysian Art and Populist Politics* (1974); Julian

Young, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art* (1992); and Elvira Burgos Díaz, *Dionysos en la filosofía del joven Nietzsche (Dionysus in the Work of the Young Nietzsche)* (1993).

**DITHYRAMBS OF DIONYSUS.** Nine poems of loose structure and varying length that Nietzsche prepared for print in 1888, though they had been written during the years 1883–1888. They were published in 1892 in the first collection of Nietzsche's works, edited by **Peter Gast**. The visionary style pays homage to the **Greek** god **Dionysus**, who first appeared in Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy* as a counterpart to **Apollo** but who by 1883 had become virtually identical with the *Übermensch*. This explains the many references to **Zarathustra** in the poems, frequently expanding on incidents in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (parts of which are themselves indistinguishable from free verse). R. J. Hollingdale characterized the collection as a combination of "strongly cadenced prose and the style of compressed metaphor" (R. J. Hollingdale, *DD*, Introduction).

The *Dithyrambs of Dionysus* feature only one direct reference to Dionysus when, in the seventh poem, titled "**Ariadne's Complaint**," he replies briefly to Ariadne's much longer lament, finishing with the cryptic remark to her, "*I am thy labyrinth . . .*" (*DD*, "Ariadne's Complaint"). In ancient myth, Ariadne was abandoned by Theseus on Naxos but rescued by Dionysus. The lament in question had first appeared in the section "The Sorcerer" in the fourth book of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, in the mouth of the sorcerer **Wagner**/Theseus, at which point Zarathustra/Nietzsche sets upon him. In the *Dithyrambs of Dionysus*, the identical lament, now renamed "Ariadne's Complaint," is placed in the mouth of Ariadne/Cosima. The effect is somewhat disturbing. The poetry itself does not reveal Nietzsche's encroaching madness, but the reassignment of the lines to Ariadne indicates an unresolved conflict on Nietzsche's part toward the Wagners.

**DÖBLIN, ALFRED (1878–1957).** German writer. A physician by profession, Döblin took an intellectual rather than an **artistic** interest in Nietzsche as a philosopher. He was a medical student when he first read Nietzsche. Unlike most of his contemporary German writers, he was not spellbound by Nietzsche but instead criticized his tendency to speak in **metaphors**, to exaggerate and generalize. In two es-

one of her short novels, *Werde, die Du bist* (1894). Dohm wrote further significant polemical works for the women's movement as well as a trilogy of novels in which the female protagonists try, not very successfully, to be "Nietzschean": *Sibilla Dalmar* (1896), *Schicksale einer Seele* (*Destiny of a Soul*, 1899), and *Christa Ruhland* (1902). Refer to Gaby Pailer, *Schreibe, die du bist! Die Gestaltung weiblicher "Autorschaft" im erzählerischen Werk Hedwig Dohms* (*Write Who You Are! The Formulation of Feminine "Authorship" in Hedwig Dohm's Narrative Work*, 1994).

**DREISER, THEODORE (1871–1945)**. American novelist. Dreiser's writing represented an attempt—mostly frustrated—to overcome the unhappiness of his deprived childhood and achieve material success. A major cause of his unhappiness was the fact that he married a woman he did not love, and she refused to grant him a divorce, thus preventing him from marrying the woman he did love. A friend of **Jack London** and protégé of H. L. Mencken, Dreiser responded to Nietzsche's call for the individual to overcome **ressentiment** and rise above the **herd** in such novels as *The Titan* (1914) and *The "Genius"* (1915). In the 1920s, Dreiser became a socialist and turned away from his advocacy of the rights of the exceptional man, though he continued to engage with Nietzschean themes, as in *Hey, Rub-A-Dub-Dub! A Book of the Mystery and Wonder and Terror of Life* (1920). Here, Dreiser laments the fact that America has not yet brought forth a Nietzsche. Dreiser became increasingly disillusioned with capitalism, expressing this in his novel *An American Tragedy* (1925). Shortly before his death, Dreiser had become so disenchanted with individualism that he joined the Communist Party.

**DRIVE (DER TRIEB)**. Nietzsche held that all our natural instincts, sensual or mental, collaborate to produce thought, but he described human drives in physiological terms and disagreed with **F. A. Lange's** antimaterialist conclusions. For Nietzsche, some drives are beneficial and others are not, but none has an inherent **moral** function; a drive acquires this "when it enters into relations with drives already baptised good or evil" (*D*, I: 38). In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche writes, "To our strongest drive, the tyrant in us, not only our reason but our conscience submits" (*BGE*, IV: 158). Nietzsche

approved of strong drives but recognized that within the community the person of strong drives is seen as a threat:

When the highest and strongest drives, breaking passionately out, carry the individual far above and beyond the average and lowlands of the **herd conscience**, the self-confidence of the community goes to pieces . . . consequently, it is precisely these drives which are most branded and calumniated. (*BGE*, V: 201)

*See also* BODY; NATURE/NATURAL.

**DRUSKOWITZ, HELENE (1856–1918).** Austrian writer and philosopher. Druskowitz acquired her doctorate from Zurich University at the precociously early age of 22. Having written several mediocre plays, which incidentally display an affinity with radical **feminism**, she published a collection of three essays on English women writers (George Eliot, E. B. Browning, and Joanna Baillie) and a work on Shelley, *Percy Bysshe Shelley*, all of which Nietzsche professed to like so much that he recommended them to his mother and sister in a letter to them both (22 October 1884). Nietzsche was beginning to feel that in Druskowitz, he might have found the disciple he had wanted—and thought he had found—in **Lou Andreas-Salomé**. Druskowitz then produced several works of high philosophical quality, such as *Moderne Versuche eines Religionersatzes. Ein philosophischer Essay (Modern Attempts at a Substitute for Religion: A Philosophical Essay, 1886)*, which—to Nietzsche’s chagrin—went against his own views; Druskowitz even accused him of incitement to immorality. In an attempt to discuss how moral standards can be upheld in a religious vacuum, Druskowitz placed her faith in the essential goodness of man and his fundamental sense of social responsibility. Her attack on Nietzsche continued in *Wie ist Verantwortung und Zurechnung ohne Annahme der Willensfreiheit möglich? Eine Untersuchung (How Is Responsibility and Accountability Possible without Positing the Freedom of the Will?, 1887)*. Druskowitz became mentally insane during the 1890s.

**DÜHRING, EUGEN (1833–1921).** German philosopher and economist. Having practiced as a lawyer, Dühring lectured at Berlin University from 1864 to 1877. In *Der Wert des Lebens. Eine philosophische Betrachtung (The Value of Life: A Course in Philosophy,*

**DURCH.** A coterie founded by Conrad Küster, **Leo Berg**, and Eugen Wolff in August–September 1886 that became the *Genie-Klub*. In 1887, Wolff drew up *Ten Theses* for the society, which established the term “die Moderne” (“the moderns”) to describe the group. The members, including **Arno Holz**, **Johannes Schlaf**, **Wilhelm Bölsche**, **Bruno Wille**, **Gerhart Hauptmann**, **Julius Hart** and his brother Heinrich, as well as the **Max Stirner** enthusiast John Henry Mackay and a series of invited guests, constituted a “talking shop” to develop the theories of the **Naturalist movement** under the leadership of Leo Berg. The group kept minutes of their meetings, where the “modern” ideas of Nietzsche, Stirner, **Leo Tolstoi**, **Henrik Ibsen**, Émile Zola, and Feodor Dostoyevsky inter alia were discussed. Views in the group ranged from vigorously pro-Nietzschean to scorchingly hostile.

**DYNAMITE.** Nietzsche first mentioned the Aristotelian **concept** of *dynamis* (the Greek word for **power**) in 1887 in a note found in the *Nachgelassene Fragmente*: “Dynamis: ‘real tendency to action,’ still contained (*noch gehemmt*) and trying to actualize itself—‘will to power’” (9 [92], Autumn 1887, KSA, 12). The note follows a reference to Otto Liebmann’s *Gedanken und Tatsachen* (*Thoughts and Facts*, 1882) and indicates that Nietzsche was trying to fit the **will to power** into the scientific framework of the physics of **force**, where action is dependent on resistance. He was also aware of the new substance called “dynamite” that Alfred Bernhard Nobel had invented in 1867. Nobel’s formula for “dynamite no. 1,” as he called it, was 75 percent glycerine and 25 percent kieselguhr; this was safer to handle than glycerine alone. Nietzsche could have had the idea of potential explosivity in mind when making the cryptic comment “still contained and trying to actualise itself.” Finally, when he was on the cusp of madness, Nietzsche used the term to refer to himself. Writing to **Helen Zimmern** on 17 December 1888, à propos his recently published *Twilight of the Idols*, he declared, “I am not a man at all, I am dynamite,” repeating the same sentiment in a letter to his old school friend **Paul Deussen**—having just completed *The Anti-Christ*—“I am more dynamite than man” (Nietzsche to Deussen, 26 November 1888). Today, Nietzsche’s iconoclasm is associated with the term “dynamite” on a broader scale. The Icelandic author Birgir

Sigurdsson's play *Dinamit* (2005) deals with Nietzsche's explosive relationships with **Lou Andreas-Salomé** and his sister **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche**.

– E –

**ECCE HOMO (p.h. 1908)**. Subtitled *How One Becomes What One Is*, this was the last of Nietzsche works to be published. Apart from a piece written in his teens entitled *Aus meinem Leben* and a three-page *Vita* enclosed in his letter to Georg Brandes of 10 April 1888 (where he claims Polish ancestry as a Niëzky), Nietzsche did not write an autobiography as such, although *Ecce Homo* has autobiographical elements, discussed below. The work has a foreword, three sections titled “Why I Am So Wise,” “Why I Am So Clever,” and “Why I Write Such Good Books,” followed by ten brief chapters on Nietzsche's individual works, more or less in chronological order. Finally, there is a conclusion titled “Why I Am a Destiny.” It could be argued that Nietzsche was already prey to delusions of grandeur while at work on *Ecce Homo*; certainly, the section headings alone invite this interpretation, yet history has decreed that Nietzsche's overwhelming sense of destiny was perfectly justified.

Nietzsche's purpose in *Ecce Homo* is to give an account of how and why each of his published works was written, with his comments on their contents: in short, he bequeaths his readers a literary autobiography. In the section on *The Birth of Tragedy*, **Socrates**, not **Apollo**, has become the counterpart to **Dionysus**. In the section on the *Untimely Meditations*, Nietzsche admits that the “warlike” essays (*EH*, “The Untimely Ones”: 1) are really all about himself and his own development. The section on *Human, All Too Human* is likewise autobiographical in that Nietzsche reminds readers what happened to inspire him to write that work—he woke up one day in Bayreuth and realized he was a stranger: “There was nothing I recognized; I scarcely recognized **Wagner**” (*EH*, “Human, All Too Human” 2). *Daybreak*, *The Gay Science*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, and *On the Genealogy of Morality* all receive surprisingly brief mention, though as one might expect, the section on *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is much fuller. Here, Zarathustra has become Dionysus, enabling

Nietzsche (who identified increasingly with Dionysus) to write: “Who beside me knows what **Ariadne** is!” (*EH*, “Thus Spoke Zarathustra”: 8)—an oblique reference to **Cosima Wagner**. In the section on *The Case of Wagner*, Nietzsche attacks the Germans rather than Richard Wagner: “the Germans are *canaille* [rabble]” (*EH*, “The Case of Wagner”: 4). This section of *Ecce Homo* ends with a trumpet voluntary for “the lightning bolt of the *Revaluation*”—later to become *The Will to Power*—but omits discussion of *The Anti-Christ*, *Nietzsche contra Wagner*, or the *Dithyrambs of Dionysus*, all finished but awaiting publication. On the brink of insanity when he wrote *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche, though provocative and reckless, still produced a shrewd critique of his own works. As he remarked to Naumann caustically in a letter dated 19 November 1888 that he might as well write his own reviews, as nobody else had yet done so.

Nietzsche’s heightened state of awareness when writing this work reveals itself in his satirical, self-parodying mood, but he is also more bitter in his attacks than elsewhere, as well as more personal: “To think German, to feel German—I can do anything, but not that” (*EH*, “Why I Write Such Good Books”: 2). Unfortunately, some of his remarks on **women** in the third section of *Ecce Homo* are particularly troubling; Nietzsche repeats Zarathustra’s insult from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* about the miracle cure for female ills, pregnancy: “Has my answer been heard to the question how one *cures* a woman—redeems her? One gives her a child” (*EH*, “Why I Write Such Good Books”: 5). Of course, in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche is not Zarathustra; but in *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche is very much Nietzsche when he maligns campaigners for emancipation as sick: “The fight for equal rights is actually a disease: every physician knows that” (*EH*, “Why I Write Such Good Books”: 5).

Begun in October 1888, *Ecce Homo* was written hastily in the last months of that year, to be finished just before Nietzsche collapsed into insanity on 3 January 1889. During November and December 1888, Nietzsche plied his publisher, Constantin Georg Naumann, with numerous requests, sending him the manuscripts of *Nietzsche contra Wagner* and *Ecce Homo*, the latter piecemeal. *Twilight of the Idols* having just come out, Nietzsche told Naumann that he would like to delay publication of *The Anti-Christ* so it would have a greater effect when published. He made a similar request in a postcard to

Naumann dated 20 December regarding *Nietzsche contra Wagner*, which he wanted delayed in favor of *Ecce Homo*. He was convinced that *Ecce Homo* would be immensely popular and wanted it to appear simultaneously in **German**, French, and English. He asked **August Strindberg** and **Helen Zimmern** to do the translations, firing off letters to them on the same day even though the work was barely complete. In his letter to Helen Zimmern he wrote, “The book will destroy **Christianity** and **Bismarck** as well” (8 December 1888). The letters betray the same type of hubris that is on display throughout *Ecce Homo*; clearly, Nietzsche was ill and running out of time. However, since the work really did become a bestseller in Germany when it appeared in 1908, much of his ebullient self-belief had substance.

By the end of December, Naumann had the bulk of the manuscript for *Ecce Homo*. At this point, Nietzsche sent an alteration—by registered post—to supplant the third part of “Why I Am So Wise,” where he had given a bland description of his father, mother, and grandmother. Instead, he now wished to substitute some highly vitriolic words on his mother and sister. When **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** finally brought out the work in 1908, she first sent **Peter Gast** to Leipzig to retrieve the alteration from Naumann and destroy it, before printing the original version as though nothing had happened. However, Gast did not destroy the missing page, and it is now in its rightful section in Nietzsche’s work. The following will give an impression of why Nietzsche’s sister wanted to censor the correction Nietzsche had sent to Naumann with such urgency on 29 December 1888:

When I search for the deepest contrast to myself, the incalculable meanness of the instincts, I always find my mother and sister – it would be to blaspheme against my divinity to believe myself related to such *canaille*. . . . I confess that the profoundest objection to “**eternal return**,” actually my most *abysmal* thought, is always my mother and my sister. (*EH*, “Why I am So Wise”: 3)

**EDUCATION.** Nietzsche did not concern himself with pedagogical theory on such topics as maturation, though he had seen the inside of a number of boys’ schools and was well qualified to give a verdict on them. He was more concerned with the philistinism of many teachers and their outmoded methods. All of this came under attack

in his five essays “On the Future of Our Educational Institutions” (*Über die Zukunft unserer Bildungs-Anstalten*), presented as a lecture series in Basel in 1872. (A draft titled “Thoughts on the Future of Our Educational Institutions” was included in the *Five Prefaces to Five Unwritten Books*, 1872.) In these lectures, Nietzsche bitterly criticizes the **German** educational system as a branch of the **state**, intent on seeking to level down **culture** through educational policies that pander to the masses; he would dearly like to substitute an intellectual aristocracy on the model of attic **Greece**. In the third essay of *Untimely Meditations*, Nietzsche advocated that state institutions should have nothing to do with philosophy since they only contaminate it: “The state never has any use for **truth** as such, but only for truth that is useful to it” (*UM*, 3: “Schopenhauer as Educator,” 8). He despaired that German educational institutions could ever become “the vehicles of true education” (David Cooper, *Authenticity and Learning: Nietzsche’s Educational Philosophy*, 1983).

Although in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* it is **Zarathustra**, not Nietzsche, who is the teacher, Nietzsche speaks on education with his own voice in his other major works. He repeatedly referred to the need for a more relevant system of education throughout his later work. In *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche reiterated ideas expressed in 1872: education meant teaching people to live and think independently. What went on in the grammar schools of the time was geared merely to produce conformity and obedience to the new Reich: “Our overcrowded grammar schools, our overloaded, stupefied grammar-school teachers, are a scandal” (*TI*, “What the Germans Lack”: 5).

Partly for this reason and partly because of his own bigotry toward **feminism**, Nietzsche repeatedly warned that **women** should not be offered grammar school education, though this was a demand made by nearly all early campaigners for women’s emancipation. Nietzsche was a bitter opponent of female higher education, arguing that emancipated women “want to lower the general rank of woman; and there is no surer means for that than higher education, slacks, and political voting-cattle rights” (*EH*, “Why I Write Such Good Books,” 5). One of the reasons why Nietzsche despised the Second Reich was its introduction of two extra years of compulsory schooling for girls (increased from the age of 14 to 16), though university education was not available to them until the turn of the century. The *Abitur*, or

grammar school, qualification was (and still is) the only way to gain entry to a university education in Germany; without it, women could not enter higher education. In Nietzsche's opinion, women were thus spared untold horrors. Refer to Gary Lemco, *Nietzsche as Educator* (1992), and Timo Hoyer, *Nietzsche und die Pädagogik (Nietzsche and Pedagogy, 2002)*.

**EISNER, KURT (1867–1919).** German writer and journalist. Eisner wrote an early and influential review of Nietzsche's work for *Die Gesellschaft* in late 1891 titled "*Friedrich Nietzsche und die Apostel der Zukunft. Beiträge zur modernen Psychopathia Spiritualis*" ("Friedrich Nietzsche and the Apostles of the Future: Contributions to the Modern *Psychopathia Spiritualis*"). Here, Eisner described *Der Fall Wagner* as "the best feature article in German literature," while *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is referred to as "a work of art like *Faust*." Eisner urges that a history of Nietzscheanism ought to be written before the moment has passed (!) and sets about drawing up his own list of candidates, to include **Hermann Conradi**, **Ola Hansson**, and **Julius Langbehn**. He also mentions "*die Jungen*" around the radical **Bruno Wille** as disciples of Nietzsche. However, in spite of giving what appears to be fulsome praise of Nietzsche's thought, Eisner ends his article with the words "become soft!" in stark contrast to **Zarathustra's** command: "*become hard!*" (*Za*, III: "Of Old and New Tablets," 29). This article was expanded into a short book the following year, reversing the title to read *Psychopathia Spiritualis: Friedrich Nietzsche und die Apostel der Zukunft* (1892).

Eisner was editor of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* from 1891 to 1893 and collaborated on the **socialist** periodical *Vorwärts* from 1898 until 1905, when he was sacked by Franz Mehring for "revisionism." Eisner continued to pursue his left-wing editorial line while maintaining his admiration for Nietzsche's thought, a common trend in socialist Nietzscheanism. In 1917, he joined the "USPD," or Independent German Socialist Party (*Unabhängige Sozialistenpartei Deutschlands*), of which he became leader. Eisner subsequently led the revolution in Bavaria in November 1918, enlisting the help of his friend and colleague **Gustav Landauer**. This overthrew Kaiser Wilhelm II (who abdicated to Holland) and substituted a short-lived Bavarian Republic, of which Eisner was head. Eisner's embattled

**Stöcker**, the leaders in the field at the time. Like them, Ellis was denounced by the **National Socialists**, and his books were burned in 1933. *See also* SEXUALITY.

**EMERSON, RALPH WALDO (1803–1882).** American writer and thinker. Nietzsche admired Emerson consistently from his early 20s until his mental collapse, though it is highly unlikely that Emerson could have known about Nietzsche, who was a neglected author in the **Germany** of his day. In 1882, Nietzsche prefaced the original edition of *The Gay Science* with a quotation from Emerson, who had died that April, while in 1888 he commented in *Twilight of the Idols*, “Emerson—Much more enlightened, adventurous, multifarious, refined than Carlyle; above all, *happier . . .*” (TI, “Expeditions of an Untimely Man”: 13).

In 1832, Emerson had resigned his Unitarian ministry and traveled to Europe, meeting William Wordsworth, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and Thomas Carlyle and returning in 1833. In 1836, he distilled his skepticism into a small book titled *Nature*, which was destined to become an influential work on transcendentalism. Everything Emerson subsequently wrote merely augmented what he had written in *Nature*. His two volumes of *Essays* (1841 and 1844) brought him great renown. Other works include *Representative Men* (1850), where he discusses great men like Napoleon or thinkers who influenced him, such as Plato and Swedenborg. All his work was written with a brilliantly concise and elegant style that strongly attracted Nietzsche, even though his English was not very good. Refer to L. S. Hubbard, *Nietzsche und Emerson* (1958) and George J. Stack, *Nietzsche and Emerson: An Elective Affinity* (1992).

**ENLIGHTENMENT.** European rational movement of the 17th and 18th centuries. Nietzsche often speaks of the Enlightenment as a stage on the way to European **Romanticism**, his *bête noire*. As its name implies (French: “*les lumières*”; German: “*die Aufklärung*”), the Enlightenment was deemed to “bring light” into philosophy, politics, and **art** as well as religion. In France, the work of **Voltaire**, Montesquieu, Denis Diderot, and the *Encyclopédistes* is characteristic of the quest to make tolerance a virtue and to codify human **knowledge**, while **Jean-Jacques Rousseau**’s attempt to build a working

faith around his conception of **God in nature** would have seminal influence. The Italian Enlightenment was predominantly journalistic, while that in England was chiefly philosophical: John Locke wrote a blueprint for **democracy**, and Jeremy Bentham drew up the foundations for **utilitarianism**; in Germany, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Gotthold Ephraim Lessing made major contributions in philosophy and literature, respectively.

Nietzsche had an ambivalent attitude toward the Enlightenment, mistrusting its reliance on **rationalism**. It asked the right questions of religion and **science** but drew the wrong conclusions; in other words, the laudable quest for “scientific” facts could be “tyrannized over by logic” (*HH*, I: “Of First and Last Things,” 6), while the seeds of skepticism did not lead to a declaration of the death of **God**. In *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche posits his *own* philosophy as a new Enlightenment (in spite of its retrograde preoccupation with the **Greeks**), with himself as **free spirit** and leading light, a motif camouflaged in the title given to the second part of *Human, All Too Human*: “*The Wanderer and His Shadow*.” Nietzsche presses his central point that all religion is founded on error; there might even be a **metaphysical** world, “but all that has hitherto made metaphysical assumptions *valuable, terrible, delightful* [to people] is passion, error and self-deception” (*HH*, I: “Of First and Last Things,” 6).

**ERNST, PAUL (1866–1933)**. German critic and writer of popular novels and dramas. Ernst became a **Marxist** when a student at Berlin University, though he severed his connections with Marxism at the turn of the century. However, he was still a Marxist when he wrote an early—critical—article on Nietzsche’s thought for *Die freie Bühne* in June 1890: “*Friedrich Nietzsche. Seine historische Stellung. Seine Philosophie*” (“Friedrich Nietzsche: His Historical Position; His Philosophy”). This publication on Nietzsche placed Ernst, alongside **Georg Brandes**, in the van of Nietzsche criticism; it is ironic that Nietzsche collapsed just before his work began to make an impact. Ernst describes Nietzsche prophetically as all set to become “in vogue,” a trend to be resisted because of the brutality inherent in Nietzsche’s “philosophy of **decadence**.” Ernst, who incidentally always recognized the psychologist in Nietzsche, struggles to place the errant Nietzsche within a dialectical framework by highlighting

his faulty evaluation of **master morality**. He deplores Nietzsche's misleading tendency to speak of **power** in a political context when he actually means a social context, making **pessimism** a reassuring "bolster" (*Ruhekissen*) for philistines. Later, in an article titled "*Der Wille zur Macht*" published in *Ethische Kultur* in 1902, Ernst suggested that Nietzsche's desire to be a prophet and ruler did violence to the poet and psychologist within him. Striking out against the current **naturalist movement** then fashionable, especially on the stage, Ernst called for a revival of the classical tradition in German drama, best seen in his *Brunhild* (1909), though his short stories and essays have survived better than his dramas.

#### ETERNAL FEMININE/WOMANLY (*DAS EWIG-WEIBLICHE*).

Nietzsche's phrase refers to the last two lines of *Faust II* by **Johann Wolfgang von Goethe** (published posthumously in 1832), where Mephistopheles, having won his pact with God on points, sees Faust redeemed by the "**eternal feminine**," the apotheosis of Gretchen: "*das Ewig-Weibliche/ zieht uns hinan*" ("the eternal feminine/ draws us aloft"). Mephistopheles is left furious and frustrated. Nietzsche's interpretation of the term "eternal feminine" was idiosyncratic, with an antifeminist barb wholly lacking in Goethe's *Faust*; that said, both men used the term to challenge the blinkered bourgeois **morality** of the Germany of their day. In Goethe's case, that morality ought to have put the child murderer Gretchen beyond the pale: at the end of *Faust I* (1808), she is not just a fallen woman but a *felon*, which is precisely why Goethe places her in the redemptive role, forcing his wealthy Weimar theater audience to show tolerance, willy-nilly.

By contrast, Nietzsche sneered at bourgeois housewives who pretended to be spiritually perfect but were vain and silly; however, there is a good deal of fear and **ressentiment** in his approach. Nietzsche, opponent of women's **education** extraordinaire, considered that women would not want self-enlightenment unless as a new adornment: "—self-adornment pertains to the eternal-womanly, does it not?" (*BGE*, VII: 232). Nietzsche then says what he really believes is going on: "—she is trying to inspire fear of herself—perhaps she is seeking domination." In *The Case of Wagner*, Nietzsche returns to the theme that women are dangerous to men. He despairs of clever men:

Hardly any of them have character enough not to be corrupted—or “redeemed”—when they find themselves treated like gods: soon they condescend to the level of the women.—Man is a coward, confronted with the Eternal-Feminine—and the females know it.— (CW: 3)

This is very far from what Goethe intended with his “*ewig-Weibliche*.” Nietzsche actually appears to be *jealous* of Goethe—dubbed “Priapus” by his early mentor, Johann Gottfried von Herder, as Nietzsche goes on to remind us (CW: 3). Suffice it to say that Goethe was supremely secure with the opposite sex—unlike Nietzsche.

**ETERNAL RETURN/RECURRENCE.** Nietzsche’s most enigmatic concept. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the doctrine (*Lehre*) is given flesh (having been mooted briefly as “the **heaviest** burden” in *The Gay Science* [GS, IV: 342]), and it then all but disappears from the work he published in his lifetime. There is great confusion as to which term is correct in English, return or recurrence. When Nietzsche uses *ewig wiederkehren* or *ewig wiederkommen*, the translation is “recur, return or come back eternally.” Almost without exception, Nietzsche chooses *die ewige Wiederkunft* (eternal return), stemming as it does from the verb *kommen*, rather than *die ewige Wiederkehr* (eternal recurrence) when speaking of **Zarathustra**’s teaching (*Wiederkunft-lehre*). The default word should be “return” rather than “recurrence” because Nietzsche used the latter so sparingly. In addition, “*Wiederkunft*” suggests a “coming to rest” at a specific moment in **time**, though not in such a way as to negate Nietzsche’s doctrine if we see it in terms of the eternal return of moments. Compare the two following passages:

I: “Alas! Man recurs/returns eternally! The little man recurs/returns eternally!” [“—ach, der Mensch kehrt ewig wieder! Der kleine Mensch kehrt ewig wieder!”] (*Za*, III: “The Convalescent,” 2).

II: “I shall return eternally to this identical and self-same **life**, in that which is greatest as well as that most small, to teach once more the eternal return of all things” [“—ich komme ewig wieder zu diesem gleichen und selbigen Leben, im Grössten und auch im Kleinsten, dass ich wieder aller Dinge ewige Wiederkunft lehre”] (*Za*, III: “The Convalescent,” 2).

To understand Nietzsche’s strategy within the doctrine, it is essential to have a clear grasp of the terms, as discussed previously, and schol-

ars should check their references against the original German. Early Nietzsche critics, foremost among them **Karl Löwith**, **Karl Jaspers**, and **Martin Heidegger**, by frequently using “*ewige Wiederkehr*” in their critique, even when Nietzsche had actually written “*ewige Wiederkunft*,” encouraged a trend that is now virtually ineradicable: the tendency—widespread in Germany—to believe that Nietzsche had presented the doctrine as “*ewige Wiedekehrslehre*.” This has encouraged English critics to believe that “recurrence” is the best translation; indeed, the most recent translation of part of the *Will to Power* renders both *ewige Wiederkunft* and *ewige Wiederkehr* as “eternal recurrence” on the same page, as though they are interchangeable (Rüdiger Bittner, ed., *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, “Lenzer Heide” manuscript, sections 6–7); they are not, however, identical. “Recurrence” is perhaps more elegant but not what Nietzsche usually says.

Nietzsche’s chief explanation of his *Wiederkunftslehre* is found in *Ecce Homo*, where he credits **Heraclitus** as the probable source of inspiration. He also explains how, on contemplating a pyramid-like rock by Lake Silvaplana near Sils Maria in 1881, he conceived the thought of eternal return as “the highest formula of affirmation that can possibly be achieved” and made it the founding principle of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (*EH*, “Thus Spoke Zarathustra”: I). In his notebooks, he made several plans for a whole book to be titled *Die ewige Wiederkunft*, two in connection with poems about Zarathustra and one for a book in four parts. One of the notebooks of summer 1888 again trails *Die ewige Wiederkunft: Zarathustrische Tänze und Umzüge* (*Eternal Return: Zarathustran Dances and Processions*), but nothing came of this.

Although there have been many attempts to explain Nietzsche’s meaning, the main passage revealing eternal return in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is not particularly clear and is open to misconstruction. Zarathustra is accompanied by a dwarf who comments that time is a circle (*Kreis*). Later, Zarathustra sees a man being throttled by a serpent; this turns out to be a vision of Zarathustra himself. So much for the “parameters” of the initiation ceremony:

Behold this moment! . . . From this gateway Moment a long, eternal lane runs *back*: an eternity lies behind us. Must not all things that *can* run have already run along this line? Must not all things that *can* happen *have* already happened, been done, run past? . . . And are not all

things bound fast together in such a way that this moment draws after it all future things? Therefore—draws itself too? For all things that *can* run *must* run once again forward along this long lane . . .—must we not all have been here before?—and must we not return [*wiederkommen*] and run down that other lane out before us, down that long, terrible lane—must we not return eternally [*ewig wiederkommen*]?” (*Za*, III: “Of the Vision and the Riddle,” 2)

Later in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the reference to the circle is dropped, but the conceit of circularity continues in Zarathustra’s reference to “the ring of eternal return” (“*der Ring der Wiederkunft*”). His refrain to bless the “nuptial ring of rings” that cements his mystical union with eternity is repeated seven times (*Za*, III: “The Seven Seals,” 2), a parody of the opening of the seven seals, Revelations 6–8, and the marriage of the Lamb, Revelations 19:7, and possibly a triumphant gloat that Nietzsche has “outringed” Wagner. Now that Zarathustra has achieved bliss (he has, in effect, wedded himself), the theory itself slips from prominence in Nietzsche’s works, resurfacing in a general way when eternity is discussed (as in *TI*, “What I Owe the Ancients,” 4). The posthumous notes (i.e., *The Will to Power*) contain a number of references, all dating back to the time when Nietzsche was busy with *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. A key feature of the doctrine of eternal return is that the *Übermensch* is someone who can *will* the return of everything (*Za*, II: “Of Redemption”). Zarathustra’s horror at the recurrence of the “little man” is what makes the thought of eternal return so terrible; we cannot “cherry-pick” the moments to be repeated but must **affirm** every single aspect of life, every second.

There are two chief ways in which the concept, as revealed in the previous quotations, has been explained: the **symbolic** or **metaphorical** interpretation and the cosmological or “**naturalistic**” interpretation. Early Nietzscheans pointed toward the symbolism of the serpent and the ring if pressed to explain eternal return but were really more concerned with the *Übermensch* and the principles of *Lebensphilosophie*; eternal return was construed mainly as an ecstatic experience of the *Übermensch*. Karl Löwith first confronted the problem of eternal return at a purely **metaphysical** level in *Nietzsche’s Philosophie der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen*, 1935 (*Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence [sic] of the Same*, 1997). As mentioned previ-

ously, the title of this book left an indelible but erroneous impression in Germany that Nietzsche's main term for eternal return was *ewige Wiederkehr*.

Martin Heidegger also read eternal return at the metaphysical level, whereby he queried the usefulness or possibility of speaking about consciousness "in time." Heidegger, in his Introduction to *Nietzsche* (1961; trans. 1986), stressed the fundamental connection between eternal return of the same and the doctrine of the **will to power**. Like Heidegger, Joan Stambaugh was preoccupied with Nietzsche's view of time as a phenomenon in *Untersuchungen zum Problem der Zeit bei Nietzsche* (*An Investigation of the Problem of Time with Nietzsche*, 1959), arguing that eternity could never be "in time." Return is the movement of time into eternity, constituting the same in the sense that there is *ultimately* no discrepancy between time and eternity. In her *Nietzsche's Thought of Eternal Return* (1972), eternal return is also based largely on the will to power.

Pierre Klossowski, in *Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux*, 1969 (*Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, 1997), viewed the concept of eternal return from a **poststructuralist** point of view best understood through the central symbol of the ring or circle. This stands for the position of the individual who has an identity if included within the circle but none if excluded. Hitherto, **God** provided the basis for self-identity; Klossowski argues that Nietzsche's eternal return destroys identities and makes it impossible for the individual to construct a stable self-identity. For **Gilles Deleuze**, it is not "the same" that returns, nor is it "being"; instead, "recurrence is itself affirmed by the passage of diversity or multiplicity" (Gilles Deleuze, "Active and Reactive," in *The New Nietzsche*, ed. David Allison, 1977).

Alongside metaphysical interpretations, eternal return received, from the first, a series of scientific interpretations from thinkers such as **Henri Bergson**. Contemporary critics who take Nietzsche seriously in terms of physics or cosmology point out, as do Milič Čapák in *The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary Physics* (1961) and Bernd Magnus in *Nietzsche's Existential Imperative* (1978), that Nietzsche was still working within Newtonian physics, which means quite simply that he could not be right on what he said about time, though he could make insightful predictions. Alistair Moles argues that Nietzsche anticipated a relational theory of time. Moles

accepts that in Nietzsche's formula, this life is eternal life, and our attitude makes it **heavy** or light, but he goes on to speculate that for Nietzsche, the self is not just eternal but scattered in the universe. Nothing happens to the self by chance: "the self is the boundary point within which the whole of time and space are encapsulated" (*Nietzsche's Philosophy of Nature and Cosmology*, 1990). Drawing on current speculative physics, Moles asserts that the notion of the pulsating universe could give some credence to Nietzsche's statement that events are not just repetitive but recurrent.

Philosophers are still trying to grapple with the concept of eternal return. Robin Small (*Nietzsche in Context*, 2001) has detailed the context of Nietzsche's study of **natural science**, suggesting that he found parallels with the thought of contemporaries such as **African Spir**. John Richardson (*Nietzsche's New Darwinism*, 2004) grounds the concept in Nietzsche's quest for **naturalism**, declaring it to be a symptom of Nietzsche's "problem with the past" since retrospection alienates us from ourselves: not all our instincts are good for us. Eternal return can redirect these instincts and let us face the past and go on willing. Paul Loeb, addressing the 15th Annual Friedrich Nietzsche Conference (Cambridge, 2005), called eternal return "the thought that splits the history of humankind in two." Refer to Ned Lukacher, *Time-Fetishes: The Secret History of Eternal Recurrence* (1998), and Lawrence Hatab, *Nietzsche's Life Sentence: Coming to Terms with Eternal Recurrence* (2005).

**EUGENICS MOVEMENT.** In Germany, the movement for a new **science** that could promote the "well-born" (the **Greek** meaning of the term) was pioneered by Alfred Ploetz, who tried to merge **socialism** with **Darwinism** through his biological theories of selection. He set out his ideas in a monograph on racial hygiene with the impossible title *Die Tüchtigkeit unserer Rasse und der Schutz der Schwachen. Ein Versuch über Rassenhygiene und ihr Verhältnis zu den humanen Idealen, besonders zum Sozialismus* (*The Industriousness of Our Race and the Protection of the Weak: An Essay on Racial Hygiene and Its Relationship to Humane Ideals, Especially Socialism*, 1895). He prefaced his book with an aphorism from Nietzsche, a typical example of how Nietzsche's name has been routinely used to bolster various causes of which he would not have approved. In Britain, the

members of Francis Galton's Eugenics Society also included a number of Nietzscheans, such as Maximilian Mügge (who characterized Nietzsche as "the pioneer of eugenics") and **Havelock Ellis**. Mügge, in an article titled "Eugenics and the Superman," which appeared in the *Eugenics Review*, placed a racist construction on Nietzsche's concept of the **will to power**. Eugenacists characteristically insisted on reading Darwinism into Nietzsche's thought in spite of Nietzsche's profound mistrust of Charles Darwin.

Medical enthusiasm for racial improvement increased within the eugenics movement during the 1920s as genetic theories became better understood (but at the cost of popular support), although it should be noted that heredity and "improving the stock" did not yet have the sinister overtones they have today. However, by the 1930s, the German eugenics movement had been usurped by Aryan racism. By contrast, the Eugenics Society in London had acquired several leading socialists as its members (Sidney and Beatrice Webb, H. G. Wells, and **George Bernard Shaw**).

**EUROPE/EUROPEAN.** Nietzsche frequently referred to himself as a good European, often within the context of insulting the **Germans**: "—**grand politics** deceives no one. . . . Germany counts more and more as Europe's flatland.—" (*TI*, "What the Germans Lack": 3). In spite of a flush of patriotic feeling during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, he never conquered his aversion to the average bourgeois German citizen who had rapidly become the backbone of Wilhelmine Germany. In contrast to the Germans, who "have no idea how vulgar they are" (*EH*, "The Case of Wagner": 4), Nietzsche greatly admired the French and felt a cultural affinity toward them, though his heart was always with the ancient **Greeks**. Looking askance at the rising **nationalism** of his day, Nietzsche thought the solution was for Europe to be united. He believed that all great European thinkers had striven for this: Napoleon Bonaparte, **Johann Wolfgang von Goethe**, Ludwig van Beethoven, Stendhal (pseudonym for Marie-Henri Beyle), **Heinrich Heine**, **Arthur Schopenhauer**, Eugène Delacroix, and Honoré de Balzac—even **Richard Wagner**. All are "on the whole an audacious-daring, splendidly violent, high-flying type of higher men who bore others up with them . . ." (*BGE*, VIII: 256). He regarded the future of **culture** as a fundamentally European project:

Owing to the pathological estrangement which the insanity of nationality has induced, and still induces, among the peoples of Europe; owing also to the short-sighted and quick-handed politicians who are at the top today with the help of this insanity, without any inkling that their separatist policies can of necessity only be *entr'acte* policies; owing to all this and much else that today simply cannot be said, the most unequivocal portents are now being overlooked, or arbitrarily and mendaciously reinterpreted—that *Europe wants to become one*. (BGE, VIII: 256)

Refer to Ralf Witzler, *Europa im Denken Nietzsches* (2001).

**EXISTENTIALISM.** Founded by the Danish philosopher **Søren Kierkegaard**, Existentialism is an antirational philosophy that emphasizes man's freedom. In the work of its chief exponent, **Jean-Paul Sartre**, this freedom produces anxiety because, in the absence of any **God**, the free individual is forced to take responsibility for his or her actions; deeds, not motives, are what count. Failure to live up to one's freedom leads to inauthenticity and bad faith. In the absence of a convenient moral code such as that provided by religion, the individual—recognizing the freedom of others—is forced to act with altruism, and it is this feature of Existentialism that deviates most from Nietzsche's strictures. Otherwise, the emphasis on freedom owes much to Nietzsche, and the early exponents of Existentialism, such as **Karl Jaspers** and **Martin Heidegger**, whose ideas were crucial for Sartre, were indeed convinced Nietzscheans, as was Sartre before he turned away from Nietzsche toward left-wing politics.

**EXPRESSIONISM.** Modernist movement. German Expressionism was much influenced by Nietzsche, reaching its heyday during the years 1910–1920 (“the Expressionist decade”). The movement was founded on the pathbreaking work of **August Strindberg** and **Frank Wedekind** (in drama) and Edvard Munch (in **art**): the two art groups specifically aligned to the movement were *Die Brücke* and *Der Blaue Reiter*. Nietzsche's iconoclasm inspired a generation of young painters to see with a new perspective; their abstractions, distortions, and use of primary colors represented an attempt to convey this novelty. So too did their choice of subject matter: man in **Dionysian** ecstasy or, more often, man in despair. Painters like Ernst Ludwig Kirchner bitterly attacked **decadent** Wilhelmine society in its death

(“Degenerate Art”), held in Berlin in 1936, produced a further paradox when people gleefully flocked to see it, ignoring Josef Goebbels’s carefully planned rival exhibition of German art (glorifying the *Volks*) that was intended to upstage it. *See also* EISNER, KURT; *DIE KOSMIKER*.

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**FEMINISM.** Nietzsche consistently opposed feminism, which during the 1880s in Germany was still in its infancy (the *Allgemeiner Deutscher Frauenverein*—General German Woman’s Association—having been founded in 1865 by Louise Otto-Peters), and it is important to understand why. Although Nietzsche liked to see himself as an iconoclast, the **culture** that he admired most was that of Hellenic **Greece**. There, Nietzsche discerned a heroic tradition made possible because **women** accepted their cloistered role as wife and mother. The Greece of **Socrates** and **Plato** was already too “modern” in Nietzsche’s eyes since there is a suggestion, in *The Republic*, that guardian women should be liberated from their domestic duties. Nietzsche’s crusade against **decadent European culture** was thus curiously one-sided. He denied women the possibility of self-development (which they were beginning to demand) but encouraged men to challenge all the accepted concepts of **morality** so that they could create themselves anew and allow the *Übermensch* to emerge.

Nevertheless, many early German radical feminists, such as **Hedwig Dohm**, **Lily Braun**, and **Helene Stöcker**, were firm Nietzscheans. They chose to ignore Nietzsche’s objections to women’s **education** and especially to the woman writer (they were all writers!) because of what he had said about the *Übermensch*. The term is not gendered in German (*der Mann* = man, *der Mensch* = human being), and women did not see themselves as automatically excluded from its benefits. The liberating potential it offered to women cannot be overemphasized. Nietzsche appeared to give such women *permission* to refuse to join the **marriage** mart, to enjoy their **sexuality**, and to reject **Christianity**. Their gratitude easily outweighed their criticism of his recidivist strictures on woman’s role and his slighting references to the “**eternal feminine**.”

Bourgeois feminists, however, such as **Helene Lange** and later **Gertrud Bäumer**, agreed with Nietzsche that woman's role was primarily domestic; like him, they viewed the role of mother as the goal of marriage, though they mistrusted Nietzsche's other comments on the liberation of the instincts and tended to give him a wide berth. Meanwhile, **Ellen Key**, who shared most of the views of the "moderate feminists" on maternal destiny, was a passionate Nietzschean. Such right-wing feminists were, ironically enough, the type of women who aspired to the values that Nietzsche derided as "eternal feminine." There were also creative writers, such as **Laura Marholm** (married to **Ola Hansson**) and **Franziska zu Reventlow**, to say nothing of **Lou Andreas-Salomé**, who identified with the aspirations of the bourgeois feminists because they shared their conservative political stance but were nevertheless overtly influenced by Nietzsche. Possibly without knowing it, Nietzsche was thus attacking a moving target when he made vitriolic antifeminist remarks. More recently, these remarks have been interpreted on a metaphorical level in a critique inspired by **poststructuralist** methods. *See also* FRENCH FEMINISM; THE NEW NIETZSCHE.

**FIVE PREFACES TO FIVE UNWRITTEN BOOKS (FÜNF VOR-REDEN ZU FÜNF UNGESCHREIBENEN BÜCHERN).** In 1872, Nietzsche, the **Wagners'** guest for Christmas at Tribschen, presented **Cosima Wagner** with a portfolio of five essays as a combined Christmas and birthday present. The manuscripts are as follows: "*On the Pathos of Truth*" (*Über das Pathos der Wahrheit*), "*Thoughts on the Future of our Educational Institutions*" (*Gedanken über die Zukunft unserer Bildungsanstalten*), "*The Greek State*" (*Der Griechische Staat*), "*On the Relationship of Schopenhauer's Philosophy to a German Culture*" (*Über das Verhältnis der Schopenhauerischen Philosophie zu einer deutschen Cultur*), and "*Homer's Contest*" (*Homer's Wettkampf*). The second essay was very brief, and Nietzsche expanded it later into a series of five lectures that he delivered in Basel in 1873: "On the Future of our Educational Institutions."

**FORCE (DIE KRAFT).** Not to be confused with **power** (*die Macht*), force is a **concept** Nietzsche commandeers from physics without actually allowing it to be fully scientific: the nearest he comes to

mechanics is when he describes force as requiring resistance in order to manifest itself (in cyclic fashion, or linear, i.e., attraction and repulsion). In August 1881, just when **eternal return** “came” to him as a revelation, Nietzsche studied the work of Johannes Gustav Vogt, whose *Die Kraft* (1878) presented force as a continuum “out there” in infinite space, in a cosmic cycle of becoming. As Robin Small points out, Nietzsche probably hoped Vogt’s propositions might help “his own attempts to provide a physical account of eternal recurrence” (Robin Small, *Nietzsche in Context*, 2001). Actually, Nietzsche took more account of **Ruggero Guiseppe Boscovich**, something **Peter Gast** later deplored, wishing Nietzsche had spent more time studying the work of Julius Robert Mayer, an early propounder of the law of energy conservation. Nietzsche knew Mayer’s essay “*Über Auslösung*” (“On Release”) in *Mechanik der Wärme* (1874) and praised the book to the skies: “You can hear the *harmony of the spheres* in it” (Nietzsche to Peter Gast, 16 April 1881). The allusion to the Aristotelian worldview is not really a recommendation, however. It highlights just how much the idea of “force” remains at the level of ambiguity in Nietzsche’s work, as also the word “strength,” which can be physical or psychological. Nietzsche often uses the noun “*Kraft*” as part of a composite phrase, as in **Homer’s Contest**, where he speaks of a “tournament of forces” (*Wettspiel der Kräfte*). In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche describes how some forces become **master** over others: it is absurd to ask strength (*Stärke*) “not to be a desire to overthrow, crush, become master.” Nietzsche continues,

A quantum of force [*ein Quantum Kraft*] is just such a quantum of drive, will, action, in fact it is nothing but this driving, willing, acting, and only the seduction of language . . . can make it appear otherwise. (OGM, I: 13)

*See also* DYNAMITE.

**FORGETTING.** In *On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense*, forgetting is described as a coping mechanism, enabling us to think we know “the **truth**” if it is agreeable to us and to reject it if not. Our freedom from illusion cannot be achieved until we recognize this process. “So long as it is able to deceive without *injuring*, that master of deception, the intellect, is free . . .” (OTLNS: 2). In the second essay of *Untimely Meditations*, Nietzsche lambastes **history** because

it forces us to dredge up things that are sometimes best left covered up (*UM*, II: “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for **Life**,” 5). In *Daybreak*, he alludes to Lord Byron’s *Manfred*, where the eponymous hero, tormented by his incapacity to forget, unsuccessfully summons up the seven spirits for aid in achieving “forgetfulness” (*Manfred*, Act I)—Nietzsche’s point being that “one may want to forget, but one cannot” (*D*, III: 167). In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche describes how humble, primitive men have been taught to have a “conscience” through having the fear of punishment burned into their brains: “When man decided he had to make a memory for himself, it never happened without blood, torments and sacrifices . . .—all this has its origin in that particular instinct which discovered that pain was the most powerful aid to mnemonics” (*OGM*, II: 3). See also FREUD, SIGMUND; LIES.

**FÖRSTER, BERNHARD.** See FÖRSTER-NIETZSCHE, ELISABETH.

**FÖRSTER-NIETZSCHE, ELISABETH (1846–1935).** Nietzsche’s sister. Two years younger than her brother, Elisabeth was perhaps too emotionally close to Nietzsche for the good of them both. Nietzsche did his best to offer Elisabeth the paternal protection she lacked as a single, fatherless woman in Wilhelmine Germany; in fact, as soon as he entered the charmed circle surrounding **Richard** and **Cosima Wagner**, he made sure that Elisabeth was also introduced into it. She became friendly with the much older Cosima and through Cosima’s friend **Malwida von Meysenbug** met other luminaries, though there would come a point, from the late 1890s on, when people came to her, as founder of the *Nietzsche-Archiv* (see the photo spread), rather than her sick brother.

Although Elisabeth constantly asserted that she was on the lookout for a wife for Nietzsche, she was delighted to keep house for him in Basel, and her clandestine meddling was a prime reason why Nietzsche’s quarrel with **Lou Andreas-Salomé** in 1882 remained irreconcilable. Nietzsche never really forgave Elisabeth for this, while Elisabeth conducted a lifelong vendetta against Andreas-Salomé. Perhaps to spite Nietzsche, perhaps also because she was running out of time, Elisabeth acquired a husband, the virulently anti-Semitic

and permanent, a refusal on which the ideas of the critical theorists also rested, though their own program was dedicated to extending the political analyses of **Karl Marx** and Friedrich Engels. They saw Nietzsche as a counterweight to Marx.

**FREE SPIRIT (*DER FREIGEIST*)**. Nietzsche used the term *Freigeist* in two ways (though these often coalesce); the first indicates a religious skeptic in line with the English word “freethinker” and is not particularly complimentary, since such a person is often a **democrat** or other social reformer. The second indicates a “free spirit,” a rebel who shuns society and domestic fetters and rejects all so-called **truth**. Nietzsche mostly used the term in this latter, (for him) positive sense, aligning himself with the freedoms implied. **Zarathustra** describes the free spirit as a social outcast: “the dweller in forests” (*Za*, II: “Of the Famous Philosophers”). It was axiomatic that the free spirit would steer clear of **marriage**.

In 1871, when he was at work on *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche planned to write an essay, “*Die Tragödie und die Freigeister*” (“Tragedy and Free Spirits”), but he shelved it, though the idea did not go away. Writing to a new (and, as it turned out, married) friend Louise Ott, whom he had met in Bayreuth in August 1876, shortly before he fled from **Wagner’s** *Ring*, Nietzsche admitted that the friendship was indeed rather “dangerous” for him: “But for you too, when I think what sort of a free spirit [*Freigeist*] you have bumped into!” (Nietzsche to Louise Ott, 22 September 1876). That same year, Nietzsche began to make notes that would eventually form the first book of *Human, All Too Human*, and this duly appeared in 1878 with the subtitle *A Book for Free Spirits*, complete with a dedication (subsequently dropped) to the kindred free spirit, **Voltaire**. *Human, All Too Human*, *Daybreak*, and *The Gay Science* are sometimes referred to as Nietzsche’s “free spirit” works.

**DIE FREIE BÜHNE (*THE FREE STAGE*)**. German periodical. *Die freie Bühne*, founded under the editorship of Otto Brahm in 1890 and renamed *Neue deutsche Rundschau* in 1895, still exists; it published some of the first reviews of Nietzsche’s works (not necessarily complimentary, as seen in the reviews by **Paul Ernst** and **Wilhelm Bölsche**). The periodical was the mouthpiece for the theater club

“*Verein freie Bühne*,” which was established in Berlin in 1889 to promote the production of plays considered too daring for public performance. Coinciding with the heyday of the **Naturalist movement**, the club flourished for four years in a climate of excitement over the ideas of **Henrik Ibsen** and **Charles Darwin**, besides those of Nietzsche and others of the avant-garde.

**FRENCH FEMINISM.** A critical approach practiced by French philosophers and psychoanalysts in the last quarter of the 20th century. Leading French **feminists** such as **Sarah Kofman**, a distinguished Nietzsche scholar, have greatly influenced the academic discipline of feminist critique in America, and in Britain to a lesser extent. Both Kofman and Bernard Patrat were students of **Jacques Derrida** and use his terminology. **Luce Irigaray** is both a Lacanian analyst and a creative writer. In *Amante Marine de Friedrich Nietzsche*, 1980 (*Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche*, 1991), Irigaray uses the linguistic techniques of **poststructuralism**, but adds another dimension that has come to be categorized in a different context as *parler femme*, or “woman speak” (as in the feminism of Hélène Cixous). The problem is that in writing in this special way, Irigaray suggests a biological determinism with which many women would take serious issue. Another (naturalized) French feminist, Julia Kristeva, agrees with Irigaray in accepting woman’s difference (Derrida spells this as *différance* to stress that the “Other” is involved) but argues that the semiotics or linguistic ciphers should receive greater scrutiny. French feminism frequently merged with the “**New Nietzsche**” approach in any engagement with Nietzsche in the last two decades of the 20th century.

**FREUD, SIGMUND (1856–1939).** Austrian founder of psychoanalysis. Freud studied under Charcot in Paris from 1885 to 1886, having established a private practice in Vienna in 1885. He founded the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in 1902 and the International Association of Psychoanalysis in 1910. In 1911, he held a Psychoanalytic Congress in Weimar, where he met **Lou Andreas-Salomé**, who became a friend and collaborator. Since both Freud and Nietzsche insisted on the dangers for mankind of repressed instincts, there are some startling similarities in their ideas; however, the solutions they offered (for Nietzsche: the activity of the strong individual; for

Freud: the “talking cure,” which he struggled to make medically respectable) could not be more divergent. They also differed strongly on their solution to repressed desires: Nietzsche thought that **forgetting** could be beneficial (indeed, it was an essential part of man’s armory), while Freud devoted his career to finding out how to reveal what the unconscious had repressed.

Freud played down any direct impact Nietzsche might have had on his thinking and avoided Nietzsche’s works; nevertheless, it can be argued that Nietzsche’s influence was unavoidable for any German-speaking intellectual at the turn of the 20th century, even without the hostility of both men, if not to **women** in general, at least to **feminists** (whom they thought were lesbians, one and all). Freud’s discovery of “penis envy” as the driving force in female **sexuality** and, by extension, in the formation of woman’s self-identity (in terms of lack) finds no echo in Nietzsche’s **ressentiment**, a vile emotion derived from 2,000 years of **Christianity**. However, Nietzsche’s praise for what woman *has*—her capacity to give birth—too often dissolves into criticism (which Freud would repeat) of those “unnatural” women who did not desire to have children. Freud’s major works include *Die Traumdeutung* (*The Interpretation of Dreams*, 1900), *Die Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens* (*The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, 1901), *Das Ich und das Es* (*The Ego and the Id*, 1923), and *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur* (*Civilization and Its Discontents*, 1930). Many of these texts first appeared in translation in the Standard Edition of Freud’s complete works, published from 1953 in London, where Freud, as a **Jew**, found refuge from the **National Socialists** after they had invaded Austria in 1938. Refer to Paul-Laurent Assoun, *Nietzsche et Freud*, 1980 (*Nietzsche and Freud*, 1998); Ronald Lehrer, *Nietzsche’s Presence in Freud’s Life and Thought* (1995); and Reinhard Gasser, *Nietzsche und Freud* (1997).

**FRIENDSHIP.** Nietzsche’s personal circumstances largely dictated his attitude toward friendship. Brought up as the only male in his household, his closest friends were destined to be men, possibly, as has been commonly suggested in regard to his relationship with **Richard Wagner**, as an attempt to fill the place of his missing father (who had died in August 1848, when he was nearly four). He

had two close friends at school in Naumburg (Wilhelm Pinder and Gustav Krug) before he was sent to the all-male boarding school at Schulpforta, where he also made lasting friendships not just with fellow students like Carl von Gersdorff and **Paul Deussen** but also with some of the masters, notably Robert Buddensieg. The classical curriculum at Schulpforta encouraged in Nietzsche a love of the **Greek** way of life and inculcated in him a veneration for the Greek **concept** of friendship as practiced by Epicurus and later described admiringly by Michel de Montaigne in his essay on friendship (*De L' amitié*), published in his *Essais* (1580; trans. 1603).

Nietzsche began his studies in Bonn, where Deussen had, like Nietzsche, enrolled as a theology student; both subsequently lost their faith. Nietzsche first met **Erwin Rohde** as a student in Leipzig. **Franz Overbeck**, perhaps Nietzsche's truest friend, was his colleague in Basel; they first met through sharing lodgings. Overbeck and Rohde would also become lifelong friends. Heinrich Köselitz, whom Nietzsche later dubbed **Peter Gast**, was an early acolyte who came to Basel specifically to hear Nietzsche's (and Overbeck's) lectures. Nietzsche first made the acquaintance of **Paul Rée** when the latter spent the summer of 1873 in Basel, and through Rée, in 1882, he met **Lou Andreas-Salomé**, arguably the only woman Nietzsche ever loved in a romantic fashion. Nietzsche's disillusionment on losing not just Lou's friendship (largely through his sister's interference) but also that of Rée made him bitter toward **women** in general.

Suffice it to say that the primacy Nietzsche increasingly awarded to friendship over other relationships (love for a woman, **marriage**, and so on) was more a matter of expediency than choice, especially after he had become critical of those formerly closest to him, namely, his mother and sister. It should be added that in their case, Nietzsche criticized their blinkered mentality without pausing to consider the social pressures that had made **Franziska Nietzsche** into a religious bigot and **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** into a willful philistine. That said, Nietzsche was a lonely figure during the years 1882–1889, cut off from his family and a peripatetic recluse in spite of the devotion of friends like Gast and **Meta von Salis-Marschlins**, whose practical help did not make up for a lack of spiritual affinity. It is all the more ironic that Nietzsche spent the last 11 years of his life in the hands of

peccadilloes in the early days of the *Nietzsche-Archiv* leaves a bitter taste because it reveals the petty-mindedness that dominated the administration of Nietzsche's literary estate. Refer to Frederick R. Love, *Nietzsche's Saint Peter: Genesis and Cultivation of an Illusion* (1981). See also *ECCE HOMO*; FRIENDSHIP.

***THE GAY SCIENCE (DIE FRÖHLICHE WISSENSCHAFT, 1882).***

(Also known as *Joyful Wisdom*.) Having established his aphoristic style in his previous work, *Daybreak*, Nietzsche was at liberty, in *The Gay Science*, to deal with a great variety of themes with conciseness and considerable wit and polish. The first four volumes of this work were published in 1882, together with a "Prelude in Rhymes." In the second edition of 1887, a fifth book, a preface, an appendix, and further poems were added, and this is the version in common use now. In the five years between the first and second editions, Nietzsche wrote *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883–1885) and *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886). Thus, the last part of *The Gay Science* is enmeshed in a more developed phase of Nietzsche's thinking. In fact, the last section of book 4 (i.e., the last book of the original edition of *The Gay Science*) ends with **Zarathustra's** descent from the mountains (*GS*, IV: 342); *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* begins with the same passage almost verbatim (*Za*, "Zarathustra's Prologue," 1).

The term "**science**" in the title, *Wissenschaft*, actually refers to any form of **knowledge**, and the best translation for *fröhlich* is "cheerful": Nietzsche wanted to convey, in the most affirmative terms possible, his fundamental conviction that there is no transcendental being. Not only is the death of God announced exultantly in *The Gay Science*, but in addition "we have killed him!" (*GS*, III: 125). The madman, having delivered this message, skips from the scene, a prophet who has come too soon: but Nietzsche knew that the fuse he had lit would eventually ignite. The cry that "God is dead" has now become a slogan to characterize his philosophy.

Nietzsche does not just want to wean man from his irrational belief in God; he also wants his "gay science" to counteract **rationalism**, Europe's new mental disease. Indeed, the impossibility of knowing the full **truth** about anything is Nietzsche's perennial theme, although he did not mean that there are no facts, still less that "the truth is what anyone thinks it is" (Bernard Williams, *The Gay Science*, Introduc-

tion). He simply denied that we could truly know “reality.” Too much of our past, right down to prehistory, contaminates our view of even such a simple thing as a mountain or cloud (*GS*, II: 57), an insight that has inspired **Jacques Derrida’s** “*toujours déjà*.”

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of *The Gay Science* remains Nietzsche’s first exposition of **eternal return** in book 4, repeated and expanded in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. The demon proposes that the **heaviest** weight man can bear is the one posed by the question “in each and every thing: ‘Do you want this again and innumerable times again?’” (*GS*, IV: 341). In many ways, this succinct portrayal of eternal return is easier to grasp than the more ecstatic elaborations in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. *The Gay Science* has also elicited **feminist** critique through the mention of **Baubô** (Preface, 4) and Nietzsche’s enigmatic declaration, “Yes, **life** is a **woman!**” (*GS*, IV: 339).

**DER GEIST (MIND OR SPIRIT).** Nietzsche had little time for transcendental versions of *Geist* found in **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s** philosophy. In line with contemporary usage, he most frequently used the term *Geist* in connection with all that had been intellectually excellent in **German culture**. In the first of his *Untimely Meditations* on “David **Strauss**, the confessor and the writer,” he argued that German materialism and jingoistic **nationalism** had blocked out the essential nature of his countrymen and diverted them from their spiritual source. Nietzsche proposed a rehabilitation of *Geist* through **art** and culture and later envisaged the project in connection with the emergence of the *Übermensch*. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the development of *Geist* is expressed poetically through **animal** imagery. The *Übermensch* is at first spiritually like a camel, burdened down with “**heavy** things for the spirit”; he must develop the independence of the lion: “the spirit of the lion says ‘I will,’” before he finally achieves the unreflecting **affirmation** of the child, a “sacred Yes” (*Za*, 1: “Of the Three Metamorphoses”). Nietzsche’s shorthand for the decline of *Geist* was the phrase “**Deutschland, Deutschland, über alles**.” There are important compounds to be made from *Geist*, such as *Zeitgeist* (spirit of the times) and *Freigeist* (**Free Spirit**), all posing problems for translation because of the dual meaning in English.

*für Stefan George und seinen Kreis* (*The Importance of Nietzsche for Stefan George and his Circle*, 1989); and Joachim Müller, *Wagner, Nietzsche, George. Das Ende von Musik, Philosophie, Dichtung* (*Wagner, Nietzsche, George: The End of Music, Philosophy, Writing*, 1994).

**GERMAN CLASSICISM.** See GOETHE; SCHILLER.

**GERMAN IDEALISM.** Idealist or transcendental philosophy took off from the cautious point made by **Immanuel Kant** that the only reasonable explanation of experience is a conjunction of what is in the mind with what it perceives to be in the world “outside.” To a certain extent, then, the mind creates its own world. Nietzsche had no time for Kant’s central premise that the only thing we can know for certain is the moral imperative within us. For Kant, this **knowledge** provides a guarantee of man’s freedom. Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1763–1814) took freedom as his starting point for his work on ethics and refused to admit that there were things beyond man’s capacity to know. There was no such thing as Kant’s “*Ding an sich*,” which resists assimilation by the mind. He subsumed matter and form under one heading: ego/non-ego. Non-ego remains dependent on the ego that conditions it. Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772–1834), commenting on Fichte’s system in *Biographia Literaria* (1817), quipped that a world that did not exist unless he thought it up was “all my I” (a pun on “I” = the ego and “all my eye” = nonsense), which is the position Nietzsche himself took toward it.

Friedrich Schelling (1775–1854) made a clean break with Fichte’s ego and described the world in terms of spirit and **nature**. The brain that contemplates nature is at the same time part of it: such contemplation is self-reflective. Furthermore, nature is purposive, an embodiment of the World Soul (*Weltseele*). Although Schelling followed Fichte in making the point that the subject produces the objective world as a means to attaining consciousness, his purpose was to show a development toward harmony and unity. Schelling, who worked briefly with **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel** in Jena, shared Hegel’s view of the “Absolute” but not Hegel’s dialectic reasoning; for Schelling, the Absolute was simply the unity of opposites. Schelling’s theory of **art** argued that just as nature was divine cre-

ation, the work of art was a microcosm of the creative act and hence divine. This also gave the creator of Romantic art or fiction a very special status.

Hegel drew together all the strands so far discussed. He rejected Kant's view that there are some things that the human self or transcendental ego cannot know through experience (such as **God**), and he shared Schelling's desire to draw a link between consciousness and the objective world: the world was the expression of a unified "absolute idea," or *Weltgeist*. This could transform religious ideas into **concepts**; our reason is thus the basis of faith. Applying his general principles to **history**, Hegel posited that phases of history are the embodiment of the *Weltgeist*, developing into their opposite (the antithesis) and eventually reaching a synthesis that in turn will resume the dialectical process under the weight of its own contradictions.

Although Nietzsche had no time at all for transcendental arguments that seemed to skirt around religious issues to no purpose, he shared the **Romantic** view of the artist as someone special, indeed, "heroic," even if set apart from his fellow men by sickness or solipsism. However, Nietzsche would argue that his source for this view was the culture of the **Greeks** rather than Idealist **aesthetics**, especially when the principal purpose of such philosophy was religious, as in the case of the theologian **Friedrich Schleiermacher**. Nietzsche tarred Hegel and Schleiermacher with the same brush: "He who has once contracted Hegelism and Schleiermacherism is never quite cured of them" (*UM*, I: "David Strauss, the Confessor and Writer," 6).

**THE GERMANS.** Nietzsche counted it a great misfortune to have been born German. After a brief period of patriotic enthusiasm during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, when he volunteered to serve his country, he set his face against **Otto von Bismarck's** Second Reich, which rapidly came to represent an authoritarian regime. Independence of spirit was discouraged in every sphere: state-run schools, the army, the police, and the church. Nietzsche also abhorred the type of chauvinistic **nationalism** and **anti-Semitism** that was becoming standard in German society and blamed it on ignorance, bad schools, and bad philosophers (especially the **German Idealists**). German **culture** was sick and decadent, making

Germany “**Europe’s** flatland” (*TI*, “What the Germans Lack”: 3). Nietzsche declared the vulgar new counterfeit *Geist* to be so unhealthy that it left him gasping for air: “I breathe with difficulty near the by now instinctive uncleanliness *in psychologicis* which every word, every facial expression of a German betrays” (*EH*, “The Case of Wagner”: 3). He admired French taste and would much rather have been French—anything but German. Just before he went insane, he managed to convince himself that he came from a noble Polish family named Niëzky (Nietzsche to **Georg Brandes**, 10 April 1888). “I really think the Germans are a rotten [*hundsgemein*] sort of people,” he wrote to **Meta von Salis-Marschlins** on 29 December 1888; “I thank heaven I am a Pole in all my instincts.”

In *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche sums up a thread running throughout his work: German culture is on the decline, and people are asking, “Haven’t you so much as one spirit who *means something* to Europe? In the way your **Hegel**, your Heinrich **Heine**, your **Schopenhauer** meant something? That there is no longer a single German philosopher—there is no end of astonishment at that.” (*TI*, “What the Germans Lack,” 4). Of course, Nietzsche was confident that he was the **dynamite** to ignite renewal. In *Ecce Homo*, he rails against German superficiality and vulgarity, but his hidden agenda is a quest to set the record straight: “Ten years—and nobody in Germany has felt bound in conscience to defend my name against the absurd silence under which it lies buried” (*EH*, “The Case of Wagner”: 4). See also “*DEUTSCHLAND, DEUTSCHLAND ÜBER ALLES*”; THE STATE; VOLK.

**DIE GESELLSCHAFT DER FREUNDE DES NIETZSCHE-ARCHIVS.** The Society of Friends of the *Nietzsche-Archiv* was founded on 28 September 1926 to protect the interests of the *Nietzsche-Archiv* in “troubled times.” **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche**, **Ernst Thiel**, and **Adalbert Oehler** were made honorary members as were the international luminaries Karl Joel and **Romain Rolland** as well as Anton Kippenberg and Walter Klemm from the Kröner Press. The president was Arnold Paulssen, and members included **Thomas Mann**, **Oswald Spengler**, and Heinrich Wölfflin. Naturally, the Society came to an end with everything else connected with the activities of the *Nietzsche-Archiv* in 1945.

**GIDE, ANDRÉ (1869–1951).** French writer, diarist, and traveler. Gide adopted pagan values after his visits to North Africa in 1893 and 1896. He became an early devotee of Nietzsche, and in his early novel *Les nourritures terrestres*, 1897 (*Fruits of the Earth*, 1949), he recommended “an amalgam of pagan, Nietzschean, hedonistic modes of conduct” (Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane, eds., *Modernism*, 1976). Gide’s novel *L’Immoraliste*, 1902 (*The Immoralist*, 1930), as the title indicates, was directly inspired by Nietzsche, who used the term several times in his late works (his description of himself as “the first *immoralist*” occurs in the posthumous *Ecce Homo*, 1908). In its turn, *L’Immoraliste* had a decisive impact on **André Malraux** and **Thomas Mann**. Although he could read Nietzsche in German, Gide, in his *Lettre à Angèle* (1899), expressed his appreciation for the translations that were starting to appear in French, especially those of Henri Albert. Gide himself was particularly influenced by *The Birth of Tragedy*. All his works testify to the struggle he had in maintaining his skepticism and his “immoral” values. Although Gide was largely neglected before World War I, in spite of his having helped found the influential periodical *La Nouvelle Revue Française* in 1908, he became one of the most prominent writers of his day and was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1947. Refer to W. Wolfgang Holdheim, “The Young Gide’s Reaction to Nietzsche,” *Publications of the Modern Language Association* 72 (1957).

**GOD.** Nietzsche saw “God” as a concept to be expunged from our consciousness: it was a lie taught by the **ascetic priest** in all religions but most perniciously in **Christianity**. Only man can “kill God” (*GS*, III: 125), a complex task since the very **language** we use contains the assumption that “the self” acts within “the world” in a subject–object relationship where the existence of God is posited. This situation caused Nietzsche to comment, “I fear we are not going to get rid of God because we still believe in grammar” (*TI*, “‘Reason’ in Philosophy”: 5). What Nietzsche seeks to show, writes David Cooper, is that “**metaphysicians**, religious believers and **scientists** are all guilty of misunderstanding the nature of language when they make their claims about substance, God, gravity, or whatever, as stating things as they objectively are” (David Cooper, *Authenticity and Learning*, 1983). Only when we realize that words are simply useful

tools will we be able to understand that **morality** goes beyond such catchphrases as “good” and “evil.”

Nietzsche’s pronouncement that “God is dead” (*GS*, III: 125; *Za*, “Zarathustra’s Prologue”: 2) liberates man from putative sin. **Nihilism** in this sense does not leave a moral void but allows us to make sense of our existence, whatever **suffering** and pain it entails, and to convert our interpretation of the world into one that allows the **will to power** to flourish.

**GOETHE, JOHANN WOLFGANG VON (1749–1832).** Germany’s foremost man of letters. A native of Frankfurt, Goethe was invited to visit Weimar by the young Duke Karl August (who awarded him the title “von”) and ended up spending the rest of his life there. The “Sage of Weimar” went through several phases, a pre-Romantic *Sturm und Drang* (“Storm and Stress”), which he virtually founded with his play *Götz von Berlichingen* (1773), swiftly followed by his cult novella *Die Leiden des jungen Werthers*, 1774 (*The Sufferings of Young Werther*, 1957), only to go through a neoclassical phase in the company of **Friedrich Schiller** when the rest of German literature was caught up in **Romanticism**. Goethe wrote dramas, poems, scientific studies, and novels, including the pioneering *Bildungsroman*, *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*, 1795–1796 (*Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship*; trans. 1824 by Thomas Carlyle). Goethe was a skeptic but not aggressively so: he said that it did not matter what people believed as long as they believed in something.

Goethe’s mastery of other disciplines such as **science** has ensured his status as Germany’s foremost man of letters. He wrote a theory of the spectrum (*Zur Farbenlehre*, 1810) and coined the term *morphology* to describe the way creatures develop, searching in those pre-**Darwinian** days for the *Urbild* or “primordial image,” as in his *Versuch, die Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu erklären* (“Attempt to Explain the Metamorphosis of Plants,” 1790). Goethe’s friend, the comparative anatomist Carl Gustav Carus, developed a theory of the unconscious that paid due attention to psychic phenomena; **Carl Gustav Jung** later based his theory of the archetype on some of the ideas postulated by Goethe and Carus.

Nietzsche applauded Goethe for his stature and independence, mentioning him hundreds of times in his works and always with the

greatest respect. Among Goethe's voluminous writings, too numerous to list here, the most important for Nietzsche was *Faust* (I: 1808 and II: p.h. 1832), where "the Earth Spirit" (*Geist der Erde*) uses the word *Übermensch* (in *Faust I*, "Night") to describe Faust. In the play, Faust proves woefully all too human, and Mephistopheles really ought to win his bet: but Faust's sheer striving endears him to God, so that the sinner at the very end of *Faust II*, a play quite different in character from *Faust I*, is redeemed when Gretchen—now the **eternal feminine**—triumphantly carries Faust's spirit aloft. Goethe paid a complex tribute to **women** with this portrayal, and it must be said that Nietzsche's querulous adaptation does him no favors, making him seem envious of Goethe's virile confidence with women. Goethe's Gretchen, the embodiment of the eternal feminine, is the archetypal victim of men's lust and not, as Nietzsche implies when he uses the term, a harpy whom men should fear: "love is merely a refined form of parasitism" (*CW*: 3).

In *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche gives Goethe the fulsome accolade that he is "not a German event but a European one . . . he did not sever himself from life, he placed himself within it" (*TI*, "Expeditions of Untimely Man": 49). Most important, Goethe provided a model for the *Übermensch*, as Nietzsche's description in *Twilight of the Idols* makes plain:

Goethe conceived of a strong, highly cultured human being, who . . . dares to allow himself the whole compass and wealth of **naturalness**, who is strong enough for this freedom; a man of tolerance, not out of weakness, but out of strength . . . a man to whom nothing is forbidden, except it be *weakness*, whether that weakness be called vice or virtue . . . (*TI*, "Expeditions of Untimely Man": 49)

Goethe's "strong human being" tallies in many ways with Nietzsche's ideal of the sovereign individual described in *On the Genealogy of Morality*. Refer to Hans Erhard Gerber, *Nietzsche und Goethe* (1953).

**GORKY, MAXIM (1868–1936).** Russian writer. Gorky is popularly regarded as the father of Soviet literature. His first novel, *Foma Gordeyev* (1899), provides evidence that he had read Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy*, which had been translated into Russian that same year, though from his earlier stories, the ideals of superhu-

man nobility and beauty indicate that he already knew *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* well; this remained his favorite among Nietzsche's works. In this novel, the young Gorky obviously wished to blend Nietzschean-inspired dynamism and ecstatic **Dionysianism** with what he would later refer to as "active" compassion as part of his humanitarianism.

Gorky was convinced that a religion of God-building (*Bogostroitel'stvo*), centered on man, would replace the conventional worship of **God**, and he tried to emphasize Nietzsche's Dionysian principle as being anti-individualistic. He never resolved this contradiction. As his revolutionary fervor grew, Gorky became critical of Nietzsche, repudiating him in the essay "*Zametki o meshchantstve*" ("Notes on the Merchant Class"). Gorky's sympathy with the **Marxist** activists prompted him to take part in the unsuccessful Revolution of 1905, and he was forced into exile. By this time, he had an international reputation as a writer, but this was somewhat dented in 1907 with the publication of *Mat* (*The Mother*, 1947), viewed in the capitalist West as a highly tendentious work. Having returned to Russia in 1913, Gorky openly supported the Bolsheviks but criticized them after the 1917 Revolution for their dictatorial practices. Refer to Betty Yetta Forman, "Nietzsche and Gorky in the 1890s. The Case for an Early Influence," in *Western Philosophical Systems in Russian Literature*, ed. Anthony M. Mlikotin (1970).

**GRAND POLITICS** (*GROSSE POLITIK*). Nietzsche disliked politics and advised his readers not to read the daily papers. Having briefly supported the founding of the new **German state** in 1871, he turned away from **Otto von Bismarck's** grand politics with their prescription of "blood and iron" (*BGE*, VIII: 254). In *Beyond Good and Evil*, he writes,

It is the age of the masses, they fall on their faces before anything massive. And *in politics* likewise. A statesman who builds for them another Tower of Babel, some monstrosity of empire and power, they call "great." . . . (*BGE*, VIII: 241)

If grand politics are for the masses, **nationalism** and **anti-Semitism** are "small politics" (*EH*, "The Case of Wagner": 2), and the matter could have rested there. However, in *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche hijacks his own idea and sees himself as part of the scenario: "Only starting

with me will there be grand politics on earth” (*EH*, “Why I Am a Destiny”: 1). Writing a draft of a letter to Georg Brandes at the beginning of December 1888, he states confidently, “We are part of a grand politics, perhaps the grandest of all.” At the end of the draft, he writes that his new manuscript, *The Anti-Christ*, will be world shattering: “*Große Politik par excellence.*”

**THE GREEKS.** Nietzsche was at home among the ancient Greeks; as a student in 1864, he changed faculty, moving with ease from theology to classical philology after only one semester at Bonn University, the groundwork having been done at Schulpforta. His work on **Diogenes Laërtius** was sufficiently impressive to gain him the recommendation of his tutor, Friedrich Ritschl, for the chair of philology at Basel when he was still only 24; his dissertation was on Theognis, the fifth-century Athenian poet. However, it was the world of **Homer**, peopled by heroes and gods—not always distinguishable from one another—that gripped Nietzsche’s imagination; his distinction between **Dionysus** (Greek god of wine and **music**) and **Apollo** is outlined in *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872). Here, **music** symbolizes, for Nietzsche, the intoxications and instinctual **drives** that make us human: Dionysus is in each of us. (Just before he went insane, Nietzsche thought he *was* Dionysus.) Nietzsche thought the hardness and courage of the ancient Greeks became softened after **Socrates** had introduced weakening elements into Greek thought, albeit via **Plato**’s dialogues. For Nietzsche, Socrates’ thought, as mediated by Plato, represented the worst kind of **ascetic ideal**.

In his essay *The Greek State* (1871), one of the *Five Prefaces to Five Unwritten Books*, Nietzsche writes that in order to produce **artists** of genius, the Greeks had to leave the work to slaves: “The misery of men living a life of toil has to be increased to make the production of the world of art possible for a small number of Olympian men” (*TGS* in *OGM*). Pre-Socratic Greece had bred heroes whose aspirations revolved around a life of contest and victory. In *Homer’s Contest* (1871), the final essay in the *Five Prefaces to Five Unwritten Books*, Nietzsche praises the way the Greeks understood contest as a positive incentive, not as an invitation to **ressentiment**. Their reconciliation with fate came not from ignorance or naïveté but from a brave acceptance of necessity.

Although Nietzsche altered many of his opinions as he matured, he did not budge on the position of **women**. In an early essay of 1871 found in the *Nachlaß* (which appeared in **Oscar Levy's** *Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche* in 1911 under the title "The Greek Woman"), Nietzsche argued that the whole fabric of ancient Greece had been held together by the collective "self-denying ordinance" of the women, who devoted their entire lives to their sons. Thus emerged the heroes who peopled the great legends of ancient Greece. It remained his firm conviction that women in the 19th century had something to learn from the way the ancient Greeks treated their women.

Throughout his work, Nietzsche never lost sight of the enigmatic philosopher **Heraclitus**. In his unfinished essay, *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* (*Philosophie im Tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen*, 1871), Nietzsche had tried to work on the Heraclitan view of becoming, hoping it might confirm his own view of absolute becoming. His theory of **eternal return**, first mooted in *The Gay Science*, represents a return to **Heraclitan** cosmology. Nietzsche also accepted much of what Democritus (ca. 460–370 B.C.) had to say on the materiality of the atom, while Epicurus (ca. 341–270), whose theories on the atom might also have derived indirectly from Democritus, was a hero who knew how to live and how to philosophize.

Although Nietzsche professed to dislike **history**, he held the historian Thucydides in high regard, especially for his portrait of the ruthless Alcibiades in the *History of the Peloponnesian War*; such a warrior became, for Nietzsche, a template for **master morality**. In his late work *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche confessed, "My recreation, my preference, my *cure* for all *Platonism*, has always been Thucydides" (*TI*, "What I Owe the Ancients": 2). Refer to Victorino Tejera, *Nietzsche and Greek Thought* (1987). See also GREEK TRAGEDY.

**"THE GREEK STATE."** Third essay of the *Five Prefaces to Five Unwritten Books*, written in 1871. Here, Nietzsche argues that modern man is pulled between an inclination for **art** and the necessity for work, a conflict not experienced by the ancient Greek, who left work to the slaves and even regarded art as work; thus, though the Greek regarded it as essential to drop everything if he felt creative inspiration, he was somewhat ashamed by this in the same way that a father

is bashful about procreation even though he has produced a beautiful child. Nietzsche argues that the Greeks saw both work and slavery as a necessary disgrace, accepting the laws of injustice and cruelty. To have cultural production, others had to toil more than their fair share. The Greeks acknowledged that “might is right,” as distilled in Nietzsche’s image of “the conqueror with the iron hand” (*TGS* in *OGM*); accepting art as a tool of the state, each Greek polis set about competing with its neighbor, sometimes with “murderous greed.” Nietzsche argues that “this mysterious connection between the state and art, political greed and artistic creation” (*TGS* in *OGM*) gives a false impression that the state is a mere iron clamp, whereas without it there would be a Hobbesian **war** of all against all. Nietzsche argues in favor of preparedness for war because it keeps a state on its mettle. Deploping the contemporary convergence of liberal politics and a “stateless money aristocracy,” Nietzsche mourns the “inevitable decline of the arts” and quips, “You will just have to excuse me if I occasionally sing a pæan to war” (*TGS* in *OGM*). Nietzsche’s polemic for and against the state is summed up thus:

The state, of ignominious birth, a continually flowing source of evil for most people, frequently the ravishing flame of the human race—and yet, a sound that makes us forget ourselves, a battle-cry which has encouraged countless truly heroic acts. . . . (*TGS* in *OGM*)

*See also* GREEK TRAGEDY; THE GREEKS; *HOMER’S CONTEST*.

**GREEK TRAGEDY.** In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche argued that duality was “the origin and essence of Greek tragedy as the expression of two interwoven **artistic** impulses, the *Apollonian* and the *Dionysian*” (*BT*, 12). He applauded the dramas of Aeschylus and Sophocles, where the tragic hero demonstrates Dionysian passion in his struggle against fate and where **cruelty** and **suffering** are presented as part of the human condition. In contrast, **Socrates’** contemporary Euripides heeded the Socratic principle that “**knowledge** is virtue.” Nietzsche writes, “With this canon in his hands, Euripides measured all the separate elements of the drama—**language**, characters, dramaturgic structure, choric **music**—and corrected them according to this principle” (*BT*, 12). Nietzsche blamed Socrates for crushing the spirit of contest in Greek tragedy, not just in general,

through his **rationalism**, but in person, by promoting the interests of Euripides. He even declares that Socrates helped Euripides to write his plays and attended only those dramatic festivals where a new play by Euripides was performed (*BT*, 13). Whether or not Socrates directly caused “the poetic deficiency and degeneration in the work of Euripides” (*BT*, 12), Nietzsche was right to say that the Euripidean hero lacked dynamism, certainly in contrast to a Sophoclean hero like Oedipus.

Whatever the reasons, it is the case that fifth-century Greek tragedy faded out. It is typical of Nietzsche that, true to his avowed dislike of **history** as set forth in the second essay of the *Untimely Meditations*, he preferred to blame Platonic philistinism for Greek cultural decline, ignoring other factors that might have been important, such as the decline of Athens as a city-state. Nietzsche was sure that Socratic dialectic had helped overthrow the awe-inspiring spectacle of man as pawn of the gods, forcing Greek tragedy to bow to philosophy. Not surprisingly, when *The Birth of Tragedy* appeared, it was bitterly criticized by Nietzsche’s colleagues for ignoring historiography. See also THE GREEKS.

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**HABERMAS, JÜRGEN (1929– )**. A “product” of the **Frankfurt School**, Habermas broke new ground in social theory by examining the theories of Ludwig Wittgenstein and postulating that **language** (and not, as **Karl Marx** argued, labor) is a “fundamental, inescapable prerequisite for the reproduction of social life.” In *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, 1981 (*The Theory of Communicative Action*, 1984), Habermas applied this theory to man both as a private individual and as a member of a technocratic society. He criticized Nietzsche for his attack on **science** and for his insistence on man as a being driven by instinct rather than rationality. In *Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne*, 1985 (*The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, 1987), Habermas attacked **Max Horkheimer** and **Theodor Adorno** for remaining “trapped within the perspective of Nietzsche’s cultural criticism” (Georg Stauth and Brian S. Turner, *Nietzsche’s*

a demonstration of what the new literature should be” (R. G. Popperwell, *Penguin Companion to Literature*, 1969). His other novels of the period, *Pan*, 1894; trans. 1956), and *Victoria* (1898; trans. 1929), reveal a Nietzschean tendency to privilege the inner **life**. In *Markens grøde*, 1917 (*The Growth of the Soil*, 1920), which is permeated with Nietzschean attitudes, Hamsun attacks normality and praises the exceptional individual. The soil in question is Norwegian soil: outsiders such as the **Jew** and the “Yankee” are despised. This was, however, regarded as his best book, and in 1920, Hamsun received the Nobel Prize for Literature. However, his popularity had already begun to wane. Readers formerly sympathetic to his work shied away from his pro-Nazi attitude during World War II. In 1947, he was fined for collaboration with the **National Socialists**.

**HANSSON, OLA (1860–1925)**. Swedish writer. Hansson became a resident of Berlin and Munich and was one of Nietzsche’s early admirers, publishing in February 1889 an article on Nietzsche titled “*Friedrich Nietzsche: Die Umrißlinien seines Systems und seiner Persönlichkeit*” (“Friedrich Nietzsche: An Outline of the Man and His System”) in the Leipzig periodical *Unsere Zeit*. Here, he reports Nietzsche’s insanity, hoping that it will be temporary. Also in 1889, Hansson married the writer **Laura Marholm**. Hansson’s brief monograph on Nietzsche, *Friedrich Nietzsche: Seine Persönlichkeit und sein System*, 1890 (*Friedrich Nietzsche: His Personality and His System*, 1968), was the first of its kind. Hansson drew comparisons between Nietzsche and the **Naturalist movement** in his article “*Nietzsche und der Naturalismus*,” published in *Die Gegenwart* (1891). Among Hansson’s works that were influential with the Naturalists are *Pariahs. Fatalistische Geschichten* (*Pariahs: Fatalistic Stories*, 1890) and *Alltagsfrauen: Ein Stück moderner Liebespsychologie* (*Ordinary Women: A Piece of Modern Psychology of Love*, 1891).

**HAPPINESS**. A term Nietzsche can use or abuse at will “to denote both something of which he approves and what he regards as its malignant shadow” (Michael Tanner, *The Anti-Christ*, Introduction). A similar term is **depth** (*Tiefe*). On one level, Nietzsche accepted that happiness was a natural state and therefore good, defining it as a *result* (not goal) of a healthy lifestyle:

first example of my “**revaluation of all values**”: a well-constituted human being, a “happy one,” *must* perform certain actions and instinctively shrinks from other actions, he transports the order of which he is the physiological representative into his relations with other human beings and with things. In formula: his virtue is the *consequence* of his happiness. . . . (TI: “The Four Great Errors,” 2)

On another level, Nietzsche believed that decadent religions (**Christianity** in particular) exploit man’s yearning for happiness by promising that **God** will reward their humility. As the satirically named Mr. Nosy Daredevil in *On the Genealogy of Morality* puts it, “Something will one day be balanced up and paid back with enormous interest in gold, no! in happiness. They call that ‘bliss’” (OGM, I: 14). Nietzsche viewed **utilitarianism** as offering a similarly fraudulent promise of happiness both because its basic premise rested on Christian tenets and because it blocked out the spirit of striving and contest essential to the **higher man**. “What is happiness?—The feeling that power *increases*—that resistance is overcome” (A-C, 2).

**HART, JULIUS (1859–1930)**. German writer and critic and supporter of the **Naturalist movement**. Hart was a frequenter of the *Durch* coterie and a major contributor to the Nietzsche-inspired periodical *Die freie Bühne* around the turn of the century. In 1899, Hart published *Der neue Gott (The New God)*, in which he criticized Nietzsche for his “romantic-dilettante-feminine” approach. Hart, in tune with the *völkisch* sentiments currently in vogue, argued that Nietzsche’s “hall of fame” excluded **Germans** of the type Hart wanted to promote: blond Nordic Aryans. Hart considered **Max Stirner** a superior thinker to Nietzsche and, believing Nietzsche to be Polish, pronounced him to be of inferior race. Hart’s book indicates the level of **nationalism** already current in Germany at the turn of the century.

In spite of his attack on Nietzsche, Hart was inspired by many Nietzschean concepts, as demonstrated in the **Dionysian** tone and dithyrambic style of his book. Hart and his brother Heinrich Hart (1855–1906), author of *Das Lied der Menschheit (Song of Humanity)*, 1888–1896, founded *Die neue Gemeinschaft (The New Society)* in Berlin in order to propound their new religion of liberal mysticism among a circle of bourgeois intellectuals, often with left-wing sympathies. The group included men such as **Gustav Landauer** and

such as **Johannes Schlaf**, were outspokenly hostile, though others, like **Leo Berg**, were strong Nietzscheans. Hauptmann subsequently accepted an invitation to read from his work at the *Nietzsche-Archiv*. Nietzsche did not mention Hauptmann because he collapsed into insanity just as Hauptmann's work was becoming a force to be reckoned with. Because of Hauptmann's attempt to reproduce harsh "reality" on the stage, with characters speaking in dialect, Nietzsche's comments would certainly have been derogatory.

**HEAVINESS (*DIE SCHWERE*)**. As with **depth**, Nietzsche chooses a deceptively simple word to reflect a deeper meaning. "*Schwer*" translates as "heavy," "difficult," or "serious," and although it often appears to be pejorative (and frequently is), as with scholarly punctiliousness or "*schwer nehmen*" (*BGE*, VI: 213), it could also intimate that something is vitally important; in *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche introduces the as-yet-anonymous notion of **eternal return** by means of a Trojan horse, "*das grösste Schwergewicht*" ("the heaviest burden"; *GS*, III: 241). When promoted to an allegorical concept as the **spirit of heaviness**, Nietzsche provides **Zarathustra** (and thus himself) with an alter ego or ventriloquist who can voice the thoughts of the "moral" man, laden with cares. The heaviness of the burden is not really the problem; it is being a man that is the difficulty—and breaking free (from **Christianity**) is hard to do.

**HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH (1770–1831)**. German Idealist philosopher. Born in Stuttgart, Hegel taught briefly at Jena University, where he worked under the precocious Professor Friedrich Schelling until the latter left Jena in 1805. Not long afterward, Hegel embarked on a peripatetic career that would end with his professorship in 1818 in Berlin, where he lived until his death.

Hegel based his philosophy on the concept of *Geist*, which can be translated as "mind" or "spirit." He rejected **Immanuel Kant**'s limitations on knowledge, arguing in *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, 1807 (*Phenomenology of Mind*, 1931), that the human mind arises from consciousness through self-consciousness, reason, spirit, and religion to arrive at absolute knowledge. If we can "think thought" (*das Denken des Denkens*), we are already in touch with absolute knowledge (*das Absolute Wissen*). The finite world is a reflection of the mind,

and there is no conflict with religion, for mind/spirit, as part of “*das Absolute*,” transforms religious ideas into **concepts**. Man can think his own being or essence by knowing himself as mind identical with **God**, or the *Weltgeist* (world spirit).

In 1821, Hegel published his major work, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (*The Philosophy of Right*, 1942). Here, he explains the relevance of the dialectic procedure for the state: the *Weltgeist* moves toward its goal, which is the freedom and self-consciousness of humanity, by indirect methods, exploiting the passions of human beings, who scarcely realize they are part of the dialectic process. A people or nation has its own spirit and is linked to the *Weltgeist* in such a way that the vicissitudes of individual states constitute world **history**. At the end of *The Philosophy of Right*, Hegel states that the synthesis of history is found in the Prussian state (some have therefore construed him to be speaking of “the end of history” at that point since he implies that the dialectic has wound to a halt), but Hegel apparently said something quite different to his students, and perhaps his contrived ending is just a genuflection to flatter the Prussian king and make sure his job remained secure.

From first to last, Nietzsche dismissed Hegel’s entire system, describing it in 1873 as an infectious disease: “He who has once contracted Hegelism and **Schleiermacherism** is never quite cured of them” (*UM*, I: “**David Strauss**, the Confessor and the Writer”: 6), while in 1882, *Parsifal* is “Hegelei in **Musik**” (letter to Malwida von Meysenbug, 13 July 1882). In *The Case of Wagner*, Nietzsche thunders,

Let us remember that **Wagner** was young at the time Hegel and Schelling seduced men’s spirits; that he guessed, that he grasped with his very hands the only thing the **Germans** take seriously—“the idea,” which is to say, something that is obscure, uncertain, full of intimations; that among Germans clarity is an objection, logic a refutation. . . . Hegel is a *taste*. (*CW*, 10)

*See also* GERMAN IDEALISM; ROMANTICISM.

**HEIDEGGER, MARTIN (1889–1976)**. German existentialist philosopher. Heidegger studied at Freiburg under Edmund Husserl. He then taught at Marburg before returning to lecture and write at Freiburg. His major work, *Sein und Zeit*, 1927 (*Being and Time*, 1949), is a

seminal **metaphysical** enquiry. Heidegger was part of the team working at the *Nietzsche-Archiv* on the publication of a new Nietzsche edition, but he was a misfit for a variety of reasons. According to Manfred Riedel, **Richard Oehler** had denounced Heidegger's *Being and Time* as "**Jewish** philosophy" (Manfred Riedel, *Nietzsche in Weimar*, 2000). For his part, Heidegger disapproved of the money spent on the **Nietzsche-Halle** and did not attend the opening ceremony in 1937; he also thought Baeumler's political approach to Nietzsche was superficial. However, Heidegger has not escaped the accusation of being a fellow traveler who did not speak out against the **National Socialists**.

Heidegger took up the post of rector of Freiburg University in April 1933. In his "rectoral address," he spoke of the German *Volk*, whose time, he made clear, had now come, implying support for National Socialism to the point of endorsing racism. Heidegger had joined the NSDA (*Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*) shortly before Hitler was elected chancellor in January 1933 (thus before there was overwhelming pressure to do so: Hitler did not assume power until November 1933). He resigned as rector in early 1934 but continued to lecture until 1944. In 1945, he was investigated by the occupying powers and temporarily forbidden to teach. Heidegger was an intensely private man who made few public statements; his defenders describe him as a naive inhabitant of the ivory tower and thus rationalize his support for Hitler and the *Führer* principle, pointing out that this is not evident in his philosophy. His critics point out that if he regretted his brief Nazi past, he never said so.

Heidegger's lectures from 1936 to 1946 form the basis of his substantial work *Nietzsche* (1961; trans. 1979–1986). During the 1920s and early 1930s, Heidegger had been a frequent visitor at the *Nietzsche-Archiv*; in 1931, he was a collaborator on the *Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe*. His chief interest in this was to have proper access to Nietzsche's posthumous manuscripts, which he viewed as Nietzsche's major work, dismissing all Nietzsche's published works as "a foreground" and declaring, "The actual philosophy remains behind as *Nachlaß*" (*Nietzsche*, 1961: Introduction). He defined the **will to power** itself as "incontrovertibly striving toward the possibility of exercising power, a striving toward the possession of **power**"

(*Nietzsche*, 1961, II). Heidegger took very little notice of Nietzsche's attempts to make power more than **metaphysics** and largely ignored his forays into **natural science: eternal return** as **metaphor** lay at the heart of his study of Nietzsche, and this would fire French enthusiasm—at least within the existentialist circle around **Jean-Paul Sartre** and **Albert Camus**—with a curiosity for Nietzsche's ideas. Heidegger was the first philosopher to make Nietzsche's *Nachlaß* the central focus of his study. **Gilles Deleuze** took Heidegger's ideas a step further in *Nietzsche et la Philosophie* (1963), but the chief heir to Heidegger, in Nietzschean terms, is **Jacques Derrida**. Refer to Eckhard Heftrich, *Durchblicke* (1970; chapter “*Nietzsche im Denken Heideggers*”), and Tom Rockmore, *On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy* (1992).

**HEIGHT.** See HIGHER MAN.

**HEINE, HEINRICH (1797–1856).** German writer of **Jewish** extraction. Heine was made to feel an outcast in Germany, and to circumvent this he converted to Protestantism in 1825. His early poems in *Buch der Lieder* (1827) contain a dichotomy between “Poesy” (poetic sensibility) and realism, while his autobiographical *Reisebilder* (*Travel Scenes*, 1826–1831) display wit and a growing social awareness. In 1831, following the 1830 revolution in France, Heine left Germany for Paris, attracted by Saint-Simonianism, and lived there until his death. Heine published more poetry in France as well as two books on **German cultural history**—*Die Romantische Schule* (1833–1835) and *Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland* (1834–1835)—both published originally in French, but his fame was secured with two biting satirical works on Germany: *Deutschland: Ein Wintermärchen* (*Germany: A Winter's Tale*, 1844) and *Atta Troll: Ein Sommernachtstraum* (*Atta Troll: A Midsummer Night's Dream*, 1843–1845).

Heine's attack on Germany met its mark, and it is not surprising that Nietzsche found in him a kindred spirit, making a number of references to Heine in his works that leave no doubt as to his admiration. There are also references to Heine in the unpublished notes. Nietzsche admired the way Heine had assimilated into French culture, becoming part of “the flesh and blood of the more refined and

demanding lyric poets of Paris” (*BGE*, VIII: 254). In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche again praised Heine for showing him what a true lyrical poet was, praising his “divine malice” and wonderful **style**: “and how he handles German!” (*EH*, “Why I Am So Clever”: 4).

**HERACLITUS (ca. 540–480 B.C.)**. Ancient **Greek** cosmologist. Heraclitus developed a doctrine of absolute becoming in which reality is characterized by constant change. Everything in the universe is held in balance, in spite of constant apparent contradictions, as between good and evil, sickness and health, and so on. There might be an impression of stability, but in fact there is only becoming. An oft-cited example is that a man cannot enter the same river twice; the water seems to be the same, but as it is constantly flowing, it will never actually be the same. Plato dubbed this a theory of flux and found fault with it since it contradicted his theory of forms. Nietzsche accepted much of the doctrine of absolute becoming but meshed it in with his own theory of **time** and used it as a basis for his teaching of **eternal return**. Nietzsche first conceived the idea of eternal return in 1881 when writing the fateful book 3 of *The Gay Science* (341/342), introducing as it did both **Zarathustra** and eternal return (at first simply referred to pro tem as “the **heaviest** burden”). In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche reflects that Heraclitus might have been the first to discover eternal return: “this doctrine of Zarathustra *might* already have been taught by Heraclitus. At least the Stoa had traces of it, and the Stoics inherited almost all of their principal notions from Heraclitus” (*EH*, “The Birth of Tragedy”: 3). He also probably linked **Zarathustra** (Zoroaster) to Heraclitus through their joint belief in the primal function of fire as well, as through their notion of twinned opposites (chiefly good and evil) as balancing poles. Certainly, behind *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* we must reckon with the influence of Heraclitus as well as Zoroaster.

It is hard to be precise about Heraclitus’s theory of creation because few fragments of his work survive. He apparently held that fire was the essential force of creation and was the unifying material that held the universe in place. It was associated with rationality. Fire became flame and smoke and entered the ether as air; this air turned to pure fire and returned to the sea. Meanwhile, an equal proportion of earth became sea, and sea became fire. Paul Bishop comments, “Although

‘cold’ and ‘warm,’ ‘damp’ and ‘dry’ were perpetually transforming themselves into each other, the wise soul was ‘dry’” (Paul Bishop, *The Dionysian Self*, 1995).

**THE HERD (DIE HERDE).** Nietzsche mainly indicated his contempt for “the herd” through his spokesman, **Zarathustra**. The lower man or herd man lacks *amor fati*, which means that he has none of the propensity for a cheerful and “willed” acceptance of his fate, unlike the **higher man** or his planned apotheosis, the *Übermensch*. Furthermore, the herd man accepts the **ascetic ideal** and aligns himself with what he thinks is a “free society,” which, however, only encourages the “animalization of man to the pygmy animal of equal rights and equal pretensions” (*BGE*, V: 203). Nietzsche decides that for democrats, socialists, and “*new philosophers*,” herd man is “their man of the future” (*BGE*, V: 203), whereas for Nietzsche he is an object of disgust. In the *Will to Power*, there is a whole section on “The Herd” that finishes as follows:

My philosophy aims at an ordering of rank: not at an individualistic morality. The ideas of the herd should rule in the herd—but not reach out beyond it: the leaders of the herd require a fundamentally different valuation for their own actions, as do the independent, or “the beasts of prey,” etc. (*WP*, II: 287)

*See also* LAST MAN; *UNTERMENSCH*.

**HESSE, HERMANN (1877–1962).** German writer. Like Nietzsche, the son of parents with neo-**Pietistic** sympathies, Hesse had connections to India that come to the fore in *Siddharta* (1922; trans. 1954). The influence of Nietzsche on Hesse is already clear in his earliest novel *Peter Camenzind* (1904; trans. 1961), though Hesse remained preoccupied with matters related to the *Bildungsroman* until he produced his own major novels, beginning with *Demian* (1919; trans. 1958). In 1916, Hesse had a nervous breakdown, adversely affected by family problems and worry about World War I; in the same year, he began his first course of psychoanalytic treatment with J. B. Lang (a pupil of **Carl Gustav Jung**). Hesse was a critic of the political situation in Germany but saw the solution in a betterment of man’s whole **life**—his spiritual life and his appreciation of **aesthetics**. These ideas are expressed in the essay “*Zarathustras Wiederkehr*” (“Zarathustra’s

**HEYSE, PAUL (1830–1914)**, German writer. Heyse studied Italian and was active as a translator as well as a writer of poetry, prose, and drama. When offered the patronage of King Maximilian II in 1854, he moved to Munich and spent the rest of his life there, becoming a prolific writer at the center of the (then) somewhat lackluster Munich literary scene, where much attention was paid to form. In his novel *Über allen Gipfeln* (*Above All the Treetops*, 1895), Heyse portrays a bourgeois protagonist who makes blustering propaganda for Nietzsche (mentioned by name in the book) and who at first believes that he can stand outside the realm of “good and evil,” only to realize that one can “only submit to the dazzling madness” for a short period. Heyse’s “shallow, moralizing conception” of Nietzsche’s thought (Bruno Hillebrand, *Nietzsche und die deutsche Literatur*, 1878) brings the novel’s rank lower than his best work; it was nevertheless immensely popular with the general reader; *Über allen Gipfeln* reached its 10th edition in 1899. An opponent of the **Naturalist movement**, Heyse was a fading star when he won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1910.

**THE HIGHER MAN (DER HÖHERE MENSCH)**. Nietzsche’s term for the embryonic human who, with his courage, cheerfulness, propensity for laughter, and essential nobility of spirit, has the potential to develop into the *Übermensch*, a development contingent on his capacity for the **will to power**, acceptance of **eternal return**, and readiness to adopt the fundamentals of **master morality**. He must seek to construct his own **morality** and create his own destiny by a willing **affirmation of life** and by *amor fati*. His rejection of the life-denying **ascetic ideal** is the first move on the way to higher health.

In book 4 of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, eight higher men visit Zarathustra to partake of a “final supper” with him. During the meal, Zarathustra teaches them the virtues of the higher man: now that **God** is dead, they should laugh and **dance**. Even though they are failures, they have the capacity for self-overcoming. They must avoid the man of **ressentiment** at all costs. So craven are these higher men that Zarathustra has difficulty in stopping them from praying to the ass in his cave (*Za*, IV: “The Awakening,” 1–2); suffice it to say that Zarathustra knows their faults, but he also knows how they can be overcome.

The eight higher men are presumably based on real people, and Weaver Santaniello (S) believes she has unlocked the key to their identities (*Zarathustra's Last Supper: Nietzsche's Eight Higher Men*, 2005). R. J. Hollingdale (H) in the introduction to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* also believed he had broken the code. The results are as follows: the *prophet* is **Arthur Schopenhauer** (H), whereas (S) calls him the *soothsayer* and decides that he is Heinrich von Stein; the *two kings* are any two kings (H and S); the *conscientious man of the spirit* is “probably **Darwin**” (H), whereas (S) renames him the “*bleeding man*” and interprets him as **Erwin Rohde**; the *sorcerer* (H) or *magician* (S) is **Richard Wagner** (H and S); the *last Pope* is imaginary (H) or Franz Liszt (S); the *voluntary beggar* is Buddha/Tolstoi (H) or Jesus/Buddha (S); the *ugliest man* is an atheist (H) or **Socrates** (S); the *shadow* is a freethinker (H) or Moses (S).

Nietzsche uses the term “*Mensch*,” which is not gendered, meaning that the previous comments could apply to a woman just as well as to a man, though Nietzsche does not provide a context inviting one to do so. The higher man’s true counterpart is **herd** man, who will always remain at the level of the herd and obedient to **slave morality**. See also ANIMALS, LAST MAN.

**HILLER, KURT (1885–1973)**. German writer and publicist. Hiller founded a literary group, *Der neue Klub*, in Berlin in 1909 that included the poets **Georg Heym**, Jakob van Hoddis, and Ernst Blass and represented the first wave of **Expressionism**. They aimed at a regeneration of contemporary society, which they (prophetically) held to be heading for disaster. All were avid Nietzscheans, and Hiller, in particular, knew his work well. The group’s heyday was 1910. Its members developed a theory, *der neue Pathos*. This was “an overt expression of Nietzsche’s ‘**will to power**,’ a synthesis of mind and body, of feeling and thought” (Roy Allen, *German Expressionist Poetry*, 1979).

The members of *Der neue Klub* were often members of other clubs or associated with periodicals such as *Die Aktion* and *Der Sturm* at the same time, and all tended to meet at the *Café des Westens*. In 1918, Hiller founded a brand of “activism”; its goals—briefly summarized as having the purpose of bringing back **Geist** into German intellectual discourse—were propounded in his journal *Das Ziel* and his book

*Geist werde Herr (Let Mind Become Master, 1920)*. The Dadaists immediately attacked him for elitism. Hiller was subsequently one of the first of the generation of Expressionists to be arrested by the Gestapo. He spent 15 years in exile in London. His autobiographical *Leben gegen die Zeit (Living Against the Time)* was published in 1969.

**HISTORY.** A dangerous pursuit, according to Nietzsche, though his attitude to history turns out to be ambivalent. Historiography had become a popular new branch of research in Wilhelmine Germany, and Nietzsche regularly registered his objections to it as hidebound and alienating, arguing that historical studies had become too “**scientific**” (in line with **Charles Darwin**’s theories). He also disapproved of Hegelian dialectic, which used history in a new way, as well as the more tangible “dumbing down” of contemporary history. Certainly, **Otto von Bismarck** encouraged a popular chauvinism to celebrate recent events, erecting patriotic monuments (often statues of himself). Another reason for Nietzsche’s objection to history was that he had decided that **forgetting** was essential to man’s psyche, and yet another was that history paralyzes the “**forces of life**” (*UM*, II: “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” 2) by analyzing dead time (Nietzsche also found fault with philology’s study of dead books). For this myriad of reasons, Nietzsche in the second essay of the *Untimely Meditations*, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life” (1874), listed his five principal objections to history:

It creates that contrast with inner and outer . . . and thereby weakens the personality; it leads an age to imagine that it possesses the rarest of virtues, justice, to a greater degree than any other age; it disrupts the instincts of a people, and hinders the individual no less than the whole in the attainment of maturity; it implants the belief, harmful at any time, in the old age of mankind, the belief that one is a latecomer and epigone; it leads an age into a dangerous mood of irony in regard to itself. . . .” (*UM*: “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” 5)

Nietzsche—whose favorite thinker among the ancient **Greeks** was the historian Thucydides—was really objecting to historiographers like **Heinrich von Treitschke** rather than history as such.

In favor of history, Nietzsche postulates an **aesthetic** approach to history that prompts us to recognize the whole from a part, a temple from a few pillars; for example, “It is in this ability rapidly to recon-

*and Evil*, as well as by the general aura of right-wing Nietzscheanism emanating from the *Nietzsche-Archiv*, where Nietzsche's sister **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** presided over her brother's literary estate. Hitler visited Elisabeth at the *Nietzsche-Archiv* on a number of occasions, each time receiving an ecstatic welcome. In 1934, he posed for a photograph beside **Max Klinger's** herm of Nietzsche.

Hitler's recognition of the propaganda value of Nietzsche's ideas for National Socialism predictably occasioned many attempts to implicate Nietzsche's thought with Nazi ideology; these were so successful that it has been a principal task of all postwar Nietzsche societies—and indeed all “Nietzscheans”—to give an account of how and why it was possible for Nietzsche's ideas to be misrepresented in this way. Refer to Jochen Kirchhoff, *Nietzsche, Hitler und die Deutschen: Die Perversionen des Neuen Zeitalters vom unerlösten Schatten des Dritten Reiches* (*Nietzsche, Hitler and the Germans: Perversions of the New Age by the Unredeemed Shadow of the Third Reich*, 1990). See also ANTI-SEMITISM; BAEUMLER, ALFRED; GERMANS; VOLK.

**HOFMANNSTHAL, HUGO VON (1874–1929)**. Austrian poet, dramatist, and librettist. Hofmannsthal became familiar with the work of Nietzsche in the summer of 1891, corresponding with **Arthur Schnitzler** on the subject. Although Hofmannsthal wrote little about Nietzsche, his name is constantly associated with him, and in 1925 he was a member of the editorial committee of *Ariadne*, the journal of the Munich-based *Nietzsche-Gesellschaft* (although only one issue was published). Like **Stefan George** and **Rainer Maria Rilke**, Hofmannsthal rejected the current trends characterized in the **Naturalist movement**, turning to the past for inspiration, and his work displays many features of *Jugendstil*. There is a neo-Romantic eroticism pervading most of his works, the most famous of which are the plays *Der Tor und der Tod*, 1893 (*Death and the Fool*, 1913), and *Jedermann* (*Everyman*, 1911), the latter being the best received of the three plays he wrote specifically for the Salzburg Festival, which he established with **Richard Strauss** and Max Reinhardt. Hofmannsthal had a fruitful collaboration with Richard Strauss as librettist for several of his major operas, including *Ariadne auf Naxos* (1912–1916). Hofmannsthal's concern over the decline of **culture** echoed that of

Nietzsche and was set out in the famous avant-garde essay “*Brief des Lord Chandos*” (1903). Unlike Nietzsche, he retained a religious dimension in his writings, and his work is permeated with **Christian** moral purpose. Refer to Jürgen Meyer-Wendt, *Der frühe Hofmannsthal und die Gedankenwelt Nietzsches* (*The Early Hofmannsthal and Nietzsche’s Thought*, 1973).

**HÖLDERLIN, (JOHANN CHRISTIAN) FRIEDRICH (1770–1843)**. German poet. Nietzsche hailed the “glorious Hölderlin” as a “tragic soul” (*UM*, I: “David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer,” 2), and the many references to the poet in his oeuvre demonstrate that Nietzsche not only admired Hölderlin’s work but also felt great personal affinity toward him. Hölderlin’s mother, an impoverished widow, had sought to encourage a priestly calling in her son, but the latter found the pressure of training for the ministry too great, especially in view of his deep admiration for the myths of ancient **Greece**. Hölderlin eventually became a pantheist: in his poems, gods inhabit the earth and sky, the sun and the sea. In this way, by introducing his fellow man to the universe, Hölderlin felt that he was fulfilling the role of priest. **Friedrich Schiller**, who met Hölderlin in 1793, immediately recognized his talent and helped him to find a post as tutor in the house of a banker in Frankfurt; unfortunately, Hölderlin fell in love with the banker’s wife, Susette (the “Diotima” of his work), and was dismissed. Nervously unfit for the travails of this life, Hölderlin became mentally ill in 1802. He is most famous for his novel in letters, *Hyperion* (I: 1797; II: 1799); this and his translations of Sophocles’ *Antigone* and *Oedipus Rex* (1804) were the only works to reach print before he went incurably insane in 1806. His most famous poems written before 1802 are “*Hyperions Schicksalslied*” (“Hyperion’s Song of Fate”), “*An die Parzen*” (“To the Fates”), and *Brot und Wein* (“Bread and Wine”); among the best known, written in 1802–1806, are “*Hälfte des Lebens*” (“The Middle of Life”), *Friedensfeier* (“Celebration of Peace”), and “*Der Rhein*” and “*Patmos*” (written 1802–1806). Hölderlin’s play *Der Tod des Empedokles* (*The Death of Empedocles*), which he worked on from 1799 to 1801, remained unfinished. Hölderlin’s work was largely ignored in his lifetime, but Nietzsche’s recognition of him as a kindred spirit helped to establish his reputation early in the 20th century

among Nietzscheans such as **Stefan George**, **Martin Heidegger**, **Gustav Landauer**, Ernst Cassirer, and **Rudolf Pannwitz**. The bold dithyrambs of *Hyperion* no doubt helped to inspire the poetic diction of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, while **Zarathustra's** apostrophe to the rising sun (*Za*, III: "Before Sunrise") is Nietzsche's most obvious testimonial to Hölderlin. Refer to Alfred Kellertat, *Hölderlin: Beiträge zu seinem Verständnis in unserem Jahrhundert (Essays towards an Understanding of Hölderlin in Our Century, 1960)*.

**HOLZ, ARNO (1863–1929)**. German writer. A founding member of *Durch* in Berlin in 1886, Holz initiated the **Naturalist movement** in Germany when, in collaboration with **Johannes Schlaf**, he wrote three novellas subsequently published in 1889 as *Papa Hamlet*. Holz recognized that Nietzsche's ideas were contrary to his own theories. In 1890, in the first review in the *Die freie Bühne* to mention Nietzsche, he remarked that "there was nothing that echoed hollow" than Nietzsche's hammer. Holz remained all his life a "fanatical theorist" of the Naturalist movement (Jethro Bithell, *Germany: A Companion to German Studies, 1962*). In *Die Kunst, ihr Wesen und ihre Gesetze (The Nature and Laws of Art, 1891–1892)*, he set forth the rules whereby **art** should mirror **nature** as faithfully as possible, and in *Revolution in der Lyrik (Revolution in the Lyric, 1899)*, he explains how free verse can form an "acoustic picture," putting this into practice in the collection *Phantasus (1898–1916)*. In his social satire *Die Sozialaristokraten (Society Aristocrats, 1896)*, Holz satirizes the superficial acquaintanceship many were starting to profess toward Nietzsche, who is mentioned several times, as is *The Gay Science* and the concepts **master morality** and **will to power**. The novel is a roman à clef based on Holz himself, **Bruno Wille**, John Henry Mackay, and **Stanislaus Przybyszewski**.

**HOMER**. Ninth- or eighth-century B.C. **Greek** poet and putative author of the epic poems *The Iliad* and *The Odyssey*. In his unpublished early work there are two pieces that recount the famous contest between Homer and Hesiod: "*Der Florentinische Tractat bei Homer und Hesiod, ihre Geschichte und ihren Wettkampf*" (1870–1873) and "*Certamen quod dicitur Homeri et Hesiodi*" (1871, both in *KGW* II, 1). In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche demonstrates how and why

Homer's legendary gods lived on through attic tragedy to influence Greek **cultural** life. He thought the polar dichotomy between **Apollo** and **Dionysus** was best expressed in the dithyrambs of Aeschylus and that Platonic/Socratic reasoning had ruined the wonderful Dionysian festivals of **Greek tragedy** and destroyed forever the world of Homer: "Plato *versus* Homer; that is complete, genuine antagonism" (*OGM*, III: 26). *See also* *HOMER'S CONTEST*.

**HOMER'S CONTEST (HOMERS WETTKAMPF)**. Early essay of 1872 and the fifth of the *Five Prefaces to Five Unwritten Books*. The title refers to a legendary contest between **Homer** and Hesiod, but this only receives oblique mention in the essay itself. Nietzsche admired the way the **Greeks** viewed struggle and argued in *Homer's Contest* that contest was essential to the Greek way of life. He believed that what made Greek **art** so spectacular was the annual festival of **Greek tragedy**, which motivated direct competition between dramatists in open contest. Nietzsche propounds the significance of the Greek goddess Eris (envy), who has a dualistic nature: the good Eris spurs on the individual to competitive feats, as approvingly recounted in Homer, whereas the bad Eris encourages the individual to resent the prowess of others. Such poisonous resentment lies at the heart of Nietzsche's later conception of **ressentiment**. Setting aside his arguments for the strong individual, Nietzsche argues that the Greek state toppled the preeminent individual precisely so that competition would not dry up—"to renew the tournament of forces" (*HC* in *OGM*). Such was the positive spirit produced by contest among the Greeks: "How wonderful!" Nietzsche exclaims (*HC* in *OGM*). This is the key to Nietzsche's constant references to struggle and to his assumption that **suffering** and even **cruelty** are necessary to the human condition and something that we can **affirm**. "Without envy, jealousy and competitive ambition, the Hellenic state, like Hellenic man, deteriorates" (*HC* in *OGM*). *See also* *THE GREEKS*; *THE GREEK STATE*; *PLATO*; *SOCRATES*.

**HORKHEIMER, MAX (1895–1973)**. German social theorist. In 1930, Horkheimer became the leading figure of the **Frankfurt School** when he succeeded Carl Grünberg as director of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, the first **Marxist** research center affiliated

to a major university in Germany. In 1933, Horkheimer, like most of his colleagues, was forced to emigrate, working at Columbia University until 1949. In 1934, Horkheimer published *Dämmerung. Notizen aus Deutschland* (*Twilight: Notes from Germany*) under the pseudonym Heinrich Regius, where he acknowledged the potential for Nietzsche's elitist philosophy to be transformed into praxis by the proletariat, since it could thereby shake off the false consciousness of its "**slave morality**." A similar argument occurs in the essays "*Autorität und Familie*" and "*Egoismus und Freiheitsbewegung*" ("Egoism and the Freedom Movement"), where Horkheimer sees his own theory—that bourgeois **morality** has systematically destroyed human **drives**—confirmed by Nietzsche. Nevertheless, in essays such as "*Traditionelle und kritische Theorie*" (1937), Horkheimer criticized Nietzsche for not paying sufficient attention to the total structure of the society he attacked. As Peter Pütz has argued, Horkheimer's whole notion of a "social totality" is so all-embracing as to virtually exclude everything else (Peter Pütz, "Nietzsche and Critical Theory," *Telos* 50, 1981–1982). In collaboration with **Theodor Adorno**, Horkheimer wrote the influential *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, 1947 (*Dialectics of the Enlightenment*, 1972), which came out two years before both men returned to Frankfurt.

**HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN (MENSCHLICHES, ALLZUMENSCHLICHES, 1878–1880)**. Subtitled *A Book for Free Spirits*, this was Nietzsche's second book. The first part, published in 1878, bore a dedication to **Voltaire**. In 1879 and 1880, respectively, the appendices *Assorted Opinions and Maxims* and *The Wanderer and His Shadow* were published separately. Finally, the whole work was republished in 1886, with the appendices incorporated as parts 1 and 2 of volume 2 and the dedication to Voltaire removed.

As Richard Schacht has pointed out with reference to this work, Nietzsche was seen at the time as a professor of philology who had not lived up to his early promise and had so far only published one book, "the scandalous *Birth of Tragedy*" (Schacht, *Human, All Too Human*, Introduction, 1996). Nietzsche had tried and failed to transfer to the chair of philosophy at Basel when it became vacant. Undeterred, he had switched his private allegiance to philosophy, and *Human, All Too Human* was the first of a series of philosophical works

that consist of aphorisms of varying length: *Daybreak* (1881), *The Gay Science* (1882), *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886), and *Twilight of the Idols* (1889). *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883–1885) and *On the Genealogy of Morality* (1887) differ in departing from the aphoristic style. The first volume of *Human, All Too Human* is divided into nine sections, plus an epilogue, a format echoed in *Beyond Good and Evil* and *Twilight of the Idols*. That said, the aphorisms in *Human, All Too Human* have more in common with *Daybreak* and *The Gay Science*, these sometimes being referred to as the three “**free spirit**” works sandwiched between *The Birth of Tragedy* and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. All three are pungently provocative. In *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche’s criticism of Christian **morality** is succinct and deadly:

Go through the moral demands exhibited in the documents of **Christianity** one by one and you will find that in every case they are exaggerated, so that man *could* not live up to them; the intention is not that he should *become* moral, but that he should feel *as sinful as possible*. (HH, I, “The Religious Life,” 141)

Nietzsche certainly knew that his book would challenge the **Wagners**. Cosima, born a Catholic, had become a fervent Protestant, while the Master himself had jettisoned his atheism to share his wife’s increasing piety. Perhaps Nietzsche felt that his book, with its attack on what passed for morality in society, might make the Wagners revert to their former broad-mindedness. He did not realize how much both Wagners would take offense. In the event, he was completely ostracized, and the friendship was not resumed. Cosima refused to read *Human, All Too Human*, while Nietzsche’s sister **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** was likewise scandalized, not least because of some hostile comments on **women** to be found in the section “Woman and Child.” Here, **marriage** is denigrated as a trap for the (male) **free spirit** but prescribed as woman’s true destiny. Women’s emancipation is rejected out of hand:

*On the emancipation of women*—Are women able to be just at all, since they are so accustomed to loving, to at once taking sides for and against? (HH, I, “Woman and Child,” 416)

Such comments would become amplified in Nietzsche’s later works, but there is also a wealth of insightful comments on themes, such as the order of rank and the nature of friendship, that can be said to

Kaiser represents a divided stance on the **woman** question, possibly because the received misogyny that he derived (perhaps unconsciously) from both Plato and Nietzsche was not out of kilter with the main thrust of Wilhelmine bourgeois society at large. Hence, in *Der Präsident* (1905), he shows a remarkably ambivalent attitude to such matters as the debate about unmarried mothers and vacillates on the **eugenic** debate in *Die Versuchung* (*Temptation*, 1909). Kaiser's tendency to mock his own characters meant that serious issues emerged repeatedly, only to be debunked; thus, the Nietzschean concepts that impressed him—"the idea of a better humanity to come and, immediately related to this—the concept of a higher form of health" (G. C. Tunstall, "The Turning Point in Georg Kaiser's Attitude to Friedrich Nietzsche," in *Nietzsche-Studien* 14, 1985) are systematically put forward and then undermined. Refer to Frank Krause, ed., *Kaiser and Modernity* (2005).

**KANT, IMMANUEL (1724–1804)**. Perhaps Germany's greatest philosopher. Kant never left his native Königsberg, where he taught logic and **metaphysics** at the university. Kant's chief works are the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, 1781 (*Critique of Pure Reason*, 1933), in which he doubted the possibility of metaphysical **knowledge**, including the knowledge of **God**, and demonstrated the limited nature of such cognition, and the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, 1788 (*Critique of Practical Reason*, 1956). In the latter, he identified practical reason with **morality**, defining the categorical imperative as a universally binding law. Although he went no further than to posit the existence of certain things that remain outside the grasp of the mind, Kant's influence on **German Idealism**, indeed the whole of **Romanticism**, was immense. Blackall writes,

Kant believed that **science** had proved that there is a real world of objects outside us, but its reality is nevertheless encompassed by our experience of it. What we experience is therefore: things as they *appear* to us. . . . But if they are things-as-they-*appear*, then there must be "things-in-themselves" [*Dinge an sich*]. (Eric A. Blackall, *The Novels of German Romanticism*, 1983)

Tanner notes, "The thing in itself is unknowable: the sensations we actually experience are produced by the operation of our subjective mental apparatus" (Michael Tanner, notes to R. J. Hollingdale, trans.,

*Twilight of the Idols*, 1990). Nietzsche is more explicit, calling the “*Ding an sich*” “that *horrendum pudendum* [horrid shameful part] of the metaphysicians! The error of spirit as cause mistaken for reality! And made the measure of morality! And called *God!*” (*TI*, “The Four Great Errors”: 3)

It is debatable how closely Nietzsche read Kant; many scholars believe that he possibly relied on **Friedrich Albert Lange**’s *Geschichte des Materialismus*, 1866 (*History of Materialism*, 1877), as his primary source. Nietzsche’s own copy of Lange’s book is the 1887 edition, but he read Lange and grappled with Kant’s philosophy (whether in primary or secondary sources) much earlier. Whatever Nietzsche’s source for his knowledge of Kant, the latter’s *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, 1790 (*Critique of Judgement*, 1952), which inspired **Friedrich Schiller** to formulate his own ideas on **aesthetics**, could have had the same effect on the young Nietzsche. For Kant, the universal standpoint in aesthetics is achieved through “disinterestedness” (*Interesselosigkeit*), whereby desire is separated from the contemplation of an object of beauty. R. Kevin Hill has suggested that Nietzsche must have studied Kant thoroughly so that he could take up his own position on aesthetics in *The Birth of Tragedy*:

Kant’s transcendental principle of judgment, that we must judge the world to display an elegance satisfying our cognitive interests, is the beginning of the early Nietzsche’s conception of the world as a work of art. (R. Kevin Hill, *Nietzsche’s Critiques: The Kantian Foundations of His Thought*, 2005)

Possibly the early Nietzsche derived more from Kant than he was later prepared to admit. Certainly, he mentions Kant’s third Critique in the notebook he kept in Chur (1877) when he visited the library there to work on *Human, All Too Human*. In the latter, he declares Kant’s morality (i.e., the categorical imperative) to be “a very naïve thing” (*HH*, I: “Of First and Last Things,” 25). He returned to a critique of Kantian aesthetics in *On the Genealogy of Morality*:

Kant, like all the philosophers, just considered art and beauty from the position of “spectator,” instead of viewing the aesthetic problem through the experiences of the artist (the creator), and thus inadvertently introduced the “spectator” himself into the concept “beautiful.” . . . Kant said, “Something is beautiful if it gives pleasure *without interest*.” Without interest! (*OGM*, III: 6)

Nietzsche berates Kant for his blockade on our sense impressions and repudiates Kant's censorship on what we can know, especially as Kant leaves room for God in the equation: "There is no knowing: consequently—there is a God; what a new *elegantia syllogismi!*" (*OGM*, III: 25).

In his late work *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche again refuted Kant's premise that it is beyond our capacity to know about the intelligible world:

History of an Error: The real world, unattainable, undemonstrable, cannot be promised, but even when merely thought of a consolation, a duty, an imperative. (*TI*, "How the 'Real World' at Last Became a Myth": 3)

Nietzsche's own project consisted of a direct challenge to Kant's attack on materialism. Philosophy should be founded on observations and experiment; **truths** and judgments are relative **concepts** and should be gauged by whether or not they are **life affirming**—and the same **perspectivism** applies to moral judgments. Nietzsche felt he had shown us the way by introducing the world to *Zarathustra*: "Mid-day; moment of the shortest shadow; end of the longest error; zenith of mankind; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA" (*TI*, "How the 'Real World' at Last Became a Myth": 3). Refer to Olivier Reboul, *Nietzsche Critique de Kant* (1974).

**KESSLER, HARRY GRAF (1868–1937)**. German scholar. Kessler, who was born and died in France, was a Nietzschean from his student days. In his memoirs (written in 1935), he described the climate of Nietzscheanism at Leipzig University in 1889–1890 as "messianic," with Nietzsche striking him and fellow students (among them **Raoul Richter**) "like a meteor." He first approached **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** in 1895, when she still lived in Naumburg, in the hope of acquiring work by Nietzsche to publish in the periodical *Pan*. In 1897, Kessler and **Meta von Salis-Marschlins** helped Elisabeth purchase the house in Weimar destined to become the *Nietzsche-Archiv*, with Kessler in the position of adviser. In this capacity, he and Elisabeth agreed with other patrons on such matters as the provision of a monthly grant for the poet **Detlev von Liliencron**.

In 1900, Kessler met Henry van de Velde in Berlin and arranged for him to meet Elisabeth, at which point the three of them planned

sexologist **Havelock Ellis** was a keen admirer of Key's work and translated *The Woman Movement*.

**KIERKEGAARD, SØREN (1813–1855)**. Danish philosopher regarded as the founder of **Existentialism**. Kierkegaard's coinage "existential" emphasizes man's tragic situation in a religious world that denies his psychological needs. Like **Franz Kafka**, Kierkegaard in his youth was dominated by his father, a rich and ostensibly devout merchant in Copenhagen. Kierkegaard's "moment of truth" (he called it "the great earthquake") came when he realized that his father suffered under an unbearable weight of guilt for having once cursed **God**. Kierkegaard further realized that his fiancée, Regine Olsen, would not be able to comprehend the full terror of this curse and broke off with her for that reason, though he did not forgive himself. The polarity between responsibility and freedom, conflicting strands in man's psychological makeup, weave through his major works from *Enten-Eller*, 1843 (*Either/Or*, 1944), to *Frygt og Bæven*, 1843 (*Fright and Trembling*, 1941). In the former, Kierkegaard is tormented by his shabby treatment of Regine, and in the latter, he finds religion paradoxical because faith in an ethical God can force an individual to perform unethical acts (as with Abraham and Isaac).

In 1844, Kierkegaard published *Philosophische Smuler* (*Philosophical Fragments*, 1936) and *Begrebet Angst* (*The Concept of Dread*, 1944). In the *Philosophical Fragments*, he took issue with **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel**, who argued that man has little chance of acting freely in the great cosmos. Kierkegaard insisted that faith presupposes free will, which is the only thing that gives **Christianity** any meaning; man might be riven, but he is free, even if this cannot be proved by logic. In *The Concept of Dread*, Kierkegaard's analysis of man's anxiety, or "angst"—now a household term but in 1843 a unique idea anticipating depth psychology by well over half a century—was too avant-garde to be properly grasped. Increasingly lonely and misunderstood, Kierkegaard castigated the Danish Church for not addressing man's spirituality.

In *Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift*, 1846 (*Concluding Unscientific Postscripts*, 1941), Kierkegaard returned to deliver what he believed to be a knockout blow to Hegel. In this work, Kierkegaard also acknowledged his former writings, these having appeared

**Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** was a member of the *Graphologische Gesellschaft* in Weimar.

For Klages, Nietzsche was “the great herald of the cosmic soul” (Steven Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany*, 1992). His seminal work on Nietzsche was *Die psychologischen Errungenschaften Nietzsches* (*Nietzsche’s Psychological Achievements*, 1926). In this work, Klages rejects the strident and masterful Nietzsche of the **will to power**, thus distancing himself from many contemporary Nietzsche enthusiasts, in order to portray a mythological character with mystique in his blood and cosmic significance—all themes that Klages had in common with Schuler. Although **Georg Lukács** tried to label this work a forerunner of **National Socialism**, its occult mysticism is actually more in tune with the matriarchal arguments that **Johann Jakob Bachofen** had put forward in *Das Mutterrecht* (*Mother Right*, 1861).

Klages believed that the **concept** of *Geist* sets man apart from the animals and underlies the human capacity to think and to will. It also causes man’s estrangement and his desire for immortality. In *Der Geist als Widersacher der Seele* (*The Mind as Opponent of the Soul*, 1926), his most famous work, Klages “made the distinction between **life-affirming Seele (soul)** and life-destroying *Geist* (mind)” (Aschheim). For Klages, *Geist* was **Socrates** and will to power, **Christianity** was dry intellect, while *Seele* was the vastly superior **Dionysian Rausch**. He continued this theme in *Geist und Leben* (*Mind and Life*, 1935) and *Die Sprache als Quell der Seelenkunde* (*Language as the Source of Knowledge of the Soul*, 1948). Klages also wrote *Rhythmen und Runen* (*Rhythms and Runes*) in 1944.

**KLINGER, MAX (1857–1920)**. German painter, sculptor, and graphic artist. Klinger was employed as professor of art theory at the *Königliche Akademie der graphischen Künste* (Royal Academy of Graphic Arts) in Leipzig. Inspired by Nietzsche’s work from 1894 on, he worked on a portrait of Nietzsche for several years, though he was unable to finish it during Nietzsche’s lifetime. However, with Nietzsche’s death mask, which he cast in bronze in Paris in 1901, and with the help of several photographs, Klinger was able to make busts of Nietzsche and a marble herm for the reading room of the *Nietzsche-Archiv*, which he completed in 1905—too late for the cer-

emonial opening of the *Nietzsche-Archiv* in 1903. For that occasion, Klinger substituted a provisional marble bust of Nietzsche instead. The 1905 herm is still in the *Nietzsche-Archiv*; **Adolf Hitler** posed beside it when he visited the *Nietzsche-Archiv* in 1934. From 1914 to 1919, Klinger worked on an even more lavish herm (with carved relief on its marble pillar) commissioned by Alfred Kröner, Nietzsche's publisher in Leipzig. This now stands in the reception hall in the *Schloß Anna Amalia* in Weimar. Klinger's portrait of Nietzsche was finally completed in 1914.

**KLOSSOWSKI, PIERRE.** *See* ETERNAL RETURN.

**KNOWLEDGE (DIE KENNTNIS) / COGNITION (DIE ERKENNTNIS).** In Nietzsche's early writings from 1870 on, it is already clear that he viewed the drive for pure knowledge negatively, since it caused man to ignore such questions as the **value of life** and the importance of illusion in favor of the “**scientific**” quest for absolute certainty. For Nietzsche, knowledge can be acquired only through **metaphor**. By seeking to know, we accept false premises about **truth** and thus create damaging obstructions in our own psyche, with the result that “‘knowledge’ is inimical to authentic living” (David Cooper, *Authenticity and Learning: Nietzsche's Educational Philosophy*, 1983). In *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche examined how knowledge arose from error:

Origin of Knowledge [*Erkenntnis*].—Throughout immense stretches of **time** the intellect produced nothing but errors; some of them proved to be useful and preservative to the species: he who fell in with them, or inherited them, waged the battle for himself and his offspring with better success. (*GS*, III: 110)

Nietzsche provides us with a catalogue of these errors: “—that there are enduring things, that there are equal things, that there are things, substances, and bodies, that a thing is what it appears, that our will is free, that what is good for me is good absolutely” (*GS*, III: 110). Eventually, all evil things become subordinated to knowledge and are finally regarded as “good.” The person who realizes this and turns his knowledge onto himself will become suicidal. “Oh Zarathustra: Self-knower! . . . Self-hangman! . . .” (*DD*, “Amid Birds of Prey”).

Nietzsche's view that knowledge was essentially an illusion remained consistent; he repeats the same arguments in the early piece *On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense* and in the mature work *On the Genealogy of Morality*. The latter work begins with Nietzsche's lament: "We are unknown to ourselves" [*wir sind uns unbekannt*] (*OGM*, Preface). In a late note from his *Nachlaß*, Nietzsche encapsulated his view: "Knowledge and wisdom in themselves have no value; no more than goodness: one must first be in possession of the goal from which these qualities derive their value or nonvalue . . ." (*WP*, II: 244). See also PERSPECTIVISM.

**KOEGEL, FRITZ (1860–1904)**. German editor who helped **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** to establish an archive for Nietzsche's works. Elisabeth's self-imposed task of bringing out a collection of Nietzsche's works would have been easier if she had not regularly sacked her editors. In August 1892, she gave **Peter Gast** the task of working on a collected edition while she absented herself to Paraguay, but on her return in September 1893, she decided to fire Gast. When, in April 1894, Elisabeth placed Fritz Koegel in charge of the editorship of Nietzsche's posthumous estate, the archive consisted of a couple of rooms in **Franziska Nietzsche's** house in Naumburg. In 1895, Koegel brought out eight volumes (part 1) of *Nietzsches Werke*, which he had prepared in collaboration with Eduard von der Hellen, and four volumes (part 2) that were the result of his own work: the *Nachlaß*. Volumes 9 and 10 appeared in 1896, and volumes 11 and 12 appeared in 1897. After this monumental achievement, Koegel was in turn dismissed in July 1897, ostensibly for not producing *The Will to Power* but really, as Elisabeth admitted in a letter to **Rudolf Steiner** dated 8–23 September 1898, because she did not like his fiancée, Emily Gelzer. In a letter to Joseph Hofmiller (28 October 1897), Koegel commented on Elisabeth's three-volume biography of her brother (1895–1904) shortly after the appearance of the second volume that year:

I want to put straight the main traits of Nietzsche's personality which Frau Förster, in her Biography, makes up, flattens out, twists and falsifies: out of prudery, ignorance and vanity.

Elisabeth had earmarked Steiner for Koegel's post, but Steiner declined to be recruited, having realized that it would be impossible to work with her. It was not until October 1898 that the new editor,

**DIE KOSMIKER** (“THE COSMICS”). Avant-garde group based in Schwabing, Munich’s Bohemian quarter, flourishing from 1897 to 1904, led by **Alfred Schuler**, though it was **Rudolf Pannwitz** who thought up the name. Pannwitz declared that Nietzsche was “cosmic man,” and one of the more outlandish aims of the group was to harness cosmic energy through the use of myth and the study of pagan cults. The other members of the group, which remained for seven years within the ambit of **Stefan George**, were **Ludwig Klages**, **Karl Wolfskehl**, and **Franziska zu Reventlow**. All knew the work of **Johann Jakob Bachofen** as well as they knew (or thought they knew) the work of Nietzsche, and all dedicated themselves to a lifestyle of free, “hetaeric” love, which was construed as being far more emancipatory for **women** than the campaign for women’s rights. It was also considered to be suitably **Dionysian**.

A characteristic tenet of the group was that a nation, or *Volk*, had its own characteristic blood: if some elements became dominant in the blood at any time, this would cause the *Volk* to behave in a certain way or certain events to take place. Hence, a buildup of heathen elements occasionally erupted in every century, causing a “flash of blood” (*Blutleuchte*). For 19th-century Germany, the 1880s had been just such a *Blutleuchte*, producing Ludwig II of Bavaria (who died in 1886) and Nietzsche, whose best works were produced during that decade. There were various tensions in the group, caused not just by Reventlow’s passionate affair, first with Klages and then with Wolfskehl (amongst others), but also by the virulent **anti-Semitism** of Schuler, Wolfskehl being a **Jew**. In 1904, at one of the group’s orgiastic parties, Schuler threatened Wolfskehl, who fled for his life, and Klages quarreled with George in the same year. George tended to keep aloof from the extravaganzas of *die Kosmiker*, but he was present at their party, held in full Bacchic regalia, on 22 February 1903.

**KUNDERA, MILAN (1929– )**. Czech writer. Kundera’s early work *Zert*, 1967 (*The Joke*, 1982), caused him to fall foul of the communist authorities since it was seen to epitomize the rebellious spirit of the Prague Spring of 1968; it became a cult work and is still perhaps his best-known novel. Although there are Nietzschean references in Kundera’s novels, his most sustained use of a Nietzschean concept is found in *The Unbearable Lightness of Being* (1984; both a best-

Franziska Nietzsche was uncertain about the offer, **Franz Overbeck** was not. He wrote to Erwin Rohde (27 January 1890), “[Langbehn] seems to be a quite unique lunatic—art historian, Schleswig Holsteiner, apparently a professional **anti-Semite**.” Nietzsche lashed out against Langbehn when the latter visited him at the mental hospital in Jena, and the idea of adoption was swiftly abandoned.

**LANGE, FRIEDRICH ALBERT (1828–1875).** German philosopher and **socialist**. In his *Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart*, 1866 (*The History of Materialism and Criticism of Its Present Importance*, 1877), Lange held that our **bodily** senses produce our ideas and argued in favor of **Kantian Idealism**, in which the world as we perceive it is the product of our own minds: even our own bodies are unknown to us. Nietzsche read the work in 1866, as soon as it came out, finding it “very useful as a source of both instruction and stimulation” (Robin Small, *Nietzsche in Context*, 2001). In the same year, Lange left German academic life to work for a democratic newspaper in Switzerland.

In 1867, Lange published *Neue Beiträge zur Geschichte des Materialismus* (*A New Contribution to the History of Materialism*) and became professor of philosophy at Zurich University in 1870. He resigned from that post in 1872, angered by Swiss support for France in the Franco-Prussian War. Returning to Germany, Lange became professor of philosophy at Marburg University and effected a Kantian revival there. Nietzsche did not agree with Lange’s refutation of materialism, though he valued him as a philosopher. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche writes, “If one is to pursue physiology with a good conscience one is compelled to insist that the organs of sense are *not* phenomena in the sense of some idealist philosophy: for if they were they could not be causes!” (*BGE*, I: 15). Refer to George J. Stack, *Lange and Nietzsche* (1983).

**LANGUAGE.** Nietzsche criticized the fact that we continue to believe that language can convey meaning in an objective sense. He insisted on the **perspectivism** imposed by language. In *On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense*, Nietzsche wrote a brilliant exposé of his theory of language, though he never published it. Here, he argues that language is always couched in **metaphor**. In our use of language, we

trap ourselves within **concepts** to help us to make sense of the world and forget the original meaning of words in order to make **life** bearable. A concept is thus a residue of a metaphor, and a word is really a metaphor of a metaphor, since the actual starting point for language is just a nerve stimulus. Daniel Breazeale has argued that Nietzsche “wished to *expose* the unsuspected role which language has played in forming our thoughts and our conception of reality in order to try to *escape* its transcendental distortions” (Daniel Breazeale, “Introduction,” *Philosophy and Truth*, 1991).

Regarding language acquisition, Nietzsche approached the topic in a conservative manner: “Learning many languages fills the memory with words instead of facts and ideas, while the memory is a receptacle which in the case of each man can take only a certain limited content” (*HH*, I: “Tokens of Higher and Lower Culture,” 267). It is extraordinary to find Nietzsche placing a *numerus clausus* on the memory and just as astonishing to find him anticipating a “new language for all” in the same passage. It would be almost another decade before Ludwik Zamenhof (alias Doctor Esperanto) published *Dr. Esperanto’s International Language* in 1887. As usual, Nietzsche’s heart is with the ancient **Greeks** and the French, who wisely “learned no foreign languages” (*HH*, I: “Tokens of Higher and Lower Culture,” 267). See also STYLE; TRANSLATION.

**THE LAST MAN (DER LETZTE MENSCH)**. Sometimes also referred to as “the ultimate man,” the last man, as portrayed in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, is characterized by complacency: he believes himself to be happy and wishes to remain as he is, lacking all passion and commitment. **Life** is uniform and secure: “Everyone wants the same, everyone is the same” (*Za*, “Zarathustra’s Prologue”: 5). The last man rejects the striving that the **Übermensch** would have to undertake in order to overcome himself (*Selbstüberwinden*) and to create his own **morality** after the death of **God**. For the last man, active striving ceases with the death of God, and he sinks into irredeemable mediocrity. When Zarathustra describes the monotonous but pleasant life of the last man, he is horrified to discover that the crowd around him is thrilled by the idea and demands, “Give us this last man, oh Zarathustra . . . make us into this last man! You can keep the *Übermensch!*” (*Za*, “Zarathustra’s Prologue”: 5). See also THE HERD.

**LEBENSPHILOSOPHIE (LIFE PHILOSOPHY).** This movement arose in the 1870s and lasted through to the turn of the century and beyond it, in varied form, to the period of the Third Reich. It stressed irrationalism above all: the primacy of intuition over the intellect, of direct experience over rational consideration. Nietzsche's thought was hailed as a forerunner to *Lebensphilosophie*, but there are sharp distinctions; where the movement diverged from Nietzscheanism was chiefly in its attitude toward mythology. The occult was seen as a means of gaining access to mystical powers. Those in the movement (whether consciously or not) included **Stefan George**, **Eduard von Hartmann**, **Wilhelm Dilthey**, **Ludwig Klages**, **Max Scheler**, **Alfred Schuler**, **Georg Simmel**, **Oswald Spengler**, **Martin Heidegger**, and **Karl Jaspers**. Members of the group tended to subscribe to Nietzsche's concept of **aristocratic values**, and some, like Schuler, looked on themselves as saviors of the German *Volk*. **Georg Lukács** was a hostile critic of the movement, attributing the rise of **National Socialism** itself to life philosophy. *Lebensphilosophie* is distinct from the élan vital of **Henri Bergson**. Refer to Karl Albert, *Lebensphilosophie* (1995).

**LEVY, OSCAR (1867–1946).** German-born critic and man of letters. According to Patrick Bridgwater, Levy was “the greatest Nietzschean of them all” (*Nietzsche in Anglosaxony*, 1972). Born in Stargard, Pomerania, into a family of Orthodox **Jews** who were nevertheless proud of their **German** nationality, Levy studied medicine at Freiburg University but then settled in London in 1892. His interest in Nietzsche began in 1893 when he was introduced to Nietzsche's thought and conceived the idea of translating Nietzsche's works into English. In 1908, Levy visited Weimar to negotiate the rights for the English translations with **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche**, a process he found extremely difficult. However, his 18-volume edition of *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche* appeared in London from 1909 to 1913, the result of two decades of lonely pioneering work. His elation on completing the English edition was shortly matched by distress at being held responsible for introducing Britain to Nietzsche's malignant philosophy, thought by many Britons to have laid the intellectual groundwork for World War I. Levy was also an opponent of Zionism, which he attacked in the journal *The New Age*. He was a bitter opponent of

**nationalism** and racism and was often uncomplimentary toward the class-ridden society of contemporary Britain. He left England in 1921 but, after living in Italy and the south of France, returned to Oxford, his home, until he died. Although he wrote numerous polemical articles, his great and pathbreaking achievement was the collected edition of Nietzsche's works in English. Refer to Uschi Nussbaumer-Benz, "*Oscar Levys nietzscheanische Visionen,*" *Monographien und Texte zur Nietzsche-Forschung: Sonderdruck* 36 (1997).

**LICHTENBERGER, HENRI (1864–1941).** French academic and man of letters. Lichtenberger was an early admirer of Nietzsche's work, which he read in the original. His *La philosophie de Nietzsche* (1898), based on a series of lectures he gave at the University of Nancy, was influential in making Nietzsche known to French readers at the turn of the century. The book appeared in German in 1899 with an introduction by **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche**, and it has been mistakenly assumed that she translated the work, whereas the translator was actually Friedrich von Oppeln-Bronikowski. Lichtenberger maintained close links with Elisabeth over the next three decades. Lichtenberger was a Germanist whose interest was by no means confined to Nietzsche; he published many works on German literature, such as *Richard Wagner poète et penseur* (1898) and *Heinrich Heine penseur* (1905). He also wrote works on the links between French and German literature, such as *L'Allemagne d'aujourd'hui dans ses relations avec la France* (*Germany Today in Her Relationship with France*, 1922).

**LIES.** In *On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense*, Nietzsche maintains that when we use **language**, we lie without realizing it because our way of forming **concepts** is closely linked to self-deceit in order to make **life** bearable. The weaker man will devise a number of **masks**, lies and deceptions to hide from himself the fact that language cannot deliver "the **truth**." In contrast, the free intellect will smash the framework of concepts and "will now be guided by intuitions rather than concepts" (*OTLNS*, 2).

In spite of his own engagement with **metaphysics**, Nietzsche vehemently declared that metaphysics (which he often equated with religion) was a grand lie from its inception, the instigator being **Plato** with his real world and world of appearance. In contrast to the Pla-

tonic certainty of there being a “truth” that was “good,” Nietzsche proposed that there were also lies that were good. The “holy lie” that there is a metaphysical world was not just **decadent** and wrong but also futile, since it had no particular purpose beyond arousing disgust in man at his own **body**. “—Ultimately the point is to what *end* a lie is told” (A-C: 55).

**LIFE.** The cornerstone of Nietzsche’s philosophy. Because **God** is dead and there is no afterlife, Nietzsche lays stress on accepting whatever life brings in an **affirmative** manner, even if that involves pain and **suffering**. He terms such an acceptance of one’s fate *amor fati*. Tracing his thoughts back to the ancient **Greeks**, who faced the absurdity of their fate bravely, aided by the **Dionysian** festivals, Nietzsche counsels his fellow men to reject the **ascetic ideal** and the **ressentiment** it engenders and embrace life joyously. Freed from the burdens imposed hitherto by a **metaphysical** system of rewards and punishments that weaken by association with guilt and sin, man can and should make his own life into a work of **art**. Like **Zarathustra**, man should laugh and **dance** and enjoy **sexuality**, for life itself is fluid and beautiful: “Yes, life is a **woman!**” (*GS*, IV: 339). The bodily **drives** are good and healthy and lead to a higher form of humanity: the **higher man** and, ultimately, the *Übermensch*, who will say “a sacred Yes” to life (*Za*, I: “Of the Three Metamorphoses”). By contrast, man should avoid life-denying **nihilism** and have nothing to do with fraudulent religions like **Christianity** that sap vitality and redirect that building block of all life, the **will to power**, away from its proper path.

**LIFE AFFIRMATION.** See AFFIRMATION.

**LIFE PHILOSOPHY.** See *LEBENSPHILOSOPHIE*.

**LILIENCRON, DETLEV VON (1844–1909).** German officer, civil servant, and writer. An early admirer of Nietzsche, Liliencron was born in the same year as Nietzsche and, like him, fought in the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871). He is best known for his poetry. For example, the collection *Adjutantenritte* (*The Adjutant’s Rides*, 1883) ranks as a pioneering introduction to what would soon become the **Naturalist movement** in Germany. His prose is also of high qual-

Museum, where he wrote the three-volume *Das Kapital* (*Capital*), only the first volume of which was published in his lifetime (I: 1867 [trans. 1888]; II: 1885 [trans. 1907]; III: 1894 [trans. 1909]).

Nietzsche knew the thought of Ferdinand Lassalle and **Eugen Dühring** sufficiently well to reject **socialism** outright; he had nothing but contempt for “the doctrine of equality . . . there exists no more poisonous poison” (*TI*, “Expeditions of an Untimely Man,” 48). However, there is no mention of Marx (or Engels) in either his work or correspondence. Even given the fact that Marx died in exile in London, it simply cannot be the case that Nietzsche was not familiar with some of his ideas. It is possible that when he snarled about socialism and **democracy** he was reacting to news from abroad; it was easy to dismiss socialism in the **Germany** of his day, **Otto von Bismarck** having actually made it illegal for the 12 years from 1878 to 1890. At all events, Nietzsche’s insistence on **aristocratic values** marks a complete contrast to Marx’s rhetorical invitation at the end of *The Communist Manifesto*: “working men of all countries, unite!” Refer to Nancy S. Love, *Marx, Nietzsche, and Modernity* (1986).

**MASK** (*DIE MASKE*). The most famous reference to the mask occurs in *Beyond Good and Evil*: “Everything profound loves the mask . . .” (*BGE*, II: 40). There is a level of play on the word *tief* here (translated as “profound,” where “**deep**” might be simpler; Nietzsche is suspicious of anything “serious”). The onlooker who sees a person’s mask also helps to create it, so that the person wearing the mask might well be mistaken for someone different: “Every profound spirit needs a mask: more, around every profound spirit a mask is continually growing, thanks to the constantly false, that is to say *shallow* interpretation of every word he speaks, every sign of **life** he gives” (*BGE*, II: 40). A mask can also provide the privacy of distance, or transfiguration; it can release a person from the straitjacket of formal behavior by letting him wear the fool’s cap and bells (*GS*, II: 107), and by the same token it can reflect the many facets of a person’s character. As in ancient **Greek tragedy**, where the actors wore masks, the mask can help creativity at the **Dionysian** level of abandonment. A mask is not necessarily visual: for **language** can also mask thought: “Every philosophy also *conceals* a philosophy; every opinion is also a hiding-place, every word also a mask” (*BGE*, IX:

289). Nietzsche's playfulness with the **metaphor** has led scholars to presume that he himself often adopts a mask. As he remarked, "Every profound thinker is more afraid of being understood than of being misunderstood" (*BGE*, IX: 290).

**MASTER MORALITY (*DIE HERRENMORAL*)**. In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche argues that two centuries of **Judeo-Christianity** have wiped away our understanding of how **morality** came about. In pre-Christian times, what was "good" was what the ruler, the strong man, dictated to the weaker underling. Christ's doctrine (and Nietzsche stressed that Christ was a **Jew**) overturned this morality, to replace it with a doctrine of **ressentiment**: the weak man was not made any physically stronger, but his **sufferings** were now valued as "good," and God would recompense him in the afterlife, whereas the master could now be as rich or as strong as he liked, and he would be still valued as "bad" in terms of trying to enter heaven. It was now in the strong man's interest to affect a **slave morality**. For Nietzsche, who believed that force must out, Christianity had fatally weakened the human psyche and damaged society. He wanted to see a return of the proud "sovereign individual" (*OGM*, II: 2), who can give his word independently of the **ascetic ideal** and freely create his own morality; it is from these ranks that the *Übermensch* will emerge and **aristocratic values** will be retrieved. Nietzsche's exhortation to the strong individual to master himself was enormously attractive to early Nietzscheans, and those who were not enthralled by **Dionysus** eagerly entered the "superman" camp. However, after two world wars involving **Germany**, it is sometimes difficult to argue the innocence of Nietzsche's master morality. *See also* THE BLONDE BEAST; THE GREEKS.

**MAYAKOVSKY, VLADIMIR (1893–1930)**. Russian writer. Like all those in the Russian **Futurist** movement, Mayakovsky was deeply influenced by Nietzsche's iconoclasm. With his instrument, the "de-poeticized word," Mayakovsky set out to shock the ordinary reader and insult the symbolist sensibility with such lyric poems as *Voyna I mir* (*War and the World*, 1915–1916; the title is a play on *War and Peace* by **Leo Tolstoi**). The complete break with tradition and convention left an anarchic center at the heart of the Russian Futur-

**METAPHOR.** Figure of speech that throws more light on a thing or on a proceeding; by doing so, it draws a comparison between disparate things, whereas a simile compares like with like (e.g., as good as gold). For example, when **Zarathustra** says of love between man and woman, “It is a torch which should light your way to higher paths” (*Za*, I: “Of **Marriage** and Children”), there is no real torch, but the image encapsulates the function of love as spiritual guide. Christ used a metaphor when saying “I am the **truth**,” a statement guaranteed to mobilize Nietzsche into a counterattack: “This immodest man [Jesus] has long made the cock’s comb of the little people rise up in pride.” (Man does not have a cock’s comb, but the metaphor throws light on his **slave values** by suggesting that he does.) Nietzsche’s images are often multilayered in this fashion. He asserted that there could be no authentic **knowledge** without metaphor, hence the importance he afforded to **art**. As Erich Blondel points out, “Only art, by virtue of its acknowledged metaphorical character, is true” (E. Blondel, “Nietzsche: **Life** as Metaphor,” in *The New Nietzsche*, ed. David Allison, 1977). Blondel likens the function of metaphor to “the capacity to forget,” of which Nietzsche says, “**forgetting** is essential to action of any kind” (*UM*, II: “On the Uses and Disadvantages of **History** for Life”: 1). Metaphor allows man to stand back from his **suffering** and to act instinctively; it is the antithesis of **science** or religion, both of which teach false truths in order to place man in a **moral** straitjacket. It has a liberating function because it does not seek to be what it is not; in fact, “the height of metaphor is to forget that it is such” (Blondel, 1977). *See also* SYMBOL/SYMBOLISM.

**METAPHYSICS.** Branch of philosophy that deals with abstract **concepts** such as **knowing** and being, or “first principles.” Nietzsche attacked metaphysics at its heart by arguing that we can never know the **truth** of anything. He pilloried **Plato** for having posited two distinct worlds: the real and the illusory, the latter housing pure forms such as “the good,” and he attacked religion for arguing that the “other” world was *better*, thus giving a spurious value and higher meaning to **suffering**. In *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche classed metaphysical enquiry as an attempt “to glorify the origin”—hence his disparaging biblical reference: “In the beginning.—” (*HH*, II: 2, “The Wanderer and His Shadow,” 3), the opening words of Genesis. However, as

many critics have argued, Nietzsche's own writings contain metaphysical elements: the "Ur-Eine," or grounding principle, found in *The Birth of Tragedy*, is a case in point. The doctrine of **eternal return** is arguably pure metaphysics, in spite of current attempts to explain the theory through physics. One could also say that Nietzsche needed the **Dionysian** principle as others need religion—or even that Dionysianism is a form of paganism, Dionysus being, after all, a **Greek** god.

**MEYSENBUG, MALWIDA VON (1816–1903).** German **feminist** and writer. Meysenbug had been forced into exile in London from 1852 to 1859 as a result of her activity during the 1848 Revolution; as governess to the daughters of the widowed Alexander Herzen in London, she became devoted to the youngest child, Olga Herzen, so much so that Herzen subsequently allowed her to adopt Olga. A member of the circle of friends close to **Richard** and **Cosima Wagner**, she met Nietzsche at the laying of the foundation stone for the *Festspielhaus* in Bayreuth in May 1872. By this time, Meysenbug had become a patron to young intellectuals, and in this capacity she invited Nietzsche, **Paul Rée**, and Arnold Brenner to spend the winter of 1876–1877 with her in Sorrento. Another result of her generosity as hostess meant that Nietzsche and **Lou Andreas-Salomé** were introduced to one another at her house party in Rome, early in 1882.

Meysenbug's autobiographical *Memoiren einer Idealistin* (*Memoirs of an Idealist*) was published in 1876, with a sequel *Der Lebensabend einer Idealistin* (*Twilight Years of an Idealist*) published in 1898. *Memoiren einer Idealistin* became a seminal work for early German feminists. In particular, Meysenbug's influence on **Meta von Salis-Marschlins** should be noted, in view of the latter's importance for Nietzsche after his mental collapse. Nietzsche insulted most of his friends during the last months of his life, and Malwida von Meysenbug was no exception. However, what appears to have saddened her most was his breach with Wagner. Her description of her friendship with Nietzsche is found in *Individualitäten* (*Character Studies*, 1901).

**MILL, JOHN STUART (1806–1873).** English **utilitarian** philosopher. The son of the philosopher James Mill, John Stuart Mill was a child prodigy who could read Greek texts (including **Diogenes Laërtius**) in the original by the age of seven. Later, Mill regretted the

**MORALITY.** Nietzsche thought that the standards of right and wrong ought not to rest on **metaphysical** arguments, and he was at pains to expose what he saw as the fraudulent link between morality and the priesthood. From **Plato** on, Nietzsche argues, philosophers have assumed that our moral sensibility sets us apart from the **animals** and is proof of man's divine origin. Nietzsche argues the contrary: that there is no metaphysical connection between mankind and morality, and any customs that guarantee codes of conduct have been forged at the animal level and stem from fear and the quest for **power**. Morality has developed out of custom, and "any custom is better than no custom" (*D*, I: 16). Significantly, Nietzsche subtitled *Daybreak Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality* and added the comment in *Ecce Homo*, "With this book my campaign against morality begins" (*EH*, "Why I Write Such Good Books": 1). With himself as immoralist in mind, Nietzsche gives his definition of the free man: "The free human being is immoral because in all things he is determined to depend on himself and not upon a tradition . . ." (*D*, I: 9).

Nietzsche explains the emergence of morality in *On the Genealogy of Morality*. Here, he argues that **master morality** was superseded by **slave morality** as a result of the **Jewish** "slave revolt," after which morality can define itself as "good" only by denigrating others as "bad." It is thus quintessentially a morality of **ressentiment** arrived at through perverse valuations, hence the need for a wholesale **revaluation of values**. Nietzsche's final argument in *On the Genealogy of Morality* is that both **Christianity** and morality must be overcome. Their relentless search for "the **truth**" will finally provide the answer that there is no such thing, and "self-overcoming" will be the logical result: "All great things bring about their own demise through an act of self-sublimation: that is the law of **life**, the law of *necessary* 'self-overcoming' in the essence of life. . . . Christianity as a *morality* must also be destroyed" (*OGM*, III: 27). Nietzsche believed that all religions inculcate a feeling of weakness and guilt, whereas "all *healthy* morality is dominated by an instinct for life" (*TI*: "Morality as Anti-Nature": 4).

**MORGENSTERN, CHRISTIAN (1871–1914).** German writer. Morgenstern began as an ardent follower of Nietzsche, as his letters demonstrate: the first mention of influence is in a letter to Marie

Goettling of 1893. Morgenstern's first work, *In Phanta's Schloss. Ein Cyclus humoristisch-phantastischer Dichtungen (In Fantasy Castle: A Humorous Literary Fantasia, 1895)*, was dedicated to Nietzsche, and a copy was sent to **Franziska Nietzsche**. Morgenstern subsequently published his work in *Charon*, the journal edited by **Rudolf Pannwitz** from 1904 until 1914. By that time, he had turned away from Nietzsche to the spiritual and anthroposophical world of **Rudolf Steiner**. Refer to Rudolf Meyer, "Christian Morgenstern und Friedrich Nietzsche," *Goetheanum* 9 (1930).

**MUSIC.** Nietzsche was a proficient pianist and liked to improvise in a grandiose manner. While still a teenager (1861–1864), he wrote several *Lieder* and in 1862 two spirited Polish dances, but his compositions are disappointingly languorous. That said, the way to his heart was through music; his profound admiration for **Cosima Wagner**, as the daughter of Franz Liszt, survived his veneration and subsequent rejection of **Richard Wagner**, while his relationship with several young women flourished on the basis of a shared interest in the piano: Nietzsche delighted in playing duets with Louise Bachofen, the young wife of **Johann Jakob Bachofen**, and proposed **marriage** to Marie Trampedach in Geneva in 1876 in a flurry of delight at her musical expertise, little realizing that she was already secretly betrothed to her piano teacher.

Nietzsche's relationship toward Wagner was at first one of fervid admiration, but this would eventually turn to criticism when Wagner embraced **nationalism**, **anti-Semitism**, and finally, in *Parsifal*, **Christianity**. Even before Nietzsche met Wagner in 1868, he admired the latter's introduction to *Tristan and Isolde*, which he first heard in Munich in 1865. Wagner's deliberate use of dissonance in that piece gave Nietzsche an essential insight into the nature of human existence. Having up to this point agreed with **Schopenhauer's** pessimistic view that man will experience more pain than pleasure in his benighted **life**, Nietzsche realized that pain or dissonance is an essential part of human experience, to be embraced rather than renounced. From this insight stemmed Nietzsche's preoccupation with **Dionysus**, the **Greek** god of music, and with his antithesis, **Apollo**. The preoccupation found its first expression in *The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music* and ended when Nietzsche "signed off"

as a philosopher, describing himself as “Dionysus the crucified” in one of his last notes before his mental collapse. In *Nietzsche contra Wagner*, completed shortly before he went insane, Nietzsche gave a definitive account of his objections to Wagner’s music: it is “a woman” (NW, “A Music without a Future”), Nietzsche snarls. *Nietzsche contra Wagner* is more succinct and deadly than *The Case of Wagner*, where Nietzsche the physician diagnosed Wagner’s disease as *décadence* with some vestige of courtesy.

Nietzsche’s innovatory introduction of music into philosophy as a central plank of an affirmative **metaphysics** has had a lasting effect on **European culture**. Almost without exception, any interest in **Apollo** that Nietzsche could muster was destined to pale in comparison to the sheer dynamism of “**Dionysian** histrionicism” (*TI*, “Expeditions of an Untimely Man”: 10). Toward the end of the 19th century, a groundswell of enthusiasm emerged for orgiastic Dionysianism, as with “*die Kosmiker*.” Scarcely any European exponent of music at that time could avoid some connection with Nietzsche’s Dionysus: one thinks of **Frederick Delius**, **Gustav Mahler**, and **Richard Strauss** (and, among philosophers, **Theodor Adorno** and **Ernst Bloch**). Refer to Babette Babich, “Nietzsche and Music” (*New Nietzsche Studies*, 1996); Stefan Sorgner, “Nietzsche,” in *Musik in der deutschen Philosophie* (2003); and Georges Liébert, *Nietzsche and Music*, trans. David Pellamer and Graham Parkes (2004).

**MUSIL, ROBERT (1880–1942).** Austrian writer. Musil lived in Vienna until the *Anschluss* (1938), when he moved to Zurich. Having first read Nietzsche in 1898 at the age of 18, Musil subsequently acknowledged that the influence of Nietzsche on him had been great if unfocused. He was first a lecturer of engineering at a technical college; later his interest turned to philosophy and logic and especially psychology. Musil achieved notoriety through the work *Die Verwirrungen des jungen Törleß*, 1906 (*Young Törless*, 1955), which portrays the sexual perversions of certain inmates of a boys’ boarding school. There is a strong Nietzschean undercurrent in this novel since the eponymous character has to “become who he is,” as in Nietzsche’s *The Gay Science* (*GS*, III: 270).

In the substantial yet unfinished three-volume *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften* (I: 1930; II: 1933; III: p.h.; *The Man without Qualities*,

Nietzsche overlays force with the **will to power** and an engagement with “change,” as encountered in **Heraclitan** absolute becoming. In Robert Mayer’s essay “*Über Auslösung*” (“On the Release [of Energy]”), Mayer distinguishes between “latent” and “living” force, a formulation guaranteed to give Nietzsche ideas. John Richardson has recently argued that Nietzsche, a **scientific** naturalist manqué, “conceives will to power ‘metaphysically’ as a universal force more basic than Darwinian selection” (John Richardson, *Nietzsche’s New Darwinism*, 2004), while Keith Ansell-Pearson, in *Viroid Life: Perspectives on Nietzsche and the Transhuman Condition* (1997), using the language of modern biotechnology, has given an account of Nietzsche’s struggle with Darwinism—especially the issue of natural selection—largely because he misunderstood it. Refer to Robin Small, *Nietzsche in Context* (2001).

**NATURE/NATURAL.** To the extent that Nietzsche denied **metaphysics** and any suggestion of the supernatural and earnestly enquired into **natural science**, he can be viewed as a “naturalist” philosopher, though the term “naturalism” meant something specific in his day, and he would have rightly denied any affinity with the **Naturalist movement**. Nor did he endorse theistic naturalism as presented by **Jean-Jacques Rousseau**; for Nietzsche, there was no law of nature because there was no lawgiver: thus, nature is “redeemed” (*GS*, III: 109). However, like Rousseau, Nietzsche believed that man’s original physiological state, before his corruption by civilization, was healthy and **happy**, and this encapsulates his idea of what is natural. He also noted Rousseau’s **concept** of a return to nature, but, mindful of the egalitarian barb in Rousseau’s thought, he declared, “I too speak of a ‘return to nature,’ although it is not really a going-back but a *going-up*” (*TI*, “Expeditions of an Untimely Man,” 48). Parting company with Rousseau, whose critique of the theological establishment did not preclude a **God** accessible through “feeling,” Nietzsche excised God completely and blamed **Christian morality** for poisoning man’s natural instincts:

I formulate a principle. All naturalism in morality, that is all *healthy* morality, is dominated by an instinct of **life**. . . . *Anti-natural* morality, that is virtually every morality that has hitherto been taught, revered and preached, turns on the contrary precisely *against* the instincts of life. . . . (*TI*: “Morality as Anti-Nature,” 4)

For Nietzsche, **Charles Darwin** was the enemy of naturalism, while Napoleon, “a piece of ‘return to nature’” (*TI*, “Expeditions of an Untimely Man,” 48), was a summation of it. He lamented that degeneration was bound to continue since even the skeptics of his day still paid lip service to an ineradicable Christian morality. *See also* BODY; DÉCADENCE; DRIVE.

**NAUSEA (DER EKEL)**. The feeling of disgust experienced by those who realize the full weight of **nihilism**. Not only is **life** meaningless, but it is, as **Zarathustra** discovers, a cycle of **eternal return** in which even “the little man recurs eternally” (*Za*, III: “The Convalescent”). The cure lies not just in **art**, as with the ancient **Greeks**, who used their **Dionysian** festivals to suspend their horror at life’s absurdity, but also in creativity, the act of making our own lives into works of art. Rather than allowing ourselves to be bowed down by **pessimism**, we should learn to be superficial “*out of profundity*” (*GS*, Preface: 4): we should sing and **dance** because, as **Zarathustra** says, “the complex of causes in which I am entangled will recur—it will create me again!” (*Za*, III: “The Convalescent”). *See also* AMOR FATI; DIONYSUS; DER ÜBERMENSCH.

**DIE NEUE ETHIK (THE NEW ETHICS OR NEW MORALITY MOVEMENT)**. This movement centered round the *Bund für Mutterschutz* (“League for the Protection of Mothers”), founded in 1904 by Ruth Bré, whose belief in social engineering caused her to be replaced as leader in 1905 by the pacifist **Helene Stöcker**. That same year, Stöcker founded the journal of the league, *Die neue Generation*. The aims of the league were to give practical help to single mothers, but some of the ideology behind this was the Nietzsche-inspired belief that **women**—even single women—had a right to enjoy their **sexuality**. The catchphrase of the group was “*sich ausleben*,” which means that every individual has the right to live **life** to his or her full potential. This—and the group’s advocacy of a woman’s right to abortion—was complete anathema to leaders of the bourgeois **feminists** such as Helene Lange and **Gertrud Bäumer**. The *Bund für Mutterschutz* tore itself apart with internal splits on issues such as the **eugenics movement** and birth control, culminating in a damaging court case in 1910, but *Die neue Generation*

**NIHILISM.** With his pronouncement in *The Gay Science* that “God is dead,” Nietzsche accepted **Arthur Schopenhauer’s** atheism while rejecting the latter’s **pessimism**, where the word “nada” (*OGM*, III: 26) sums up a weakening form of nihilism. Keith Ansell-Pearson writes, “Nihilism describes a condition in which there is a disjunction between our [inherited] experience of the world and the conceptual apparatus we have at our disposal . . . to interpret it” (Keith Ansell-Pearson, *An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker*, 1994). Thus, Nietzsche’s nihilism seeks to be **life affirming** by finding new ways to interpret the world we live in and new **moral** values to suit our new circumstances. The word first appeared as a theme in his notebooks for 1880 and 1882, appearing in print in 1886 in the relatively late work *Beyond Good and Evil*, where it is used in conjunction with a discussion of **perspectivism**: a philosopher is self-defeating if he “would rather lie down and die on a sure nothing than on an uncertain something . . .” (Nietzsche means **African Spir**, who conducted a relentless quest for certainty). Nietzsche declares, “This is nihilism and the sign of a despairing, mortally weary **soul**” (*BGE*, I: 10). Nihilism is a major theme in *The Will to Power*.

Nietzsche argues that rather than reach despair because there are no certain **truths**, we must pass through nihilism to find a new way of making values. We *ought* to approach nihilism in a positive frame of mind, jettisoning outworn judgments, but we *don’t* because the origins of our morality are too caught up in a past genealogy that we do not understand. In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche seeks to unravel two centuries of **Judeo-Christian** falsehoods so that we can overcome nihilism and become the valuers of values (and not priests, philosophers, or politicians). “Nihilism is the state reached when the highest values of humanity devalue themselves” (Keith Ansell-Pearson, “Introduction,” *On the Genealogy of Morality*). This devaluation paves the way for a **reevaluation of all values** that will include such **concepts** as the *Übermensch*, **eternal return**, and the **will to power**.

**NIJINSKY, VASLAV (1890–1950).** Russian dancer of extreme talent and sensitivity. Having grown up in poverty, Nijinsky responded to Serge Diaghilev’s checkbook overtures and became an inaugural member of the **dance** troupe *Ballets Russes*, founded in Paris in

father being the famous actor James O'Neill), and it was only after an attack of tuberculosis at the age of 24 that O'Neill settled for writing as a career. Influenced by **Henrik Ibsen** and **August Strindberg** as well as by Nietzsche, he dealt with a variety of themes; the earlier plays challenge hypocrisy in society. Nietzsche's influence, especially the concept that **Dionysian** ecstasy can break through the "veil of Maya" to discover the tragic problems of existence beneath our consciousness, can be traced in *Emperor Jones* (1920), *The Hairy Ape* (1922), *The Fountain* (1925), *The Great God Brown* (1926), and *Lazarus Laughed* (1927). Like Nietzsche, O'Neill rejected formal religion and advocated a life in which the instincts and passions would be allowed to thrive. His characters often fail to achieve this end and are finally destroyed by their own frustrations, like Abbie in *Desire under the Elms* (1924) and Lavinia in *Mourning Becomes Electra* (1931). Lavinia's plea to Peter, "Can't you forget sin and see that all love is beautiful?" meets with decisive rejection. See also BODY; DRIVE.

**ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY (ZUR GENEALOGIE DER MORAL, 1887)**. Subtitled *A Polemic*, written in 1887, and widely regarded as Nietzsche's most significant philosophical achievement, the *Genealogy* is divided into three essays, each of which has subdivisions of several pages in length. There are no aphorisms in the work, and the argument is coherent, with none of the haphazard shower of insights familiar from works such as *The Gay Science*. In the first essay, titled "'Good and Evil,' 'Good and Bad,'" Nietzsche is at pains to demonstrate how the current state of **slave morality** came about. He argues that before the advent of the **ascetic priest** there was a natural order of rank in which born leaders, "the noble, the good, the beautiful and the happy" (*OGM*, I: 10), gained power as of natural right and exerted their mastery through the natural functioning of **master morality**. Although the Germanic "**blond beast**" might be feared, the automatic functioning of the **pathos of distance** ensured that he was simultaneously respected.

The "slaves' revolt" in morality came about when the **Jews** were victorious in putting an end to master morality with the argument, "Only those who suffer are good, only the poor, the powerless, the lowly are good . . ." (*OGM*, I: 7). Inherent to this doctrine was the

negative function of **ressentiment**: “Whereas all noble morality grows out of a triumphant saying ‘yes’ to itself, slave morality says ‘no’ on principle to everything that is ‘outside,’ ‘other,’ ‘non-self,’ and *this* ‘no’ is its creative deed” (*OGM*, I: 10). In this way, the spirit of resentment has triumphed in **morality** for the past 2,000 years, vexatiously pervading **Christian** morality. Nietzsche observes of the man of resentment: ‘His soul *squints*’ (*OGM*, I: 10).

In the second essay, “Bad Conscience,” Nietzsche reflects on why we humans, distinguished from other **animals** by the ability to make a promise, should connive in our subjugation by accepting a morality that represses our instincts, so that conscience is essentially “bad conscience.” Whereas in ancient times we could externalize **cruelty** and **suffering**, these are now turned inward against ourselves. Nietzsche cautions that when man learned to turn the other cheek and became submissive, it was at terrible cost to his inner **life**:

Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be “tamed.” . . . (*OGM*, II: 16)

Unable to repress his natural urges but just as unable to view them as “good,” man was doomed to a life of despair. Filled with bad conscience, man obeyed the priest and blamed *himself* for his sickness, a great nausea occasioned by his *Schuld* (debt or guilt) before God.

“The **Ascetic Ideal**,” the topic of the third essay, feeds on weakness and submission. As Nietzsche observes, “Satisfaction is *looked for* and found in failure, decay, pain, misfortune, ugliness, voluntary deprivation, destruction of selfhood, self-flagellation and self-sacrifice” (*OGM*, III: 11). Nietzsche points out that the ascetic priest is successful on his own terms; he has a **will to power** that is able to manifest itself *because* of the self-loathing of the downtrodden. We can recognize them by “that glance which is a sigh. ‘If only I were some other person’ is what this glance sighs . . .” (*OGM*, III: 14). Nietzsche pours out abuse on “these failures” who “have taken out a lease on virtue to keep it just for themselves” (*OGM*, III: 14). He dreads the day when the happy, healthy, and powerful begin “to doubt their *right to happiness*” (*OGM*, III: 14). Only the realization that there is no God can allow man to walk free from the negative moral-

ity of the ascetic ideal and allow him to construct his own morality. And as Nietzsche had already pointed out in *The Gay Science*, only we can kill God (*GS*, III: 125).

Although the *Übermensch* is only mentioned once in the *Genealogy*, in connection with Napoleon, that “synthesis of *Unmensch* (brute) and *Übermensch*” (overman) (*OGM*, I: 16), Nietzsche clearly foresees a man of the future who will overcome the ascetic ideal: “this Antichrist and anti-nihilist, this conqueror of God and nothingness—he must come one day . . .” (*OGM*, II: 24).

**ON TRUTH AND LIES IN A NONMORAL SENSE (ÜBER WAHRHEIT UND LÜGE IM AUSSERMORALISCHEN SINNE).** Essay written in 1873 in which Nietzsche stressed that in spite of humanity’s drive for absolute **truth**, there is really no such thing. All of us are caught in the nets of **language** and are unaware of the way we twist and turn for meanings. The drive for **knowledge**, entwined with the quest for truth, is dependent on language, which is rhetorical and incapable of delivering a “truth” stripped of **metaphor**. Nietzsche cites a host of figures of speech to show the fluidity of meaning in language:

What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical and binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensual force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins. (*OTLNS*: 2)

Nietzsche proposes that we should grasp the problem posed by the “fluid meaning” of **concepts** and evaluate the usefulness of both truth and **lies**. Some fictions are necessary to human **life** and are thus converted into “truths.” Although they are lies and illusions, they at least have value. In the same way, concepts provide a structure for thought. Man has to have some security so that he can sit at “this” table by “this” window; he must forget that the words or designations are mere metaphors, otherwise he will have neither repose nor security. **Forgetting** is therapeutic in that the free intellect can become creative by smashing the framework of concepts and giving full rein to intuition. *See also* FREUD, SIGMUND.

**PARMENIDES.** See SPIR, AFRICAN.

**PERSPECTIVISM.** Claimed as an essential fact of Nietzsche's theory of **knowledge**, "perspectivism" is a word used tantalizingly rarely in Nietzsche's published works; it is most frequently found in *The Will to Power*. Walter Kaufmann's translations often render words like *Optik* as "perspective," giving the misleading impression that Nietzsche uses the term more than is the case. In a fragment of 1881, Nietzsche describes how prone we are to accept the evidence of our eyes: "This mirror image of the eye [represents] our poetic-logical power to ascertain the perspectives to all things by means of which we *keep ourselves alive*" (KSA, 9, 15 [9]). The point is not that we see correctly but that what we think we see is **life-promoting**. Several years later, in *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche declares, "There would be no life at all if not on the basis of perspective evaluations and appearances" (BGE, II: 34). Nietzsche dismissed contemporary philosophers who "speak even of perspective with an arrogant disdain"—those meant (according to Robin Small, *Nietzsche in Context*, 2001) are **Friedrich Albert Lange** and Gustav Teichmüller. Suffice it to say that Nietzsche used the term "perspectivism" here to refute **Kantianism** of the type represented by Lange. Nietzsche viewed consciousness as a sign of decline and preferred to trust human instinct rather than Kantian abstraction.

Nietzsche's insistence on perspectival interpretation of sense experiences was an important grounding for his **nihilism** and was closely linked to his rejection of absolute **truth**: there are no facts, "only interpretations" (WP, III: 481). In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, he sought to establish a perspectival method of **moral reevaluation** that would go beyond such simplifications as "good" and "evil." Keith Ansell-Pearson comments, "Such a mode of thinking recognizes the conditionality of human forms of knowledge and is not concerned with absolutes, moral or otherwise" (Keith Ansell-Pearson, *Nietzsche as Political Thinker*, 1994). In sum, Nietzsche perceives perspectivism as a vital part of his new kind of philosophy, and it permeates all his thinking, implicitly if not explicitly.

**PESSIMISM.** Nietzsche first encountered the **concept** of pessimism as a student in Leipzig in 1865, when he read **Arthur Schopen-**

**hauer's** *Die Welt als Wille und Erscheinung*, 1819 (*The World as Will and Representation*, 1969). He was immediately captivated by Schopenhauer's central tenet, the will to **life** (*Wille zum Leben*). Like Nietzsche, Schopenhauer was an atheist, but unlike Nietzsche, he held that man suffers permanent pain through his predicament. To reduce the pain, one must reduce the intensity of the will, and if a man can truly free his intellect from the will, then he is a genius. More realistically, the most we can expect to do is lead an ascetic life and sympathize with the sufferings of others.

Nietzsche never lost his respect for Schopenhauer's dedication to his task, but he disagreed with his philosophical conclusions. He could not accept Schopenhauer's central tenet that life is fundamentally evil, and though he had his own theory on **suffering**, he argued against compassion or **pity**. In his mature work, Nietzsche refuted Schopenhauer's thesis with his own concept of the **will to power**, which is in essence the **affirmation** of life and not its abnegation. What Nietzsche had to develop in his thought was how, in the wake of the death of **God**, he could steer humanity away from a life-denying pessimism toward a positive form of **nihilistic** pessimism. His solution was a **revaluation of all values**; the new **morality** that would emerge would lack all **metaphysical** overlay. (Critics have been swift to point out that Nietzsche's concepts of the *Übermensch*, **eternal return**, and the will to power do, however, sometimes strain in the direction of metaphysics.)

**PIETISM/NEO-PIETISM.** Two dominant and related strands in German **Lutherism** that must be placed within the **cultural history** of **Germany**. These terms often arouse hostility and bemusement in equal measure, as the word "pietist" is used differently in English. Pietism in Germany sprang up during the 17th century as a reaction to the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) and Lutheran scholasticism. The center of faith was the inner religious life, nourished by biblical devotional study. The Pietist placed him- or herself unconditionally in the lap of Jesus, just as a **child** would trust its mother. Pietism developed a specific vocabulary to reflect this doctrine of obedience and surrender, and "child" is a major term within this. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche parodies Christ's call for us to be childlike when *Zarathustra* begins his discourse by calling for man to meta-

chapter (“The Religious Revival”) of volume 2 of Lecky’s *History of England in the Eighteenth Century* (8 vols., 1878–1890). Nietzsche’s attack on **Christianity** had a broad edge, but he usually meant Protestantism, especially of the zealous, authoritarian, evangelical kind that provoked guilt and the fear of condemnation: and this was radical neo-Pietism, as described here.

At the ass’s festival in part 4 of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the eight higher men recite a litany typical of an evangelical “awakening,” not to worship Christ but in honor of “a perfumed ass.” Zarathustra finds them reciting, “Amen! And praise and wisdom and thanks and glory and strength be to our God for ever and ever!” (*Za*, IV: “The Awakening”). With supreme irony, Zarathustra rebukes the higher men: “Everyone would adjudge you, with your new faith, to be the worst blasphemers or the most foolish of old women” (*Za*, IV: “The Ass Festival”). As Nietzsche’s works became increasingly anti-Christian, he lost many friends; **Franz Overbeck** was his only Basel acquaintance who kept in touch with him to the end, perhaps because he, too, had lost his faith.

**PITY (DAS MITLEID)**. An affect to be avoided on a number of counts. First, it is demanded in **Christian morality** and has infected other areas such as **Arthur Schopenhauer**’s philosophy and English **utilitarianism** and is therefore suspect per se (*D*, II: 132); second, it is useless, for we do not actually **suffer** with the sufferer; he or she has to cope with the pain alone, in view of which our pity merely increases the sum total of suffering in the world. Thus, the person feeling pity is at risk of becoming sick and depressed (*D*, II: 133). In *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche points out that the pitier often has an ulterior motive, that of feeling helpful and of being needed—both of which are weakening (*GS*, IV: 338)—while in *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche reminds his readers that **democracy** and **socialism** breed a “religion of pity, in sympathy with whatever feels, lives, suffers,” and thus induce a particular brand of weakness into Europe, “a new **Buddhism**” (*BGE*, V: 202). The infection permeates “our entire literary and artistic decadence from St. Petersburg to Paris, from **Tolstoy** to **Wagner**” (*A-C*, 7). The solution is to adopt the **pathos of distance** and to steel oneself to **Zarathustran** hardness: “So be warned against pity . . .” (*Za*, II: “Of the Compassionate”).

**PLATO.** Born around 428 B.C. of **aristocratic** descent, Plato was horrified at the trial and execution of his teacher, **Socrates**, in 399 B.C. In 387 B.C., he founded the Academy in Athens, and apart from a brief intervention in the political life of Syracuse in 367 B.C., he devoted his life to teaching and writing. Much of his work, written in a characteristic form of dialogue, reflects the ideas of Socrates, and it is often impossible to unravel the Socratic from the Platonic. With this proviso, we speak now of Platonic “forms” (or ideas) as unknowable entities in the nonreal world: for example, such abstracts as “the good” and “the **truth**.”

Although in his early essay on *The Greek State*, written in 1871, Nietzsche respected Plato’s attempt to envisage a state led by a philosopher ruler, he never surmounted his prime objection to Plato’s **metaphysics**, in which the real world, where change is constant, is separated from the “intelligible” world (of forms), where there is no change. In *Daybreak*, he wrote,

If we are not to lose ourselves, if we are not to lose our *reason*, we have to flee from experiences! Thus did Plato flee from reality and desire to see things only in pallid mental pictures; he was full of sensibility and knew how easily the waves of his sensibility could close over his reason.—Would the wise man consequently have to say to himself: “I shall honour *reality*, but I shall turn my back on it *because* I know and fear it?” (*D*, V: 448)

In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche denounces Plato’s invention of “pure spirit and the good in itself” that forced Plato into “standing truth on her head and denying *perspective* itself, the basic condition of all **life**” (*Beyond Good and Evil*, Preface). On the same note, Nietzsche in his late work *The Anti-Christ* attacks Plato as a liar: “The ‘holy lie’—common to Confucius, the Law-Book of Manu, Mohammed, the Christian Church: it is not lacking in Plato. ‘The truth exists’: this means, whenever it is heard, *the priest is lying . . .*” (*A-C*: 55). See also THE GREEKS.

**POLITICS.** See BISMARCK, OTTO VON; DEMOCRACY; GRAND POLITICS; STATE.

**POSTMODERNISM.** Allied to the movements in the **arts** known as **structuralism** and **poststructuralism**, postmodernism, which, taken

literally, would refer to works from approximately 1950 on, undermines all the traditional certainties such as those inherent in humanism. In architecture, postmodernism attacks the arrogance of the “International” style and favors witty references to mass **culture** in commercial architecture. In literary criticism, postmodernism has come to mean something slightly different, largely because Nietzsche’s thought has been used as the fulcrum for debate. Existing texts or ideas are examined at the margins for hidden signifiers so that new interpretations can be teased out. Postmodern critics subvert **language** itself to this purpose. Following the Nietzschean premise that **truth** must be interrogated, “**New Nietzsche**” scholars have followed the **deconstructive** practices of French philosophers like **Jacques Derrida**. Their justification is that Nietzsche, too, embarked on a subversive process whereby he questioned the foundations of truth, language, and **morality**. Although Nietzsche’s role has thus been seen as crucial for postmodernism, the emphasis placed on *The Will to Power* as his central text has worried more traditional contemporary thinkers.

**POSTSTRUCTURALISM.** In general, the term given to literary theories prevalent during the 1970s that superseded the more linguistically rigorous **structuralism** but, more specifically, the umbrella name for the **deconstruction** of **Jacques Derrida**, who leaned heavily on Nietzsche’s thought and method (his “**style**”) for his own interpretative practices, as did **Michel Foucault** and **Roland Barthes**. Poststructuralism makes “theory” the chief repository of all “meaning,” applying not just to verbal **language** (often referred to as “discourse”) but also to any sociocultural signifying system. The human being is “decentered,” with no unified or coherent identity; he or she is controlled by the power structures at work during any given period. By extension, the author of a text is “dead.” The individual reader is free to enter the text and its complex scattering of signifiers, an experience that can allegedly amount to orgasmic bliss or *jouissance*. Texts themselves cross boundaries of genre and become simply *écriture*. Since it is given that no text means what it appears to say, a variety of interpretations are inevitable. *See also* POSTMODERNISM.

**POWER (DIE MACHT).** As with **force** (*die Kraft*), Nietzsche tried to acquire sufficient **scientific knowledge** to fuel a physical description

of the way power operates its control. Of the works he read relating to the subject, the one he seems to have found most useful was Robert Julius Mayer's essay *Über Auslösung* ("On Release") in *Mechanik der Wärme* (1874), dealing with the accumulation and discharge of force. Here, Nietzsche found his predilection confirmed for a hierarchy of power in which some forces direct and some drive. In a fragment from 1881, Nietzsche points out that many people think "more power" implies "more force" when, in fact, more is less, for example, when the person with most power at his fingertips, say, a machine operator, just needs to use the slightest touch (*KSA*, 9, 11 [25]). In 1888, Nietzsche returned to the same problem of power, but now the essential ingredient of will is present:

We do not know how to explain a change except as the encroachment [*Übergreifen*] of one power [*Macht*] upon another power [*Macht*]. . . . The will [*Wille*] to accumulate force [*Kraft*] is special to the phenomena of **life**, to nourishment, procreation, inheritance. . . . Should we not be permitted to assume this will as a motive force in chemistry, too?—and in the cosmic order? (*WP*, III: 689)

In this passage we see just how easy it was for the **National Socialists** to cull slogans from *The Will to Power* when, in fact, Nietzsche's intention in this case is to explain chemistry and cosmology in his own terms. Central to Nietzsche's argument is the quest for hegemony: "opposites, obstacles are needed" (*WP*, III, 693), and within that, the crucial factor is quantity. For Nietzsche, the material world is driven not by mechanical laws but by the operation of "quanta of force [*Kraft-Quanta*], the essence of which consists in exercising power [*Macht*] against other quanta of force [*Kraft-Quanta*]" (*WP*, III: 689). In spite of his constant attempts to amass scientific knowledge, Nietzsche, who was a mediocre mathematician and no more than an amateur enthusiast in **natural science**, found it difficult to explain **eternal return** or the will to power in any convincingly scientific way. Refer to Robin Small, *Nietzsche in Context* (2001).

**PRZYBYSZEWSKI, STANISLAUS (1868–1927).** Polish writer. Przybyszewski wrote in both Polish and German and was as well known to his contemporaries for his provocative Bohemianism as for his novels and plays. He first read Nietzsche's works in the early 1890s. In 1892, he published *Zur Psychologie des Individuums. I:*

*Chopin und Nietzsche, II: Ola Hanson*; here the word “individual” stands for what would normally be termed “genius.” Catching sight of the sick Nietzsche in Weimar, paraded by **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** like a freak attraction, Przybyszewski was struck by the tragedy of Nietzsche’s situation. Believing (as many did at the time) that Nietzsche was of Polish extraction, Przybyszewski thought there was much to link him to Nietzsche’s “Slav” cast of mind and to his use of **language**. Together with his friend **Richard Dehmel**, Przybyszewski set himself against the austere theories of the **naturalist movement** propounded by **Arno Holz**, and espoused an **aesthetic** form of decadent Satanism, believing this to be true Nietzscheanism. His chief works in German are *Totenmesse* (*Mass for the Dead*, 1893), *Satanskinder* (*Satan’s Children*, 1897), and *Androgyne* (1900).

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**RACISM.** See ANTI-SEMITISM; EUGENICS MOVEMENT; NATIONALISM; NATIONAL SOCIALISM; *VOLK, DAS*.

**RATIONALISM.** Philosophical stance that relies on reason to search out **truth**. Starting with **Socrates**, Nietzsche picked off every rationalist thinker who crossed his path, accusing each one of various **life-denying** doctrines. Under “**science**” or “**Darwin**,” he attacked the fashion of his day for rationalism, convinced that it destroys the human spirit and fails to make any allowance for the human imagination, the life of the passions, or the capacity for health-giving **Dionysian** intoxication. His rejection of “truth” is allied to his denial that reality has a logical structure. Addressing “the realists,” Nietzsche uses an argument that would later be developed by **Henri Bergson** and **Jacques Derrida** when he points out that we can never capture pure reality because our past will always color the present moment:

Your love of “reality,” for example—oh, that is an old, ancient “love!” In every experience, in every sense impression there is a piece of this old love; and some fantasy, some prejudice, some irrationality, some ignorance, some fear, and whatever else, has worked on it and contributed to it. (*GS*, II: 57)

Nietzsche's solution lay in skepticism and **perspectivism**, but critics of the latter stance have accused him in turn of irrationalism. *See also* DESCARTES, RENÉ; ENLIGHTENMENT; *THE GAY SCIENCE*.

**REALITY.** *See* RATIONALISM; PLATO.

**RECURRENCE.** *See* ETERNAL RETURN.

**RÉE, PAUL (1849–1901).** German **Jewish** philosopher. Nietzsche first met Rée in 1873 when the latter visited Basel for the summer. Writing to **Erwin Rohde** (then in Kiel) on 5 May 1873, Nietzsche declared Rée to be a “thoughtful and gifted man” and made a point of reading his publications when they appeared. In 1875, Rée published his *Psychologische Beobachtungen* (*Psychological Observations*) and, in 1877, *Der Ursprung der moralischen Empfindungen* (*The Origin of the Moral Sensations*; both essays contained in *Paul Rée Basic Writings*, trans. Robin Small, 2003). Nietzsche, Paul Rée, and Albert Brenner spent the winter of 1876–1877 with **Malwida von Meysenbug** in Sorrento and were able to fully discuss their ideas on **morality** on this occasion (Meysenbug in her memoirs, published 1876, dubbed her house party an “idealists’ colony”). Between 1875 and 1882, it could be said that Rée’s compassionate psychological observations on morality had some credence with Nietzsche. However, Rée was Nietzsche’s rival for the hand of **Lou Andreas-Salomé** in 1882, which ultimately divided the two men irreconcilably, a fact that saddened Nietzsche deeply. Rée in his turn felt hurt and rejected when Lou Salomé married Fred (later Frederick) Andreas in 1887; he thereafter became a practicing doctor. In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche—referring to *The Origin of the Moral Sensations*—decisively rejected Rée’s “altruistic evaluation” (*OGM*, I: 5), though without his characteristic animosity toward ideas he disliked. Rée died of a fall in the Swiss Engadine in circumstances that do not rule out suicide. Refer to Robin Small, *Nietzsche and Rée: A Star Friendship* (2005). *See also* FRIENDSHIP.

**RENAISSANCE.** “Rebirth” of **European**—especially Italian—**culture** after the medieval period. The Renaissance was not univer-

sally so described until the Basel professor **Jacob Burckhardt** established it as a period of time roughly coinciding with the 15th century. Nietzsche read his colleague Burckhardt's work with close attention.

Nietzsche does not make constant reference to the Renaissance in his work but nevertheless pronounced it "the golden age of this millennium": "The Italian Renaissance contained within it all the positive forces to which we owe modern culture" (*HH*, I: "Tokens of Higher Culture," 237). Nietzsche's list of these forces includes the liberation of thought, disrespect for authorities, victory of **education** over the arrogance of ancestry, and enthusiasm for **science**. Burckhardt was scrupulous in arguing that an age has its own character and is not automatically better than the preceding age, and Nietzsche echoes this thought in *Twilight of the Idols*, where he reflects on the vitality of the Renaissance: "—Ages are to be assessed according to their *Positive forces*—and by this assessment the age of the Renaissance, so prodigal and so fateful, appears as the last *great age*" (*TI*: "Expeditions of an Untimely Man," 37).

In *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche praised the works of early Renaissance practitioners (especially Dante, Raphael, and Michelangelo), lamenting the fact that there will never again be such a species of **art** in which the falsehood of "the beyond" is so gloriously portrayed (*HH*, I: "From the Souls of Artists and Writers": 220). He had high praise for Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) and for that handbook for the future **Übermensch**, *Principe*, 1513 (*The Prince*, 1532), not just for its ruthless politics but also for its **style**. Nietzsche set Machiavelli on the same pedestal as the ancient **Greek** Thucydides because they shared an "unconditional will not to deceive themselves and not to see reason in *reality*—not in 'reason,' still less in '**morality**'" (*TI*, "What I Owe the Ancients": 2). The comparison to Thucydides is significant; this was the Greek writer he most respected. Nietzsche did not hesitate to use the word "Machiavellism" to describe **Otto von Bismarck's** *Realpolitik* (*GS*, V: "We Fearless Ones," 357).

The fact that Nietzsche placed "Cosimo" on his reading list in 1879 (meaning Cosimo di Medici), probably referring to Alfred de Reumont's book on Lorenzo di Medici (1874), though he made no further comment on the Medicis, indicates that he had more pressing concerns on his mind than a complete survey of Renaissance

culture. Indeed, Machiavelli's prince and the warlike Cesare Borgia (ca. 1475–1507) probably incorporated “Renaissance man” for Nietzsche, with Borgia earning his highest admiration:

One altogether misunderstands the **beast of prey** and man of prey (Cesare Borgia for example), one misunderstands “**nature**,” so long as one looks for something “sick” at the bottom of these healthiest of all tropical monsters and growths, or even for an inborn “hell” in them: as virtually all moralists have done hitherto. (*BGE*, V: 197)

In *The Anti-Christ*, Nietzsche blamed the **Germans** for not reaping the harvest of the Renaissance. For Nietzsche, the Renaissance was a period when **Christianity** was revalued and an attempt was made to bring about a victory “of the opposing *values*, *the noble values* . . .”—the sort of victory that could entertain the idea of “*Cesare Borgia as Pope*. . . . Christianity would thereby have been abolished!” (*A-C*: 61). Instead, **Martin Luther** tried to reform Rome and, when that failed, brought about the Reformation, making the Renaissance “an event without meaning, a great *in vain!*” (*A-C*: 61). See also ARISTOCRATIC VALUES.

**RELIGION.** See BUDDHISM; CHRISTIANITY; LUTHER, MARTIN; PIETISM; ZARATHUSTRA/ZOROASTER.

**RESSENTIMENT.** Nietzsche always used the French term to express what he asserted to be the source of negative moral values in society. In German there is no real equivalent to the term, though in English, “resentment” comes close. Nietzsche uses “ressentiment” to express an attitude of **life** rather than a specific emotion related to jealousy. The term is intimately bound up with Nietzsche's concept of **herd** men, who unquestioningly accept the **slave morality** of **Christianity** (or any religion) as peddled by the **ascetic priest**. Slave morality, described at length in *On the Genealogy of Morality*, encourages man to despise his own **body** and his instinctual life, so that he learns to say “no” to all that is noble and healthy (in Nietzsche's definition). The solution lies in Nietzsche's concept of higher health for the **higher man**, who, by creating his own destiny, will **affirm** and love **life**. Thus will come into being the *Übermensch*, the apotheosis of the **will to power** to whom resentment is anathema. Refer to Esam Abou El Magd, *Nietzsche. Ressentiment und schlechtem Gewissen*

*auf der Spur* (Nietzsche: *In Search of Ressentiment and Bad Conscience*, 1996). See also *AMOR FATI*; *CONSCIENCE AND BAD CONSCIENCE*.

**REUTER, GABRIELE (1859–1941).** German writer. Reuter’s novel *Aus guter Familie* (*From a Good Family*, 1895) was a best-seller. The chief character in this novel, Agathe Heidling, is unable to heed the Nietzschean message to “become who she is” and ends up as a mentally unstable spinster, having been “cured” of what her family construe to be hysterical demands for wider horizons: “her will is broken,” we are told ominously. Reuter herself was a convinced Nietzschean who also studied the work of **Max Stirner**. Although she was fundamentally apolitical, believing that radical **feminist** activity would sap her creative powers, Reuter portrayed strong female characters who either make their way in the world—like the unmarried mother, Cornelia Reimann, in *Das Tränenhaus* (*The House of Tears*, 1909)—or are untrue to their inner core, succumbing to sickness like Agathe Heidling or Frau Bürgelin in *Frau Bürgelins Söhne* (1899).

Reuter, in the company of her friends **Fritz Koegel** and **Rudolf Steiner**, met the mentally ill Nietzsche when he was in the care of his mother and sister in Naumburg in 1894. Reuter lived in Weimar at that time, though she moved to Munich and subsequently had an illegitimate daughter under circumstances similar to those related in *Das Tränenhaus*. Her appreciation of the liberating potential of Nietzsche’s philosophy never waned. “Just to be able to say ‘I will’—and not ‘I can’—that sums it all up” (Gabriele Reuter, *Ellen von der Weiden*, 1900).

**REVALUATION OF ALL VALUES (*DIE UMWERTUNG ALLER WERTE*).** Also known as “the transvaluation of all values.” English speakers should bear in mind that “*Wert*” also translates as “worth.” Ignoring the theories of value in 19th-century European political economy based on the economics of Adam Smith, Nietzsche resolutely concentrated his attack on the outmoded values of Christian **morality**. Having established that **God** is dead, it was Nietzsche’s central concern that the individual should be self-reliant in terms of **morality** rather than succumb to the weakening effects of the **ascetic ideal**. In this way, **nihilism** could be pursued in an **affirmative** rather

than **pessimistic** climate. Those unwilling to make the journey would remain in the **herd**. In *Beyond Good and Evil* and *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche challenges us to go beyond such clichés as “good” and “evil” and undertakes his quest to find the origin and function of values.

In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche examines the etymology of the terms “good” and “bad” and links both of them to **power**. In former times (well before **Christianity**), **master morality** dictated what was to be seen as “good.” **Slave morality**, as set forth in the New Testament, avenged itself by declaring that slave characteristics (weakness, humility, poverty, **pity**, and so on) were “good.” In this way, early Christianity brought about **ressentiment** and slave values:

People have taken the *value* of these “values” as given, as factual, as beyond all questioning; up till now, nobody has had the remotest doubt or hesitation in placing higher value on “the good man” than on “the evil,” higher value in the sense of advancement, benefit and prosperity for man in general (and this includes man’s future). What if the opposite were true? (*OGM*, Preface: 6)

Nietzsche argues that modern man has been forced into a **life-denying** posture that has extinguished **aristocratic values**; these can be retrieved at an individual level in the self-creativity and self-overcoming of the *Übermensch*. Only then can “value” depend on the valuer, as it should. The danger is that it is not possible to have a society in which everybody decides what constitutes morality on an individual basis. Had Nietzsche lived to write *The Will to Power*, the book was scheduled to have the subtitle *Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values*. The notes left behind and posthumously assembled into the text of *The Will to Power* devote large sections to nihilism (book 1), revaluation of values (book 2), and, of course, the **concept** of “**the will to power**” (book 3).

**REVENTLOW, FRANZISKA ZU (1871–1918)**. German writer. A rebel from an aristocratic family that eventually disowned her for her profligate behavior, Franziska zu Reventlow came to a knowledge of Nietzsche via **Henrik Ibsen** (as did many others): she began to frequent the Lübeck Ibsen Club in 1889. From 1893 to 1895, she studied **art** in Munich, interrupting her studies to marry Walter Lübke, by whom she was swiftly divorced for adultery in 1896. Her son Rolf,

**SCHOPENHAUER, ARTHUR (1788–1860).** German philosopher.

A native of Danzig, Schopenhauer's chief work was *Die Welt als Wille und Erscheinung*, 1819 (*The World as Will and Representation*, 1969). Here, his **pessimistic** philosophy is expounded in four books dealing in turn with the theory of **knowledge**, the philosophy of **nature**, **aesthetics**, and ethics. Schopenhauer asserts that the world is "representation," that is, the creation of our perceiving mind. The only way we can have knowledge is through the self: either the self as object in space and **time** or the inner self as repository for sensations and desires—in other words, the will. **Body** and will are thus inseparable. The will is an appetite for **life**—*Wille zum Leben*—that causes conflict between individuals, since all are blindly driven by their will. The result of this inevitable conflict is **suffering**, which is not fortuitous but the purpose of existence. Pain is the essence of life. The only amelioration of the situation can come about through contemplation of the will by means of the intellect.

Deeply influenced by Vedantic and **Buddhist** thought, Schopenhauer recommended the suspension of the will by contemplation as a form of negation or nirvana. The will can be negated only by an ascetic lifestyle. To "will less," we must sympathize with the **suffering** of others. The good man will practice altruism, chastity, and fasting. **Happiness** is a reduction in the level of pain; sometimes this can be achieved through the "disinterested" contemplation of a work of **art**, which can lift the **veil** of Maya (illusion) so that the individual can perceive reality as illusion and thus achieve self-consciousness. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche also used the **concept** of "the veil of Maya," but he denied the value of Schopenhauerian compassion, and, though like Schopenhauer he held art in high esteem, nothing came higher on his list of priorities than life itself: one's life was, in fact, a work of art, something one "created."

In his later works, Nietzsche attacked Schopenhauer with great gusto, but as a young man he was under his spell. Part of the attraction of **Richard Wagner** for Nietzsche when they met in 1868 was that Wagner was also a convinced Schopenhauerian. In "Schopenhauer as Educator," the third essay of the *Untimely Meditations*, Nietzsche berates society for its poor level of **education** and faulty understanding of philosophy, hardly mentioning Schopenhauer, though he is still an admirer, but in *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche makes an apology to

his readers for having been misled by Schopenhauer (and Wagner): “It is obvious that at that time I misunderstood what constitutes the veritable character both of philosophical pessimism and German **music**,—namely, their *Romanticism*” (*GS*, V: 370).

It is plausible that Nietzsche’s **antifeminism** stemmed at least in part from Schopenhauer, who, like Nietzsche, had a difficult relationship with his mother and sister but, unlike Nietzsche, made a complete and acrimonious break with both women. Schopenhauer accused his widowed mother, the novelist Johanna Schopenhauer, of “loose living” and left his beloved Weimar for good, losing touch with his sister Adèle, who was also a putative writer. For whatever reasons, both men came to be counted as the two great misogynists of their age. Refer to Otto Most, *Zeitliches in Europa in der Philosophie Nietzsches und Schopenhauers* (1977) and Christopher Tonaway, ed. *Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche’s Educator* (1998). See also PITY; *DER ÜBERMENSCH*.

**SCHULER, ALFRED (1865–1923)**. German thinker and private lecturer. In 1897, Schuler became the leader of *die Kosmiker*. This newly founded esoteric group was convinced that an orgiastic heathen lifestyle could rekindle the “fiery blood” (*Lebensglut*) of ancient civilizations. From the Reformation on, only certain rare individuals could experience an ancient *Blutleuchte*, or flash of blood. To reinforce his point, Schuler declared that he was a reincarnation of a Roman legionary and dressed accordingly, even when not at a party. Schuler spoke of the mystical unifying powers of *Volk* that a group of initiates could summon; he was so sure of his capacity to reawaken hidden occult creative powers that he planned a special cultic dance to heal Nietzsche, though it was not actually performed. *Die Kosmiker* sought to awaken a new Nietzschean consciousness based on the life of the instincts and inspired by mother right, as expounded by **Johann Jakob Bachofen**. **Jews**, being fundamentally patriarchal, were much vilified within the circle, in spite of the fact that **Karl Wolfskehl**, who had founded the group with **Ludwig Klages**, was a Jew. The quarrel between Schuler and Wolfskehl flared up at a party held in January 1904 that nearly ended in violence, with the result that the group broke up, unable to resolve the internal conflicts brought about by the **anti-Semitism** of Schuler and Klages. Schuler, in particular, was rabidly anti-Semitic, in-

sulting all those, dead or alive, whom he considered to be unresponsive to vitalism: he even labeled **Martin Luther** a Jew. He despised individualism, departing here from Nietzsche, who was otherwise hailed as “cosmic man” within the group. Refer to Baal Müller, ed., *Cosmogonische Augen. Alfred Schuler. Gesammelte Schriften (Cosmogenic Eyes: Alfred Schuler: Collected Works, 1997)*.

**SCIENCE (DIE WISSENSCHAFT)**. This term merely designates academic **knowledge** in German (in contrast to the process of cognition) and is usually used with a cognate (as in *Naturwissenschaft* = **natural science**); it is far less strong than the English term “science.” According to Nietzsche, the broader field of science (“systematized knowledge”) has—like **morality** and **Christianity**—led man down fallacious paths, frequently passing off manipulation as “the **truth**” when only **art** is true because it embraces **metaphor**. Hence, the whole scientific quest is one that Nietzsche rejects outright for its harmful effects on **culture**:

Science [*Wissenschaft*] is related to wisdom as virtuousness is related to holiness; it is cold and dry. . . . As long as what is meant by culture is essentially the promotion of science, culture will pass the great **suffering** human being by with pitiless coldness, because science sees everywhere only problems of cognition [*Erkenntnis*] and because within the world of the sciences suffering is really something improper and incomprehensible, thus at best only one more problem. (*UM*, III: “Schopenhauer as Educator,” 5)

Nietzsche points out that although we pride ourselves on the impartiality of scientific knowledge, our faith in science still rests on a **metaphysical** foundation, contaminating our drive for knowledge from the outset. Refer to Gregory Moore and Thomas H. Brobjer, *Nietzsche and Science* (2004). See also DARWIN.

**DIE SELBSTÜBERWINDUNG**. See *DER ÜBERMENSCH*.

**SEXUALITY**. Nietzsche praised the instinctual **life** and heralded sexuality as joyful and **natural**. He attacked the attempts of the **ascetic priest** to poison the pleasures of the flesh and was viewed by many early Nietzscheans as the herald of erotic libertarianism. Although there are passages in Nietzsche’s works where a hetaeric lifestyle

for women is advocated (e.g., *HH*, I: “Woman and Child,” 424), Nietzsche, the Wilhelmine gentleman, remained fundamentally puritanical in matters concerning **woman’s** maternal function. He resolved the conflict by positing the idea that the sexually aroused woman wants nothing other than to be impregnated: “Has my answer been heard to the question how one *cures* a woman—‘redeems’ her? One gives her a child” (*EH*, “Why I Write Such Good Books”: 5). Forgetting his own maxims on freedom for the individual, Nietzsche castigated **feminists** as lesbians “incapable of giving birth.” He was also (but less stridently) scathing of effeminacy in men (*OGM*, III: 26). If we disentangle the misogyny from Nietzsche’s remarks on sexuality, we are left with a clear plea for frankness in a domain where pleasure, not bad **con-science**, should dominate. *See also* SYPHILIS.

**SHAW, GEORGE BERNARD (1856–1950)**. Irish playwright. Shaw’s Fabianism acted as a filter to his reception of Nietzsche. He first heard of Nietzsche in 1890 but read nothing by him first-hand until 1896. Having, to his great satisfaction, shocked the British public with *Plays Pleasant and Unpleasant* (1898)—*Mrs. Warren’s Profession* was banned—Shaw turned his attention to the **eugenics movement** and developed his own theory of the **life force**, a **power** that, with the help of those concerned, raises individuals to a higher and better existence. Although Shaw asserted that Nietzsche had exerted little influence over him, the title for his play *Man and Superman* (1903) is clearly borrowed from Nietzsche; however, the creative revolution he seeks to postulate owes more to **Charles Darwin** and **Henri Bergson** than to Nietzsche. Possibly Shaw’s admiration for **Henrik Ibsen**, whom Nietzsche loathed, persuaded him to keep Nietzsche at a safe distance, and there is little discernible influence in such plays as *Pygmalion* (1912) or *Saint Joan* (1924), which are arguably Shaw’s masterpieces.

**SHESTOV, LEV (1866–1938)**. (Actual surname: Schwarzmann.) Russian writer and thinker much influenced by Nietzsche. Himself an adherent of the “new religion” propounded by **Dimitri Merezhkovsky** and his circle, Shestov, who read Nietzsche in the late 1890s, abandoned **rationality** in favor of a questing faith that has been compared to the thought of **Søren Kierkegaard**, though Shestov did

in Heinz-Jürgen Dahme and Otthein Rammstedt, eds., *Georg Simmel und die Moderne (Georg Simmel and the Moderns, 1984)*.

**SLAVE MORALITY (DIE SKLAVENMORAL).** Nietzsche thought the **ascetic ideal** inculcated a servile **morality** in **Christianity** and all other religions that taught believers they would be rewarded in another **life** for privations endured in this life (thus nurturing their **ressentiment**). The clergy has secured control over the anxious and **suffering** flock, or **herd**, by telling them that their own sins have caused their suffering. A perverted view of what is right or wrong, good and evil, has been the result. Nietzsche argued for a **revaluation of values**, believing that slave morality was anti-**life** and produced “bad **conscience**” and negative values:

The beginning of the slave revolt in morality occurs when *ressentiment* itself turns creative and gives birth to values. . . . Whereas all noble morality grows out of a triumphant “yes” to itself, slave morality says “no” on principle to everything that is “outside,” “other,” “non-self”: and this “no” is its creative deed. (*OGM* I: 10)

Nietzsche’s antidote to herd man and, by extension, to the problem of slave morality is the *Übermensch*, a hypothetical man of the future whose **natural** superiority will manifest itself in **master morality**.

**SOCIALISM.** The General German Worker’s Association (*der Allgemeine Deutsche Arbeiterverein*) was founded in 1863 by Ferdinand Lassalle, a rival of **Karl Marx**; the Social Democratic Workers’ Party (*Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei*) was founded by August Bebel and Karl Liebknecht in 1869; the two parties merged in 1875 into the Socialist Workers’ Party (*Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei*). In 1890, this became the German Social Democratic Party (*Die Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* [SPD]) when the *Sozialistengesetz* was revoked. The latter was a law whereby **Otto von Bismarck** had banned socialism during the years 1878–1890. The new party adopted the Erfurt program, which vaunted the Marxist doctrine of abolition of class rule and of class itself.

Nietzsche repeatedly insulted socialism in his work, linking it to his fear that **Europe** was on a downward slide toward *décadence*, and much of his philosophy was intended as a corrective to this danger. It is obvious why Nietzsche, firmly convinced of the benefit of

**aristocratic values** and deeply suspicious of any form of altruism, should loathe the burgeoning new movement. He lumped it together with **utilitarianism**, **democracy**, and (illogically, in view of Marxian hostility to religion) **Christian morality**, seeing socialists as would-be philanthropists set on weakening society by encouraging mediocrity. The Marxist doctrine of economic equality was anathema to Nietzsche, who saw it as an example of **ressentiment** that would give power to **herd** man: “Whom among today’s rabble do I hate the most? The Socialist rabble” (A-C, 57). Nietzsche’s chief aspiration was that the solitary *Übermensch* should create his own fateful destiny. Had he been more interested in daily politics (he refused to read the newspapers), he would have been even more worried about the inroads Marxism was making into **German** politics. *See also* THE STATE.

**SOCRATES (ca. 469–399 B.C.)**. Ancient **Greek** philosopher. Although we can glean his opinions only secondhand from **Plato**’s Dialogues, it is clear that Socrates believed that man should acquire **knowledge** by a method of logical thinking. He instructed others by feigning ignorance and by thus drawing out their opinions and exposing their inconsistencies. He insisted that he was no cleverer than other men; he simply knew the extent of his ignorance better. His method of questioning was sometimes intrusive and resented; finally, he was accused of corrupting the youth of Athens and condemned to death by drinking hemlock. Nietzsche found the whole **concept** of Socrates’ philosophical method repugnant, especially the placing of the **drives** on a lower scale than intelligence. Nietzsche thought this denial of the instincts ran directly counter to the **Dionysian** impulse in **Greek tragedy**, and in his later works the dichotomy between **Apollo** and Dionysus, as set out in *The Birth of Tragedy*, became a dichotomy between Dionysus and Socrates. Nietzsche blamed Socrates directly for the extinction of Greek tragedy, which had originated as a festival in honor of Dionysus and died out by the end of the fifth century B.C., with no apparent explanation. To Nietzsche it was anathema to preach the superiority of dry logic over the **body**, but he had some admiration for Socrates, too, since the latter’s belief in a system of nobility of spirit was not unlike Nietzsche’s own belief in **aristocratic values**. Refer to Hermann Josef Schmidt, *Nietzsche*

*und Sokrates. Philosophische Untersuchungen zu Nietzsches Sokratesbild (Nietzsche and Socrates: Philosophical Investigations into Nietzsche's Portrayal of Socrates, 1969); Werner J. Dannhuser, Nietzsche's View of Socrates (1974); and Michel Guérin, Nietzsche: Socrate héroïque (1975).*

**SOLOVIEV, VLADIMIR (1853–1900).** Russian philosopher. Soloviev was strongly influenced by **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel** and **Friedrich Schleiermacher**. A devout Protestant, Soloviev turned from an early radicalism to a complicated **Christian** humanism in which he tried to reconcile his admiration for Nietzsche's vitalism with his disapproval of what he saw as the egoism of the *Übermensch*. Using the idea of correspondences, Soloviev thought that man should be in harmony with his surroundings, just as plants and animals are with cosmic development; he would become man-**God** through a secularized version of *sobornost*, a term that originally referred to the unity of man and God through the sacrament of Holy Communion.

Soloviev's mysticism deeply influenced **symbolism** in Russia, in particular the work of the writers **Vyacheslav Ivanov**, **Alexander Blok**, and **Andrei Bely**, especially in its insistence on the matriarchal principle enshrined in the transcendent image of "Divine Sophia." Naturally, there is a conflict here with Nietzsche's disapproval of anything that smacked of the "**eternal feminine**." Soloviev's encounter with Nietzsche was further complicated by the fact that his figure of the Anti-Christ is, like Milton's Satan, essentially dynamic and compelling. In his utopian and futuristic *Short Tale on the Anti-Christ* (1900), the final part of *Tri razgovora (Three Conversations)* set in the 21st century, Soloviev portrays an Anti-Christ, also referred to as an *Übermensch* and as a man of the future, who is in conflict with the forces of good and is ultimately vanquished.

Although Soloviev was not opposed to **Darwinism** as such, his ideas led to a reaction against materialism in Russian intellectual circles. In his positive and **affirmative** form of Christian philosophy, he preached that the end of the world would bring about the end of death and that, after a struggle between the powers of good and the powers of evil, God's reign on earth would be established. *See also* GERMAN IDEALISM.

**SOUL.** Nietzsche regarded the teaching that man has an immortal soul as pernicious, since that gave **Christianity** the excuse to preach that the soul was eternal and therefore needed salvation. In addition, he objected to the “**scientific**” arguments that atoms could have a soul, a view held from antiquity. Democritus had speculated that sensations are produced by emissions from other atoms on the atoms of the soul; for Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, monads (divisible atoms) can have a soul. Nietzsche coined a phrase for this branch of error: “*Seelen-Atomistik*” (“soul atomism”). It needed surgical removal, “a remorseless war of the knife” (*BGE*, I: 12):

Let this expression be allowed to designate that belief which regards the soul as being something indestructible, eternal, indivisible, as a monad, as an *atomon*: *this* belief ought to be ejected from science [*Wissenschaft*]! (*BGE*, I: 12)

However, Nietzsche goes on to say that the soul can survive as a hypothesis and suggests **concepts** that science could usefully embrace: “mortal soul,” “soul as multiplicity of the subject,” and “soul as special structure of the **drives** and emotions” (*BGE*, I: 12). He quite happily used the term on many occasions throughout his works, often expanding it into a phrase, such as “living touchstones of the soul” (i.e., **consciousnesses** that will overcome **morality**; *BGE*, II: 32), while expressions like “**Greek** soul” are legion. At the end of the day, though, Nietzsche believed that “there is no soul” (*NW*, “Where I Make Objections”). His main objection to **René Descartes** was the latter’s presumption that man was a union of body and mind/soul (the two being equivalents). “If we relinquish the soul, ‘the subject,’ the precondition for ‘substance’ in general disappears” (*WP*, II: 485). *See also* NATURAL SCIENCE.

**SPENCER, HERBERT (1820–1903).** English sociologist who preempted **Charles Darwin** and Alfred Russel Wallace with his ideas on evolution, though his theory that evolution took place through the inheritance of acquired characteristics was forced to give way to the Darwinian discovery of natural selection. (Spencer, not Darwin, coined the phrase “the survival of the fittest” in his *Principles of Biology*, 1864.) Nietzsche wrote of Spencer’s theory—within the context of a critique of **democracy**—“this is to misunderstand the essence of **life**, its *will to power*” (*OGM*, II:

12). Spencer predicted that individualism (which he vigorously advocated) would come into its own only after an unwelcome period of **socialism** and war. Nevertheless, Nietzsche insisted on classing him as a **utilitarian** socialist: “Our Socialists are *décadents*, but Mr. Herbert Spencer is also a *décadent*—he sees in the victory of altruism something desirable! . . .” (*TI*, “Expeditions of an Untimely Man”: 37).

**SPENGLER, OSWALD (1880–1936)**. Spengler is best known for his celebrated *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (I: 1918; II: 1922; *The Decline of the West*, 1934), a work that examines **culture** from both a diachronic and a syncretic angle: ancient civilizations are scoured to see what made them rise and decline, while contemporary cultures, such as that in North America, are examined for explanations of cultural stagnation. Nietzsche is mentioned sporadically throughout *Decline of the West*, where the argument ranges from penetrating to obscure and even banal: some rather obvious remarks are made to prove the point that the diet of a people or **Volk** alters their thought processes. For Spengler, the national priorities are “the maintenance of the blood, the succession of the generations, the cosmic, **woman**, and **power**.” Spengler’s idiosyncratic exegesis covered all **art** forms—**music**, architecture, even handwriting.

Spengler’s central premise is that Faustian man, in contrast to **Apollonian** man, whose belief in technology has become a materialistic religion, has been in decline since 1789. With this central premise that since the French Revolution culture has sunk into mere civilization, Spengler also differentiates between “totem,” the **affirmative** attitude of the man of action, and “taboo,” all that is bureaucratic and negative. The totemic aspect underpins Spengler’s own form of *Lebensphilosophie*. Spengler argues that “good” and “evil” are taboo concepts, unlike the totemic “good and bad.” Civilization is “the extinction of nobility,” and “nobility is cosmic and plant like.” Spengler’s hatred of the priesthood exceeds even that of Nietzsche. Spengler is again on the attack in *Der Mensch und die Technik*, 1931 (*Man and Technology*, 1932), where he spells out the evils of technology and, incidentally, reopens the question of diet. Carnivores seek prey, but vegetarians *are* prey. Man is a beast of prey, but more so in some races (**master** races) than others.

In July 1920, Spengler was an honored guest at the *Nietzsche-Archiv* when he visited Weimar. In 1923, he was invited to join the committee of the *Stiftung Nietzsche-Archiv*, and he was also invited to join the committee of the *Gesellschaft der Freunde des Nietzsche-Archivs* when it was formed in 1926, but he became increasingly ill at ease with the strident tone of **nationalism** to be found at the *Nietzsche-Archiv* and resigned from his position on the executive in 1935. Although he had coupled Nietzsche's name with that of the German *Volk*, Spengler became disillusioned with **National Socialism**. His *Jahre der Entscheidung* (*Years of Decision*, 1933) provoked a government ban on his work. A broken man, Spengler withdrew into isolation.

**SPINOZA, BARUCH (1632–1677)**. Jewish philosopher resident in Holland who abandoned Judaism in favor of an atheistic pantheism. His significance for **European** philosophy was such that all later philosophers built on his system. His most renowned work is his *Ethics* (1677). As Nietzsche told **Franz Overbeck** in a letter of 30 July 1881, he was at one with this “most abnormal, most solitary thinker” on five principal points: “[Spinoza] . . . denies free will; purpose; the moral world order; the unegoistic; evil; . . . in sum, my solitude [*Einsamkeit*] . . . is now at least shared [*eine Zweisamkeit*].” Beyond this, Nietzsche was critical of Spinoza's doctrine that all we know, whether mind or matter, is a manifestation of an all-embracing **God**. Spinoza's method also comes under attack because of his use of mathematical terminology that Nietzsche denigrates as “hocus-pocus,” while sneering at the way Spinoza “encased and **masked** his philosophy” (*BGE*, I: 5). Refer to William Wurzer, *Nietzsche und Spinoza* (1975).

**SPIR, AFRICAN (1837–1890)**. Russian veteran of Sebastopol and private scholar. Spir renounced his naval career in 1856 and in 1867 emigrated to Germany and later Switzerland. Spir's intention in his chief work, *Denken und Wirklichkeit, Versuch einer Erneuerung der kritischen Philosophie* (*Thought and Reality: Attempt at a Renewal of Critical Philosophy*, 1873), expanded and reprinted as the first two volumes of the *Gesammelte Schriften* (1883–1884), was to “present a metaphysical system which rests on a sharp and uncom-

**SPIRIT OF HEAVINESS (*DER TRAGENDE GEIST/ GEIST DER SCHWERE*)**. Also translated as “the spirit of gravity.” This allegorical figure—Zarathustra’s alter ego or inner voice—is first encountered as the weight-bearing camel in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. The camel takes on its **heavy** burden with masochistic willingness, similar to that of a zealous religious man who is told to observe an impossible string of religious observances and who cannot do enough to oblige. In the section “Of the Three Metamorphoses” in part 1, Zarathustra questions whether the motive is “to debase yourself in order to injure your pride?” The camel is transformed into a rebellious lion that resists the religious commandments and bellows, “I will!” (Clearly a reference to the Lord’s Prayer: the lion will no longer say “Thy will be done.”) However, it is the innocent **child** who will be the new beginning, the “sacred yes” (*Za*, I: “Of the Three Metamorphoses”), with no burden of guilt. Right at the outset, Nietzsche sets out his stall: to make man aware that after the death of **God**, there is no need to carry the burden of the outmoded **morality** that went with him.

In “The Vision and the Riddle,” the weight-bearing spirit reappears as a dwarf who refuses to understand Zarathustra’s vision of **eternal return**; Zarathustra angrily calls him the spirit of heaviness or gravity, but the problem belongs to Zarathustra, and it is this: how can he endure the terrible thought of eternal return? We encounter the concept of inner struggle again in book 3, where Zarathustra’s soliloquy details Nietzsche’s own opinion of the weakening effects of morality: only at an individual level can we break free. “This—is now *my* way: where is yours?” (*Za*, III: “On the Spirit of Gravity,” 2).

**SPITTELER, CARL (1845–1942)**. Swiss writer. Recognition came late to Spitteler: he was 74 when he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1919. His early work, published on his return to Germany after eight years as private tutor in Russia, was a pseudo-classical epic *Prometheus und Epimetheus* (1880–1881), written in a dithyrambic **style** so close to that of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* that it was taken to be an imitation of Nietzsche, until it was pointed out that it had been published two years before Nietzsche’s work. Spitteler corresponded with Nietzsche in cordial fashion (albeit on

the unedifying topic of publishers). In an early article on Nietzsche titled “*Nietzsches Abfall von Wagner*” (“Nietzsche’s Defection from Wagner”) and published in *Der Bund* on 8 November 1888, Spitteler acknowledged that Nietzsche earned his wholehearted respect for his critique of Richard Wagner. For his part, Nietzsche wrote to Spitteler’s friend **Josef Widman** (15 September 1887) that “he would not have guessed that a contemporary **German** writer could produce such fine work.” Spitteler went on to write his magnum opus, the epic poem *Olympischer Frühling* (*Olympian Spring*, 1900–1910), in “bumping Alexandrines” (Jethro Bithell, *Germany: A Companion to German Studies*, 1962). Spitteler achieved growing recognition in the circle round **Michael Conrad**, all of whom contributed to the journal *Die Gesellschaft*, but he was never “in fashion.” Refer to Richard Oehler, “Nietzsches Zarathustra und Spittelers Prometheus,” in *Ariadne* (1925).

**THE STATE.** Nietzsche made a clear distinction between the state and a nation or people (**Volk**). The function of the state is to prepare a breeding ground for the genius, but only **culture** can go on to produce that genius. It is typical of Nietzsche that from first to last, his engagement with politics merges into a discussion of **culture** and is always measured against the gold standard of the ancient **Greek** state. In an early essay, *The Greek State*, written in 1872 as one of the *Five Prefaces to Five Unwritten Books*, Nietzsche stated that Greek cultural excellence depended on work being left to the slaves so that the **artist** could work untrammelled. This is how the genius was able to flourish in ancient Greece. Nietzsche had kind words for **Plato**’s ideal state because it nurtured the **aristocratic** class from which artists are selected, but he blamed Plato for “excluding the inspired artist entirely from his state” in favor of “the genius of wisdom and **knowledge**,” no doubt at the behest of **Socrates**.

In *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche assessed what happens when a state founded on religion becomes secular, warning that “if religion disappears the state will unavoidably lose its ancient Isis **veil** and cease to excite reverence . . . modern **democracy** is the historical form of *the decay of the state*” (*HH*, I: “A Glance at the State,” 472). He has harsh words for **socialism**, which serves to show “what danger there lies in all accumulations of state power,” and argues

for “as little state as possible” (*HH*, I: “A Glance at the State,” 473). Nietzsche’s praise for the Greek city state is now limited because he disapproves of its desire for stasis, but even so, he remarks, Greek culture evolved “*in spite of the polis*”—one only needs to remember Thucydides’ account, making Athens “rise resplendent once again” (*HH*, I: “A Glance at the State,” 474). By the time he wrote *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche had come to view the state as “the coldest of all monsters” (*Za*, I: “Of the New Idol”) and German culture under the Second Reich as pretty much a lost cause.

In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche stressed that he was a good **European** (*BGE*, VIII: 241) and backed the idea of European unity, largely because its culture, if not its politics, strove in that direction. Nietzsche certainly hated **Bismarck** and had no time for democracy or **grand politics**. A major reason for his support for Europe was that it would dilute the **Germans** and “their stupidity and dull-mindedness, their coarseness in more delicate affairs” (*UM*, 3: “Schopenhauer as Educator,” 6). In his late work, Nietzsche saw the state as the very antithesis of culture: “Culture and the state . . . are antagonists. . . . In the **history** of European culture the rise of the Reich signifies one thing above all: *a displacement of the centre of gravity*” (*TI*, “What the Germans Lack”: 4). See also “*DEUTSCHLAND, DEUTSCHLAND ÜBER ALLES*”; GERMANY; GRAND POLITICS; VOLK, DAS.

**STEINER, RUDOLF (1861–1925)**. Austrian thinker. Steiner lived in Weimar from 1890. A passionate **Goethe** scholar, he was also a very early Nietzschean, writing an article titled “*Nietzscheanismus*” in 1892: many more would follow, as would the monograph *Friedrich Nietzsche. Ein Kämpfer gegen seine Zeit*, 1895 (*Friedrich Nietzsche: Fighter for Freedom*, 1960). His *Die Philosophie der Freiheit* (*The Philosophy of Freedom*) appeared in 1894. Steiner and other early Nietzscheans such as **Gabriele Reuter** began to visit **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** while Nietzsche and his sister were still in Naumburg. The attraction was not so much the possibility of seeing the sick Nietzsche as of seeing some of the manuscripts as yet unpublished, most notably *The Anti-Christ*. Steiner attempted to tutor Elisabeth on Nietzsche’s philosophy (she was at work on his biography), only to conclude that she was the least apt person he could imagine for such an undertaking.

Although Elisabeth died in 1935, the links she had cultivated with leading **National Socialists**, not least **Adolf Hitler**, guaranteed that the *Stiftung Nietzsche-Archiv* would be smiled on during the Third Reich. The painstakingly slow work on the *Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe*, begun in 1931, continued, with **Martin Heidegger** a key collaborator. After the election putting Hitler in power (January 1933), the *Stiftung Nietzsche-Archiv* was openly pro-**National Socialist** and remained so after the death of Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche. In 1942, Günther Lütz, minister for education and *Volksbildung*, joined the committee of the *Stiftung Nietzsche-Archiv* in 1942 at the suggestion of Richard **Oehler**. All activity of the organization ceased at the end of the war.

**STIRNER, MAX (1806–1856)**. German thinker. Stirner was an anarchic philosopher whose programmatic “selfishness” is set out as a philosophy in *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum*, 1845 (*The Ego and His Own*, 1912). This book lapsed into obscurity for several decades until interest in it was renewed at the end of the 19th century, largely through the efforts of John Henry Mackay. Stirner declares, “I am unique. Nothing concerns me more than myself.” Although Stirner is much neglected today, frequent comparisons were made in the early years of Nietzsche reception between Stirner the egoist, who does what is right for himself alone, and Nietzsche’s *Übermensch*. A debate raged over whether Nietzsche had read Stirner without admitting to his influence, with Anselm Ruest, in *Max Stirner: Leben, Weltanschauung, Vermächtnis*, 1906 (*Max Stirner: Life, Worldview, Legacy*), concluding that Nietzsche kept silent through fear that Stirner’s philosophy would be “misused” to justify crimes. Refer to R. Schellwein, *Max Stirner und Friedrich Nietzsche* (1892) and A. Lévy, *Stirner et Nietzsche* (1904).

**STÖCKER, HELENE (1869–1943)**. German writer and **feminist**. Stöcker studied in Bern for her doctorate since German universities were not open to **women** students until the turn of the century. From 1896 to 1899, she was research assistant to **Wilhelm Dilthey** and by this time a convinced Nietzschean; she had also met Minne Cauer and been won over to feminism. Paradoxically, when she was at the height of her feminist activity, Stöcker was on good terms with both

Care, 1902). His first play, *Die Ehre*, 1889 (*Honor*, 1915), was followed by the deliberately **decadent** *Sodoms Ende* (1890–1891), where an early reference is made to Nietzsche’s ideas, ironically at a time when Nietzsche, having become insane at the beginning of 1889, could not appreciate it. The hero in the play, Willy Janikow, is described by his girlfriend as “a god . . . who can do anything,” but a cautionary note is struck by Janikow’s fellow painter, Reimann, who has little time for geniuses “**beyond good and evil**, as they now say.” Behind the name “Sodom,” Sudermann thinly disguised contemporary Berlin society, and the police promptly banned the play. The work that made Sudermann famous Europe-wide was his next play, *Heimat*, 1893 (well known in Britain as *Magda*, 1923). With this play, Sudermann took up a central role in the **naturalist movement**. See O. Bockstahler, “Nietzsche und Sudermann,” in *German Quarterly* 8 (1935).

**SUFFERING.** Nietzsche regarded suffering and **crudelty** as fundamental to humanity. **Pity** at another’s suffering is a weakening effect that **democracy** and **socialism** have inherited from **Christianity morality**, when what is needed is “to remain spectators of suffering, to *let* suffer” (*BGE*, V: 202); not for nothing did Aristotle refer to **Greek tragedy** as a purgative for the emotions (*A-C*: 7). Nietzsche lambasted Christianity because it preached that man was guilty of his own suffering through sins that had to be atoned. This was the cue for the **ascetic priest** to lay his hands on man. The **ascetic ideal** makes man responsible for his own suffering, which is eventually channeled into **ressentiment**: “It was suffering and impotence—that created all afterworlds” (*Za*, I: “Of the Afterworldsmen”). Nietzsche’s solution that “**God** is dead” released man from guilt but not from suffering. However, by self-overcoming, the **Übermensch** will be able to **affirm life** and love his fate, whatever it brings. The **artist** is able to present the tragic aspect of life in the form of illusion. This is something that man can understand and emulate to the point of making his own life an **aesthetic** phenomenon. “As an aesthetic phenomenon existence is still bearable for us” (*GS*, II: 107). See also *AMOR FATI*.

**SUPERMAN.** See *DER ÜBERMENSCH*.

**SYMBOL/SYMBOLISM.** A symbol was originally a token used in **Greek** society; for example, parting lovers might break a ring in two, with the intention of reuniting it when next they met. For them—and for them only—it symbolized fidelity; otherwise, it was just a broken piece of metal. In contrast to **metaphor**, a symbol starts off with a concrete person or thing that comes to represent something else. Nietzsche’s use of symbols is a complex part of his figurative imagery by means of which familiar things, such as the sky, a **veil**, the **blond beast**—even the song “*Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles*”—acquire a symbolic meaning to the point of becoming coded messages in his philosophy. Nietzsche also frequently used personification and symbolical allegory. **Zarathustra**’s **animals** are personified allegory since they speak and think like people and stand for ideas far more complex than their animal nature could comprehend; an example is Zarathustra’s ass when it brays “yea” in a spoof on **affirmation** (*Za*, IV: “The Awakening,” 2). However, Nietzsche’s iconography is never static. For example, **Richard Wagner** at first symbolized **art** for Nietzsche, only to become the symbol of *décadence* at a later stage.

**SYMBOLIST MOVEMENT.** An international movement in the arts, especially poetry, that began in France in the wake of Charles Baudelaire’s pathbreaking *Les fleurs du mal* (1857). This collection contains the poem *Correspondances*, where the term **symbolism** is used in a special way. According to Baudelaire, who drew on the ideas of Jakob Boehme and Emanuel Swedenborg, everything in the **natural** world has a reciprocal correspondence in the spiritual world. Jean Moréas in *Le Figaro* on 18 September 1886 was the first to define the movement. Symbolist poets from the 1890s on hailed Nietzsche as a liberator of the senses; their approval was often couched in terms of homage to **Dionysus**. The poets most obviously part of the movement were Paul Verlaine, Arthur Rimbaud, Stéphane Mallarmé, and **Paul Valéry**. The chief distinguishing feature of these poets was their use of words as magic symbols that could convey a transcendental reality. In Germany, the major symbolist poets were **Stefan George** and **Rainer Maria Rilke** and in Russia **Dimitri Merezhkovsky**, **Vyacheslav Ivanov**, **Alexander Blok**, and Valery Briusov. The leading Russian symbolist theoretician was the writer

**Andrei Bely.** In America, the poet Arthur Symons should be mentioned and in Britain **W. B. Yeats** and Ezra Pound. Later writers such as T. S. Eliot and Dylan Thomas continued the tradition.

**SYPHILIS.** It is commonly held that Nietzsche suffered from syphilis and that this occasioned his migraines, his eye and stomach trouble, and his final collapse into insanity, but the case is not proven. According to **Paul Deussen**, in *Erinnerungen an Friedrich Nietzsche* (1901), Nietzsche told Deussen that he had sought refuge in playing the piano when duped into entering a brothel by a malicious cabdriver in Cologne in February 1865. This story, which might well be true, proves nothing apart from setting a seedy framework for what comes next. In 1890, the clinic in Basel to which **Franz Overbeck** took Nietzsche, having rescued him from Turin, recorded that Nietzsche himself had volunteered that he had suffered from two “specific infections.” At the clinic in Jena where Nietzsche was taken soon afterward, the documents record “1866, syphilitic infection,” which would date the supposed infection(s) to the time of Nietzsche’s transfer of studies from Bonn to Leipzig University.

In the train home from the Jena clinic, Nietzsche declared to his mother that he was “22 years old,” a seemingly silly thing to say, but not if his subconscious was unearthing unpleasant things from 1866. However, Nietzsche was a sick man and not really in a fit state to give his medical history to anyone. After Nietzsche’s death in 1900, **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** tried to rewrite the medical history of her brother’s mental collapse; letters went back and forth between Binswanger (in charge of the Jena clinic), Overbeck, and **Peter Gast**. In this context, Overbeck assured Gast on 21 May 1905 that Binswanger had told him in strict confidence that Nietzsche’s illness was caused by lues (another word for syphilis), while Binswanger, probably not wishing to be sued by Nietzsche’s sister, now maintained that there was no clear evidence one way or the other. That is still the case after well over a century.

A further complication comes from **Richard Wagner’s** physician, Dr. Eiser. Wagner, believing that Nietzsche’s headaches came from excessive masturbation, engineered a meeting between Eiser and Nietzsche in Rosenlaubad in August 1877. The Eisers stayed for four days at the resort, and Nietzsche went to see Eiser, firing off excited

letters to friends to say that he had at last found a decent doctor. Having examined Nietzsche, Eiser dutifully reported to Wagner on 26 October 1877 that Nietzsche definitely did not practice harmful masturbation. After all, Eiser wrote, Nietzsche had assured him that he had had “clap” during his student days and had had sex in Italy on doctor’s orders. What is astonishing is that while Eiser believed Nietzsche’s statement (though Nietzsche was probably fibbing), and while Wagner believed Eiser’s *compte rendu* (though Eiser was breaking his Hippocratic oath), and while Nietzsche believed Wagner’s bona fides until he found out his real motive, *all three* seem to have genuinely believed that masturbation is a far worse plague than a dose of venereal disease. Of course, syphilis has symptoms that *could* tally with Nietzsche’s affliction. Refer to Pia Daniela Volz, *Nietzsche im Labyrinth seiner Krankheit* (1990), and Richard Shain, *The Legend of Nietzsche’s Syphilis* (2001).

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**THIEL, ERNST.** *See* NIETZSCHE-ARCHIV.

**THUCYDIDES.** *See* THE GREEKS.

**THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA.** *See* ZARATHUSTRA, THUS SPOKE.

**TILLE, ALEXANDER (1866–1912).** German writer and thinker. Tille, “a Social Darwinist of the most extreme kind” (R. Hinton Thomas, *Nietzsche in German Politics and Society 1890–1918*, 1980), spent the decade 1890–1900 teaching at Glasgow University until the students rebelled against him for his pro-Boer sympathies (the Boer War lasted from 1899 to 1902). In 1895, Tille became editor of the English translation of Nietzsche’s works and was himself the first translator of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* into English (*Thus spake [sic] Zarathustra. A Book for All and None*, 1898). In 1894, he gave lectures on Nietzsche to the Goethe Society in Glasgow in which he zealously insisted on Nietzsche’s social **Darwinism**. Tille’s major work, *Von Darwin bis Nietzsche. Ein Buch Entwicklungsethik* (*From*

*Darwin to Nietzsche: A Book on Evolutionary Ethics*), appeared in 1895. Here, Tille argued that a physiologically higher form of human being was also the **moral** goal of mankind.

Tille was prepared to face the brutal consequences of his elitism: believing that **nature** should be helped in the removal of the weak so that the strong could flourish, he spoke of the beneficial effect of the slums of East London because they cleansed the nation of undesirables. In this sense, he ran directly counter to the movement for social welfare that gathered pace from 1890. Although a passion for Nietzsche was a link between himself and **Helene Stöcker** during their brief love affair (they met in 1900), Tille was more inclined than Stöcker to find fault with Nietzsche for having harbored a feudal concept of **aristocracy** instead of treating elitism on its own merit. Tille himself, as leading member of the *Altdeutscher Verband* after 1898, argued for a racial (but not **anti-Semitic**) pan-**German** evolutionary ethic in which service to the *Volk* constituted service to mankind.

**TIME.** Nietzsche approached the question of time from the viewpoint of “becoming” (or “occurring”: *Geschehen*, as he termed it), on the same lines as the absolute becoming posited by **Heraclitus**. In a note written in 1881, Nietzsche gave the example of the growth of a tree to explain how we fail to perceive the passage of time, even when it is happening before our eyes:

Every moment the tree is something *new*: we confirm the shape because we cannot perceive the slightest absolute movement: we stick through it a mathematical average line, we *add on to it* lines and surfaces based on what our intellect says, which is an *error*, and assume it is the same and static, because all we *see* is something static and we only *remember* when something is similar (the same). But really it is different: we must not let our skepticism be transferred to essence. (KSA, 11 [293])

At around the same time as this quote, Nietzsche conceived the doctrine of **eternal return**, first mooted in *The Gay Science* and later expounded in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. In the latter, the dwarf speaks of time as a circle (*Za*, III: “Of the Vision and the Riddle,” 2), but this is not Nietzsche’s view. Nietzsche conceived time as both linear and infinite and, as such, infinitely divisible. He found no objection to counting back into infinity or forward into infinity and

viewed countable time as separate from the events within it, which were finite. In 1883, at work on *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche wrote in his notebook, “An *endless process* can not be thought of in any other way than as *periodical*” (KSA, 10: 15 [18]). Thus, although Nietzsche claims that the world can contain only a finite number of elements, his procedure of counting forward and back to infinity does not rule out the fact that “the period of recurrence must be finite at any given time, although always open to increase” (Robin Small, *Nietzsche in Context*, 2001). On these terms, there is no contradiction between eternal return and Nietzsche’s view of time as infinity. Refer to Nicholas Rennie, *Speculating on the Moment: The Poetics of Time and Recurrence in Goethe, Leopardi, and Nietzsche* (2005). See also HERACLITUS; NATURAL SCIENCE; SPIR, AFRICAN.

**TOBARI, CHIKUFŪ (1873–1955).** Japanese academic. A native of Hiroshima, Chikufū studied German at Tokyo University and became a high school teacher at Yamaguchi. On his return to Tokyo for further study in 1899, he became a member of the editorial team on the journal *Teikoku bungaku* and in 1900 published three essays on German literature, “*Doitsu no bankin bungaku*” (“On Recent German Literature”), which centered chiefly on **Hermann Sudermann**, then popular in Japan. Chikufū later became embroiled in the **aesthetic life** debate within academic circles, which from 1901 to 1903 centered on a misunderstanding of Nietzsche’s ideas. Chikufū stood on the side of his friend Takayama Chogyū, who was accused of immorality, and lost his own post as a consequence. His interest in Nietzsche continued, and he published partial translations of Nietzsche’s works: *Human, All Too Human* in 1906 and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* in 1907 (the latter in full in 1921). In 1924, during his visit to Germany and Italy, Chikufū visited **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** at the *Nietzsche-Archiv*. He is well regarded as the editor of a German–Japanese dictionary.

**TOLSTOI, LEO (1828–1910).** Russian writer of world stature. Although Tolstoi is known chiefly for novels such as *Voyna i mir*, 1863–1869 (*War and Peace*, 1957), and *Anna Karenina* (1877; trans. 1954), he was also a **moralist** and thinker. A patriot who fought in the Crimean War, Tolstoi was an **aristocrat** who owned several hundred

**TRAGEDY.** *See* GREEK TRAGEDY.

**TRAGIC HERO.** *See* AESTHETICS; GREEK TRAGEDY.

**TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY.** *See* GERMAN IDEALISM.

**TRANSLATION.** Although Nietzsche, as a philologist, was technically a linguist, his interest in classical texts lay in their content and not in their **language**, which—as an expert in **Greek** and Latin—he rather took for granted. He knew virtually no English and was not even competent in French, but he enjoyed reading texts translated from other languages and did not routinely complain about the quality of translation, though this was often poor. The one point he did make forcefully, in *Beyond Good and Evil*, concerns **style**: “That which translates worst from one language into another is the tempo of its style, which has its origin in the character of the race, or, expressed more physiologically, in the average tempo of its ‘metabolism’” (*BGE*, II: 28). Nietzsche goes on to explain that the **German** language—ponderous and clumsy—is unsuited for lighthearted writers such as Aristophanes and Petronius.

Of course, Nietzsche wanted only the best when it came to translations of his own works. In 1875, Marie Baumgartner had competently translated the third of the *Untimely Meditations* into French, but just before he went insane, Nietzsche raised his sights, approaching **August Strindberg** to do the French translation of *Ecce Homo*. At the same time he asked **Helen Zimmern** to do the English translations of *Ecce Homo* and *Twilight of the Idols*; he was hoping Hippolyte Taine would do the French translation for the latter. On 8 December 1888, he frantically sent letters to all three personages. Three weeks later he would lose his mind.

**TREITSCHKE, HEINRICH VON (1834–1896).** German academic thinker and writer. Treitschke taught history and politics at several universities, beginning with Leipzig in 1859 and finally ending in Berlin, where he spent the rest of his career lecturing; he was also a member of the Reichstag from 1871 to 1884. Treitschke’s influential five-volume *Deutsche Geschichte im 19 Jahrhundert*, 1879–1894 (*History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century*, 1915–1917), was

not yet finished when he died; the work bristles with Prussian authoritarianism, though it deals only with the period up to 1848. As professor of history at Heidelberg University from 1867 to 1874, Treitschke disapproved of what he saw as Nietzsche's cavalier and speculative approach to philosophy, and Nietzsche reciprocated this hostility. Having founded the *Verein Deutscher Studenten* in 1880, Treitschke emerged as a fanatical **anti-Semite**, giving **völkisch** speeches to packed audiences. Treitschke was all that Nietzsche loathed; it is therefore ironic that **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** found people to believe her when she insisted that Nietzsche's work had an affinity with that of Treitschke. It is technically true that both men had an interest in the politics of **power**, but Treitschke pressed for colonial aggrandizement, seeing Germany's destiny as fulfilling the legacy of the Holy Roman Empire (the First Reich, founded in 1800 by Charlemagne, or *Karl der Grosse*), while Nietzsche groaned at the thought of "**Deutschland, Deutschland über alles.**"

**TRUTH.** Nietzsche suggested that there was no such thing as "the truth": we impose meaning on our world by using a **language** that gives the illusion of being absolute but is in fact a **perspective** and no more; words themselves are **metaphors**, though we are so accustomed to them that we do not see them as such. However, we conveniently forget these details in our desire to think that we know the truth, while all the time we are merely tailoring language to fit in with our relationships with other people. "Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force . . ." (*OTLNS*, 2). What interested Nietzsche was not the absolute value of truth but rather its significance for human existence; he was at pains to challenge dogmatists by demonstrating the provisional nature of our assumptions. Nietzsche used the trope of "**woman**" to uphold the fluidity of truth:

Supposing truth to be a woman—what? is the suspicion not well founded that all philosophers, when they have been dogmatists, have had little understanding of women? That the gruesome earnestness, the clumsy importunity with which they have hitherto been in the habit of approaching truth have been inept and improper means for winning a wench? (*BGE*, Preface)

The use of the trope “woman” in this controversial manner mobilizes the type of metaphor that, Nietzsche warns, lies hidden in language, making our drive for truth impossible. In *Nietzsche contra Wagner*, Nietzsche proceeds on the same quest, again asking rhetorically, “Perhaps truth is a woman who has reasons *not to let her reasons be seen?* . . . Perhaps, speaking Greek, her name is **Baubô**?” (NCW, Epilogue: 2).

Nietzsche’s point is not to attack real women who try to conceal their thoughts or actions but to praise the **Greek** way of life, where a superficial stance was viewed as healthier than one of **depth**, points made at the end of *Nietzsche contra Wagner*. Truth is elusive because our method of knowing is limited by our capricious, value-laden use of language, which goes hand in hand with our self-consciousness. We are condemned to live in a fog of **concepts** unless the intellect can break free. See also DECONSTRUCTION; FORGETTING; PERSPECTIVISM; ON TRUTH AND LIES IN A NONMORAL SENSE.

### **TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS (GÖTZEN-DÄMMERUNG, 1888).**

Aptly subtitled *Or How to Philosophize with a Hammer* (1888) on account of Nietzsche’s economical method of hammering home concise philosophical reflections, the work is a fruit of Nietzsche’s last year of sanity, a period when he experienced a heightened awareness of reality before the sudden collapse of his mind. The passages in which he explains the philosophical treatment of “reality” are a case in point. **Plato** is attacked for elitism: “The real world, attainable to the wise, the pious, the virtuous man—he dwells in it, *he is it*,” while **Christianity** promises “the real world” later on as a reward but does not deliver. **Immanuel Kant**’s real world is just as unattainable but is also “a duty, an imperative” when reduced to thought. At last, skepticism burns away the gray of dawn: “Cockcrow of positivism.” Finally, we abolish the real world and, with it, the apparent world: a time ripe for the entrance of *Zarathustra* (TI, “How the ‘Real World’ at Last Became a Myth”). Nietzsche distills the wisdom of 2,000 years into one page of dense reflection.

Some early Nietzsche scholars, especially theologians at the turn of the century, have tried to pass off *Twilight of the Idols* as the product of a diseased brain, but the admittedly strident tone merely accentuates themes that Nietzsche had repeatedly dealt with in

earlier works, such as his contempt for Christianity as “*hostile to life*” (*TI*, “**Morality as Anti-Nature**”: 3). With scathing comments, Nietzsche dismisses a host of luminaries in the history of ideas, such as **Socrates**, **Arthur Schopenhauer**, and **John Stuart Mill**; we have “*Carlyle*: or pessimism as indigestion,” “*Zola*: or delight in stinking,” “*Sainte-Beuve*—fundamentally a **woman**,” and *George Sand*, “this prolific writing cow” (*TI*, “Expeditions of an Untimely Man”: 1–6).

In addition, Nietzsche has an inexhaustible supply of invective with which to insult **Germany** or, more specifically, German **culture** under **Otto von Bismarck**’s Second Reich. The Germans’ taste in **music** is pedestrian (“constipated, constipating”; *TI*: “What the Germans Lack”: 2), their **educational** standards mediocre. Philosophy is being devoured by politics: “*Deutschland, Deutschland über alles* was, I fear, the end of German philosophy” (*TI*: “What the Germans Lack”: 1); culture and the **state** are antagonistic. **Richard Wagner** escapes most of the diatribe only because Nietzsche had just devoted the whole of *The Case of Wagner* to a withering exposé of his former mentor. Only **Johann Wolfgang von Goethe** escapes censure, and then only because he was “not a German event but a **European** one” (*TI*, “Expeditions of an Untimely Man”: 49). One factor of major significance is that at the end of this work, Nietzsche returns to a favorite theme when he defines “that wonderful phenomenon,” **Dionysus**, as “the older Hellenic instinct, an instinct still exuberant and even overflowing: it is explicable only as an *excess* of energy” (*TI*, “What I Owe to the Ancients”: 4).

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**DER ÜBERMENSCH (DER MENSCH = HUMAN BEING).** The English translations “Superman” and “Overman” misleadingly suggest a gendered male. **Johann Wolfgang von Goethe**, in the first part of *Faust*, had already used the term *Übermensch*. Nietzsche adopts the term to name the hypothetical individual whom he proposes as an antidote to the **cultural** and **moral** pigmy spawned by **European *décadence***. This strong man of the future is to be produced through the nurturing of certain qualities such as self-mastery, courage, and “hardness.” The latter quality is a response to the Christian belief

that meekness is a virtue, in line with the perverted values “good” and “evil”: Nietzsche thought that **Christianity** had encouraged a **slave morality** in thrall to the **ascetic priest**. Turning all this on its head, Nietzsche advised the individual to accept the death of **God** in a positive way and reject restrictions on his instinctive **life**. He should create his own life and, in fact, his own values. Only in this way could he become the noble *Übermensch* as taught by Zarathustra in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (*Za*, “Zarathustra’s Prologue”: 3 and 7). This self-creativity involves other facets of Nietzsche’s thought, since the will must be employed to **affirm** life: the *Übermensch* is thus a repository of the **will to power**.

Unlike the “**last man**” who has accepted his lot and who regards himself (mistakenly, in Nietzsche’s view) as contented, the *Übermensch* will be the epitome of striving. By conquering negative tendencies in his psyche to the point of sublimation through *Selbstüberwindung* (self-overcoming), he will be beyond the pettiness of **ressentiment** engendered by slave morality. Although the *Übermensch* thus anticipates the man of the future, there is a real justification for saying that he also looks backward to the ancient **Greeks**, who acted fearlessly and without reflection. It was this type of independence that Nietzsche labeled “**aristocratic**.” With the **revaluation of values**, poised between past and future, Nietzsche inferred that the circumstances for the emergence of the new type of man had not yet evolved. *See also* UNTERMENSCH.

**ULTIMATE MAN.** *See* THE LAST MAN.

**UNAMUNO, MIGUEL DE (1864–1936).** Spanish writer and academic. Unamuno became professor of Greek at the University of Salamanca in 1891–1892; he became rector there in 1900. Like the Italian **Benedetto Croce**, he admired the works of **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel**, but like Croce’s fellow Italian **Giovanni Papini**, Unamuno was drawn to the ideas of **Henri Bergson** and William James. With his good knowledge of German, Unamuno was able to read Nietzsche in the original and came to admire him as a scholar of Greek as well as a defender of the instinctual **life** against **scientific** encroachments. However, like Papini, Unamuno underwent a religious conversion at the turn of the century. The inner conflict to

which this gave rise is the topic of his *Amor i pedagogia* (*Love and Pedagogy*, 1902), where the attempt is made “to reconcile man’s irrational, subconscious, intuitive **drives** and longings with the impositions of **scientific, rational, logical** and analytical thinking” (Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane, eds., *Modernism*, 1976).

Having come down against scientific reasoning, Unamuno was able to adopt an antirationalist stance in his *Vida di don Quijote y Sancho*, 1905 (*The Life of Don Quixote*, 1927). In his renowned *Del sentimiento trágico de la vida*, 1913 (*The Tragic Sense of Life*, 1958), Unamuno treated Nietzschean themes of existence rather than abstract thought: like Nietzsche, he thought philosophy should have a practical application and made this a theme in many of his works. Unamuno’s attacks on totalitarian politics caused him to fall foul of the military directorate of Primo de Rivera, and he lived in exile in Fuerteventura from 1924 to 1930; he had again been apprehended and was under house arrest when he died. Refer to Augustín Izquierdo Sánchez, *Nietzsche y Unamuno* (1992).

**UNTERMENSCH.** Nietzsche casually mentioned the *Untermensch* in *The Gay Science* when he remarked that polytheism had made the first move toward establishing the individual’s rights by allowing people to invent their own gods, heroes and **Übermenschen**, as well as “*Neben—und Untermenschen*” (“almost-humans and undermen”; *GS*, III: 143); he is referring to the worship of goblins and the like. He is not making a racist statement; rather, the reverse is true—he is saying that polytheism has been beneficial in the **history of culture**. The term *Übermensch* was first used by **Johann Wolfgang von Goethe** in *Faust I* (1808); Nietzsche coined *Nebemensch* and *Untermensch* by analogy, a common feature of his writing **style**. We should note that when Nietzsche wanted to provide a contrast to the *Übermensch*, he did not use the term *Untermensch* (although it is an easy mistake to infer that he must have done) but instead used expressions such as **herd man** (to denote the inferior man who follows the mass) and **last man** to denote the complacent person who has ceased to strive. By the end of the 19th century, the **eugenicists** were using the term *Untermensch* to denote a degenerative or inferior type of individual. It acquired racist overtones under **National Socialism**, where Heinrich Himmler used it to label Russians, Slavs, and **Jews**.

**UNTIMELY MEDITATIONS (UNZEITGEMÄSSE BETRACHTUNGEN, 1873–1875).** Nietzsche's second book, consisting of four separate essays (though 13 had been planned) on the parlous state of **German culture**, individually titled "**David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer**" (1873), "On the Uses and Disadvantages of **History for Life**" (1874), "**Schopenhauer as Educator**" (1874), and "**Richard Wagner in Bayreuth**" (1876). They were not printed together in book form until 1893. In the first essay, Nietzsche provides so hostile a critique of Strauss's literary method that even he, in a letter to Carl von Gersdorff dated 11 February 1874 (the day after Strauss had been buried), confessed that he felt somewhat uneasy. Strauss had given expression to his skepticism in *Der alte und neue Glaube, 1872* (*The Old Faith and the New*, 1873), and it was this work, somewhat rambling and complacent, that had offended Nietzsche and sparked off the essay. Nietzsche's quarrel was not with the content of the work; indeed, both Nietzsche and Strauss became more convinced in their atheism the older they became. Nietzsche shared the view Strauss had put forward in his major work *Das Leben Jesus, kritisch bearbeitet* (1835; translated by George Eliot as *The Life of Jesus Critically Examined*, 1846) that much of the gospel story began as a myth created by the **Jews**. Nietzsche the philologist simply could not forgive Strauss for his barbaric cultural philistinism: in other words, his bad **style**.

The second essay warns that the contemporary pursuit of history weakens all creativity within society and is "hostile and dangerous to life" (*UM*, I: "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," 5). In Germany especially, Nietzsche argues, there is little **original artistic** work: all is foreign borrowing, reflecting the universal rage for ease and comfort. Worse still, philosophy has been tamed, reducing people to the level of automatons. Nietzsche sighs, "Are there still human beings, one asks oneself, or perhaps only thinking-, writing- and speaking-machines?" (*UM*, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," 5). For Nietzsche, the pursuit of cultural history neuters the enquiring mind, producing a race of eunuchs. The cure is to give life precedence over the quest for **knowledge**.

The last two essays are panegyrics on Arthur Schopenhauer and Richard Wagner and were rapidly overtaken by events since Nietzsche would soon turn against both mentors. In "Schopenhauer

as Educator,” Nietzsche applauds Schopenhauer for recognizing that human **suffering** sets man apart from the beasts: “As long as anyone desires life as he desires happiness he has not yet raised his eyes above the horizon of the **animal**” (*UM*, III: “Schopenhauer as Educator,” 5). Nietzsche writes that Schopenhauer was blessed with the innate propensity to become a philosopher and to understand **truths** that escape other scholars, who are “greedy for posts and honors, cautious and pliable, ingratiating towards those with influence and position” (*UM*, III: “Schopenhauer as Educator,” 7), yet there is scarcely a mention of Schopenhauer’s actual teaching in this work.

In “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth,” there seems to be little Wagner cannot do: “He is master of the arts, the religions, the histories of the various nations, yet he is the opposite of a polyhistor, a spirit who only brings together and arranges: for he is one who unites what he has brought together into a living structure, a *simplifier of the world*” (*UM*, IV: “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth,” 4). Nietzsche’s praise is directed at Wagner’s unique concept of theater, in which he fuses **music** and life, life, and drama; indeed, Wagner is the only perfect dithyrambic dramatist since Aeschylus. Perhaps blinding himself to Wagner’s vanity, Nietzsche forges a link with the preceding essays in his disparaging comments on scholars and philosophers who seek fame and recognition: “the sole purpose of their work is to create for the present day an illusory reputation for wisdom” (*UM*, IV: “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth,” 6). The essay ends with Nietzsche’s praise for Wagner as “not the seer of a future, as he would like to appear to us, but the interpreter and transfigurer of a past” (*UM*, “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth”: 11). Nietzsche seems to infer that some knowledge of cultural history, which he has been at pains to disparage in all four essays, *does* have its uses when revealed to us by a genius like Wagner. Clearly, Nietzsche did not feel at ease with this essay, which appeared in July 1876, just before he went to Bayreuth to see the first performance of *The Ring* (from which he fled in horror). His relationship with Wagner was ruptured after that experience.

**UTILITARIANISM.** The movement in English philosophy represented by Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and **John Stuart Mill** (1806–1873). Jeremy Bentham proposed an ethic that bypassed the question of motive: he held that it was possible to do the right thing for the wrong

motive. In his *A Fragment on Government* (1776), Bentham asserted that the measure of right and wrong is “the greatest happiness of the greatest number.” Things are to be measured and judged on their actual and potential consequences. However, even Bentham found it difficult to hold to this simple formula. Nietzsche’s critique of this notion in his notebook (Spring 1888) is largely justified:

The value of an action must be judged by its consequences—say the Utilitarians—to judge by its origins implies an impossibility, namely that of *knowing* its origins. . . . One does not know the origin, one does not know the consequences: does an action then possess any value at all? . . . (WP, II: 291)

When John Stuart Mill tried to redefine utilitarianism in his essay “Utilitarianism” published in *Fraser’s Magazine* in 1861, he provided a succinct exposition of the theory as an ethic for ordinary human beings, but he also insisted that utility did not exclude the pleasures; moreover, some pleasures were more valuable than others. Critics have argued that the bare bones of utilitarianism depend on quantity alone and preclude value judgments on quality. Nietzsche thought Mill’s theories would lead to a “weakening and abolition of the *individual*” (D, II: 132).

– V –

**VAIHINGER, HANS (1852–1933).** German philosopher. Vaihinger came to Nietzsche through his study of **Immanuel Kant** when he was professor of philosophy at Halle University. In his immensely influential *Die Philosophie des Als Ob*, 1911 (*The Philosophy of ‘As If’*, 1924), Vaihinger, a convinced Nietzschean and admirer of **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche**, raised challenging questions such as whether, in view of Nietzsche’s antithetical stance toward the **truth** of any proposition, one should not also suppose that he might have posited the existence of **God** through dialectic reasoning. Vaihinger’s analysis of Nietzsche’s theory of **knowledge** centers on what he calls “the doctrine of conscious illusion.” He denied that his philosophy amounted to skepticism; it is a rational way for man to avoid conflict in an irrational world if he willingly accepts irrational answers to problems that have no rational solutions. In his popular *Nietzsche als*

*Philosoph* (*Nietzsche as Philosopher*, 1902), Vaihinger asserted an affinity between Nietzsche's philosophy (a positive version of **Schopenhauer's** main tenets) and **Darwinism**. This explained Nietzsche's attack on **moralism**, **socialism**, **democracy**, humanism, intellectualism, **pessimism**, and **Christianity**. In a specially revised war edition of this much-reprinted brochure, with an introduction for soldiers at the front, Vaihinger argued that Nietzsche was a pure philosopher whose ideas ought not to be confused with the aggression of men such as **Heinrich von Treitschke** or Friedrich von Bernhardi.

**VALÉRY, PAUL (1871–1937)**. French poet and man of letters. In his youth, Valéry was a friend of Stéphane Mallarmé and through him published **symbolist** poems and essays until he suddenly stopped writing in 1896, remaining silent for two decades. In 1912, **André Gide** presented Valéry with a volume of his own "*Vers anciens*," and this apparently persuaded Valéry to overcome his reservations about the literary life. By 1925, Valéry was a celebrity, being elected to the *Académie Française* in 1926. However, he was never secure financially and was always under pressure to publish for a livelihood. This did not stop him from pursuing his lifelong hobby of annotating his every thought in a series of notebooks (*Cahiers 1894–1945*), published posthumously. These journals, of which there are 29, reveal his interest in Nietzsche and his acceptance of Nietzsche's low opinion of the **cultural** state of modernity. Like Nietzsche, "[Valéry] wrote mordantly about the contemporary world" (W. N. Ince, *Penguin Companion to Literature*, 1969). Refer to Eduard Goède, *Nietzsche et Valéry* (1962).

**VALUES.** See REVALUATION OF ALL VALUES.

**VEIL (DIE SCHLEIER)**. Like the **mask**, Nietzsche sees the veil as a means of protection or disguise. In **Arthur Schopenhauer's** interpretation of **Buddhism** and Eastern thought, without the veil of Maya or illusion we are forced to acknowledge **life** as purposeless and **nature** as hostile to mankind, with nirvana or subjugation of the **will** as the only escape. In contrast to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche embraced relativism cheerfully and hated all attempts to deliberately obscure meaning. He held the theologian **Friedrich Schleiermacher** in contempt, punning at his expense in *Ecce Homo* (*EH*, "The Case

of Wagner”: 3)—“Schleiermacher” means “veil maker.” Nietzsche uses the veil metaphorically to suggest that life, like a **woman**, veils its beauties: “Yes, life is a woman!” (GS, IV: 339), but unpredictable things happen when the veil is lifted: when **Baubô** shows her naked belly. See also DERRIDA, JACQUES.

**VEREIN FREIE BÜHNE, DAS.** See *DIE FREIE BÜHNE*.

**VOLK, DAS (PEOPLE OR FOLK).** A **concept** that became linked with Nietzsche’s name through the popularity of the work of critics such as Pierre de Lagarde, author of the influential *Deutsche Schriften* (*German Texts*, 1878), and **Julius Langbehn**, who wanted to follow the lead announced by **Richard Wagner** of regenerating **German culture**. To many who were not familiar with Nietzsche’s rejection of Wagner, Nietzsche’s diatribe against degenerate German **culture** appeared to be in agreement with the proto-**nationalism** of such men as **Houston Stuart Chamberlain**. The specific notion of the *Volk*, first mooted among right-wing intellectuals dissatisfied with the demands of the 1848 bourgeois liberals, was adopted by students of the *Kyffhäuser Bund* in 1881 and came to indicate the special relationship of the German people to the soil of their land through their blood. Nietzsche’s brother-in-law **Bernhard Förster** peddled a racist version of folkish nationalism, and Nietzsche made his objections to it quite explicit. However, it resurfaced as a dominant theme in the works of **Oswald Spengler** and **Martin Heidegger**, both on the fringes of politics, and in the work of other ideologues of **National Socialism**, such as **Alfred Rosenberg** and, indeed, **Adolf Hitler** himself.

**VOLTAIRE (1694–1778).** (Pseudonym for François-Marie Arouet.) Leading French writer of the **Enlightenment**. Voltaire’s chief works in this connection were the *Lettres philosophiques* (1734) and the *Dictionnaire philosophique*, 1764 (*Philosophical Dictionary*, 1962), while his most famous work is the biting satirical tale *Candide* (1759; trans. 1959). In the *Lettres philosophiques*, Voltaire, after spending two years in England from 1726 to 1728 (when he was temporarily banished from Paris), wrote what amounts to a paean of praise for English politics and society. In these “letters,” which are really short essays (a method Nietzsche adopted), Voltaire found the

English attitude to trade healthy as opposed to the reactionary attitude of the French **aristocracy** and admired English toleration of other faiths; he had fulsome praise for the pioneering work of John Locke and Isaac Newton. In the *Philosophical Dictionary*, Voltaire mounted a broadside challenge to the French establishment (notably the orthodox Church and the **State**). His entry for “*Bien (tout est)*” neatly persiflaged the philosophy of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, whose philosophy that “all is for the best, in the best possible of all possible worlds” is also attacked in *Candide* in the figure of the ridiculous philosopher, Pangloss. Voltaire was also an ardent propagandist for the theater and wrote several plays in which he upheld the “Unities” or rules of French tragedy, to which **Richard Wagner** was implacably opposed. He also wrote works on **history**.

Nietzsche paid homage to Voltaire by dedicating the first edition of *Human, All Too Human* to him, possibly as a deliberate attempt to annoy Wagner; if so, it worked: Wagner was duly alienated. Ultimately, Nietzsche would find that more separated him from Voltaire than attracted him, although he certainly took Voltaire’s side in the struggle against his antagonist, **Jean-Jacques Rousseau**. However, Voltaire’s pursuit of theism was, for Nietzsche, a non sequitur since it failed to kill off **God**; thus, Voltaire remained steeped in the orderliness of the Enlightenment in a way diametrically opposed to Nietzsche’s extravagantly **Dionysian** approach to life:

Oh Voltaire! Oh humanity! Oh imbecility! There is some point to “**truth**,” to the *search* for truth; and if a human being goes about it too humanely—“*il ne cherche le vrai que pour faire le bien*” [he only seeks what is true in order to do good]—I wager he finds nothing! (BGE, II: 35)

Of course, to call someone a “seeker after truth” represented a grand insult in Nietzsche’s worldview, but he was more generous to Voltaire in *Ecce Homo*, acknowledging him as a “*grandseigneur* of the spirit” (EH, “*Human, All Too Human*”: 1). See also FREE SPIRIT.

– W –

**WAGNER, COSIMA (1837–1930)**. The daughter of Franz Liszt, Cosima divorced Hans von Bülow in order to marry **Richard**

**Wagner** in 1870. When she first met Nietzsche in May 1869, she was heavily pregnant with Siegfried; by then, she already had three daughters, one of them (at least) Wagner's child. Much has been made of Nietzsche's affection for Cosima; the medical records show that Nietzsche said on entering the Jena mental hospital 27 March 1889 that "his wife Cosima Wagner" had brought him there. Cosima has also been entangled in the mystery of how to interpret Nietzsche's puzzling references to **Ariadne**. What must be borne in mind is that Cosima was utterly devoted to Wagner and supported him in every way. She exerted herself to shore up his finances, particularly with regard to the Bayreuth venture in 1872. Furthermore, Cosima became a widow in 1883, the year after Nietzsche's disastrous attempt to come close to **Lou Andreas-Salomé**. Nietzsche therefore had ample opportunity for a rapprochement with Cosima, though Cosima, who was now busy forging a cult in Wagner's memory, would have certainly repulsed any advances; after the publication of *Human, All Too Human*, she regarded Nietzsche as "infectious" (Joachim Köhler, *Nietzsche and Wagner: A Lesson in Subjugation*, 1998).

It seems clear that Nietzsche held Cosima partly responsible for what he thought was the master's rejection of atheism. Cosima had converted from Catholicism to Protestantism in order to marry Wagner, and Nietzsche presumed that her religious bent had encouraged Wagner to adopt his final position in search of Christian redemption, as witnessed in *Parsifal* (1882). For her part, Cosima no doubt thought that Nietzsche had been a treacherous friend to her husband. In 1876, when Nietzsche went to Bayreuth to hear *The Ring*, he was put off by what he heard at the rehearsals and fled, pleading ill health. **Malwida von Meysenbug's** attempts to smooth over the cracks in the relationship between Nietzsche and the Wagners when they were all in Sorrento in October and November 1876 were not successful, and Nietzsche did not meet the Wagners in person again, though on 19 December 1876 he sent his customary birthday congratulations to Cosima (her birthday fell on 25 December). Thus, Nietzsche did not openly quarrel with the Wagners, but the antagonism was palpable and, indeed, mutual.

To the horror of **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche**, her former friend Cosima destroyed all of Nietzsche's correspondence to the Wagners. However, since Nietzsche often kept copies of the letters he sent, it is

clear that Nietzsche sent a number of letters to Cosima in the period just before his mental collapse. These late missives from Turin reveal Nietzsche's conflicting emotions toward his former friend: deep respect for Cosima as well as bitter anger toward her for corrupting Wagner with religiosity and, in the final analysis, a sense of betrayal because Cosima did not match up to Nietzsche's fantasy image of her as "Princess Ariadne, my beloved" (3 January 1889).

**WAGNER, RICHARD (1813–1883).** German composer. Wagner's impact on 19th-century **music** was monumental. His first opera of international repute was *Der fliegende Holländer* (*The Flying Dutchman*, 1843); there followed *Tannhäuser* (1845), *Lohengrin* (1850), *Tristan und Isolde* (1865), *Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg* (*The Mastersingers of Nuremberg*, 1868), *Der Ring des Nibelungen* (*The Ring*, 1876), and *Parsifal* (1882).

Nietzsche first met Richard Wagner in Leipzig in November 1868. The friendship between them, in which Wagner was at first very much the senior partner or father figure, continued for several years, at a level of intimacy evidenced by the fact that Nietzsche spent Christmas of 1869 and 1870 with the Wagners at Tribschen, a house of modest size on Lake Lucerne. Nietzsche was thus privileged to hear the first performance of the "Siegfried Idyll," which Wagner had composed for his wife's birthday (25 December 1870) and had arranged to be played on the stairs at Tribschen so that **Cosima** would wake up to the sound of the music. Nietzsche was also present at the ceremony in Bayreuth in 1872 when the foundation stone for the *Festspielhaus* was laid—a momentous occasion for the Wagners (see the photo spread). At this event, Nietzsche met the Wagners' friend, **Malwida von Meysenbug**, who became a close friend of his own.

Nietzsche gradually realized the depth of the gulf that separated him from the **nationalistic** and **anti-Semitic** ideas of the Wagners. He disliked the nationalistic overtones present in *The Ring* and fled from Bayreuth before the opening night in August 1876. That fall, Nietzsche spent the winter with Paul Rée and Malwida von Meysenbug at a villa in Sorrento; by coincidence, the Wagners spent several weeks late October and November 1876 at a nearby hotel. Nietzsche and Wagner were able to meet, and Wagner explained his plans for

*Parsifal* to Nietzsche. The following year, in a letter to Cosima (10 October 1877), Nietzsche genuflected toward the “glorious promise of Parcival [*sic*],” but his comments became bitter after Wagner had sent him the score. In a letter to Reinhardt von Seydlitz (4 January 1878), Nietzsche, having skimmed through it, declared, “More Liszt than Wagner”—an insult to Cosima’s Catholicism, which Nietzsche saw as a decadent influence on Wagner.

Nietzsche’s turn away from Wagner was gradual and painful. He had eulogized Wagner in *The Birth of Tragedy*, and the encomium continues in the fourth essay of *Untimely Meditations*. Slight irritation has set in by *Daybreak*: there is in Wagner’s music “a compulsive and importunate restlessness.” (*D*, IV: 218). The attack begins in earnest in part 1 of volume 2 of *Human, All Too Human*, published in 1879. (Volume 1 [1878] had been Nietzsche’s first work to be published after the fiasco of his flight from *The Ring* at Bayreuth.) Nietzsche pulls no punches: “Richard Wagner, seemingly the all-conquering, actually a decaying, despairing **romantic**, suddenly sank down helpless and shattered before the **Christian** cross” (*HH*, II: Preface, “Assorted Maxims and Opinions,” 3). In *The Gay Science*, Wagner is found guilty of **Schopenhauerian** compassion, but Nietzsche still struggles to remain polite: “Let us be loyal to Wagner in that which is *true* and original in him” (*GS*, II: 109). He need not have bothered to be civil; the Wagners had decided after their first encounter with *Human, All Too Human* that Nietzsche was completely beyond the pale.

Wagner is parodied as the “sorcerer” (one of the **higher men**) in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (*Za*, IV: “The Awakening,” 1–2). By then, Wagner was dead, and Nietzsche could and did say what he liked about him, making no attempt to hide his contempt for his erstwhile mentor. In 1888, he wrote two works of Wagner critique: *The Case of Wagner* and *Nietzsche contra Wagner*. In the former, he particularly objected to Wagner’s return to a mystical brand of Christianity in *Parsifal*, calling the opera “Music as Circe . . . *the stroke of genius* in seduction” (*CW*, Postscript), and in the latter, Wagner “as danger” sums up the diatribe (*NCW*, “Wagner as Danger”: 1). Refer to Frederick R. Love, *Young Nietzsche and the Wagnerian Experience* (1963); Roger Hollinrake, *Nietzsche, Wagner and the Philosophy of Pessimism* (1982); Franz-Peter Hudek, *Die Tyrannei der Musik*.

*Nietzsches Wertung des Wagnerschen Musikdramas* (1989); Dieter Borchmeyer and Jörg Salaquarda, *Nietzsche und Wagner: Stationen einer epochalen Begegnung* (1994); and Joachim Köhler, *Nietzsche and Wagner: A Lesson in Subjugation*, trans. Ronald Taylor (1998). See also FRIENDSHIP.

**WAR.** Nietzsche is often accused of bellicosity, but his intention is always to show how necessary it is for the decisive man of action to gain **power**. In his praise for the “**blond beast** of prey,” he singles out ruthless warriors who have gained mastery by conquest: Alcibiades, Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Cesare Borgia, and Napoleon: these are men he would like to see reflected in the *Übermensch*. Indeed, in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the argument is made—albeit in the mouth of Zarathustra—in favor of the hard and strong individual: “What warrior wants to be spared?” (*Za*, I: “Of War and Warriors”). In volume 1 of *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche drew up the balance sheet for and against war:

War—Against war it can be said: it makes the victor stupid, the defeated malicious. In favor of war: through producing these two effects it barbarizes and therefore makes more **natural**; it is the winter or hibernation time of **culture**, mankind emerges from it stronger for good or evil. (*HH*, I: “A Glance at the State,” 444)

In part 2 of volume 2 of *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche saw war as energizing: “To nations growing wretched and feeble war may be recommended as a remedy . . .” (*HH*, II: “The Wanderer and His Shadow,” 187). Yet in spite of this rhetoric, Nietzsche was a pacifist in his private life; he disliked **Otto von Bismarck**’s warmongering intensely. Having served briefly in the Franco-Prussian War as a medical orderly, where he found the plight of the wounded soldiers execrable, he was invalided out and wrote to his friend Carl von Gersdorff, “I shall have to content myself with watching and sympathizing from a distance” (letter of 22 October 1870). Nietzsche’s sister **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** vexatiously described Nietzsche as a war lover during World War I, ignoring his use of the term as a **metaphor** for strength and implying that he would have backed **German** aggression (whereas the opposite is true). Partly through this conduit, for decades Nietzsche was viewed in intellectual circles in Britain as a chief instigator of World War I.

as a *Gewaltmensch*. Wedekind, who liked to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds, no doubt intended both interpretations.

A similar ambiguity is found with Wedekind's female characters, especially Lulu, the protagonist in *Erdgeist* and its sequel, *Die Büchse der Pandora*, 1904 (*Pandora's Box*, 1918). Wedekind, like Nietzsche, found Wilhelmine prudery disgusting and hypocritical and endorsed Nietzsche's opinion that **women** should be acknowledged as **sexual** creatures—that they should “think with their flesh”—but he then debunked lascivious women throughout the plays. Lulu is the first of many principal characters in Wedekind's plays whose high libido causes her death, with many jokes against her. In addition, Wedekind, like Nietzsche, thought that the scholarly woman was an aberration (as demonstrated by the lesbian character Gräfin Geschwitz in the “Lulu plays”). Wedekind's ruthless mockery holds up a mirror to Wilhelmine society in a uniquely sardonic and effective way. His critique is much more acclimatized to the demimonde of society than Nietzsche's, which is fundamentally an **aristocratic** concern for **culture**, combined with a call for the assertion of the instincts. Refer to Richard Arthur Firda, “Wedekind, Nietzsche and the **Dionysian** Experience,” in *Modern Language Notes* 87 (1972).

**WEIGHT.** See HEAVINESS; SPIRIT OF HEAVINESS.

**WEININGER, OTTO (1880–1903).** German philosopher. An adherent of the views of **Immanuel Kant** and **Arthur Schopenhauer**, Weininger tried and failed to inhabit a Kantian realm of ideas, viewing **life** as a dualistic struggle between the divine (“*das All*”) and chaos (“*das Nichts*”). In his notorious *Geschlecht und Charakter*, 1903 (*Sex and Character*, 1906), Weininger starts with a viable premise similar to that adopted by **Havelock Ellis**, namely, that homosexuals should be treated with more respect; he then gives a highly questionable analysis of blood plasma in order to conclude that, on grounds of mathematics, a strongly masculine man should mate with a strongly feminine **woman**, though other configurations are tolerable as long as the ratio “adds up” to 10. Weininger then argues at a tangent for the rest of the book; having introduced the idea of femininity, he is at pains to prove that woman is a predator of man through her desire for sex and, ultimately, for a child, in order to fulfill her destiny.

Throughout his book, Weininger makes frequent, if spurious, references to Nietzsche to support his ideas: both thinkers identify real problems, such as the marginalized position of women in society, only to lay the blame on women themselves. Having pronounced on woman's lack of creativity throughout the centuries, Weininger concludes that women are inherently inferior to men in intelligence. In fact, woman lacks intelligence to the point where one cannot speak of her as having a character. Weininger demonstrates **Jewish** self-hatred when he argues that a Christian woman, however inferior she is to a (Christian) man, is still superior to a Jewish man. Converting from Judaism to **Christianity** in 1902 (on the day he passed his doctorate), Weininger revised his view on Nietzsche, now berating the **God**-slayer and Jesus-attacker in *Über die letzten Dinge* (*On Last Things*), a diffuse commentary on the contemporary art scene completed in August 1903, two months before he shot himself. In this work, published posthumously, Weininger rates **Henrik Ibsen** and **Richard Wagner** higher than Nietzsche. Refer to Kurt Rudolf Fischer, "Experiences with Nietzsche and Weininger," in *Nietzsche and the Austrian Culture*, ed. Jacob Golomb (2004).

**WHIP.** In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the old crone with whom Zarathustra has been bantering has the last say in their exchange when she declares, "Are you going to **women**? Don't forget the whip!" (*Za*, I: "Of Old and Young Women"). It is not clear from the German whether the whip belongs to Zarathustra or to "women" in general, so the translation "Don't forget *your* whip" is quite misleading. Nietzsche could well be saying that women have the whip hand, a view he airs in *Ecce Homo*, where woman is declared "a little beast of prey!" (*EH*, "Why I Write Such Good Books": 5). Adorno presumed the worst:

He fell for the fraud of saying the "feminine" when talking of women. Hence the perfidious advice not to forget the whip: femininity itself is already the effect of the whip. (*Minima Moralia*, 1951)

In either case—woman as victim or woman as femme fatale—the image is troubling, even if one allows for Nietzsche's *rancune* at his failure to win over **Lou Andreas-Salomé**. Nietzsche devised the scenario for the famous photograph of Lou perched in a cart pulled by himself and **Paul Rée**, taken in Lucerne in May 1882 (see the photo spread), and the whip brandished by Lou actually has a rose at the tip:

grotesque rather than perfidious. Refer to Carol Diethe, *Nietzsche's Women: Beyond the Whip* (1996).

**WIDMAN, JOSEF VIKTOR (1842–1911).** German writer and academic. Widman studied in Basel under **Jacob Burckhardt** at the *Gymnasium*, became headmaster in Bern in 1868, and eventually became editor of the periodical *Der Bund*, published in Bern. Although he was a novelist and playwright in his own right, he is best remembered as the author of the review of *Beyond Good and Evil*, “*Nietzsche's gefährliches Buch*” (“Nietzsche's dangerous book”), which appeared in *Der Bund* on 17 September 1886, the earliest review of any of Nietzsche's works. (Nietzsche had asked his then publisher, Gustav Naumann, in a letter of 2 August 1886, to send Widman a review copy of the book in question.) Widman acknowledged Nietzsche's talent, though, as the title of the review also indicates, he had certain reservations and increasingly distanced himself from Nietzsche's thought. In his play *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* (*Beyond Good and Evil*, 1893), Widman pilfered Nietzsche's title in order to turn it on its head, while in *Der Heilige und die Tiere* (*The Saint and the Animals*, 1905), one of the characters proposes an alternative to Nietzsche's “death of **God**”: a “godless **Christianity**.” Widman's friend **Carl Spitteler** in the periodical *Die Gesellschaft* defended Widman against various scurrilous attacks. See also SCHLAF, JOHANNES.

**WIGMAN, MARY.** See DANCE.

**WILAMOWITZ-MÖLLENDORFF, ULRICH VON (1848–1931).** German philologist. At the time of his vitriolic attack on Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy*, Wilamowitz-Möllendorff had only recently acquired his own doctorate in philology (1870) and was employed in Berlin, though he was later professor in philology at Greifswald University from 1883 before moving to Göttingen. He had known Nietzsche at Schulpforta, though he was four years his junior. Nietzsche had actually sent Wilamowitz-Möllendorff a copy of *The Birth of Tragedy*, knowing that he would be interested. The bitterness of the ensuing debate took Nietzsche completely by surprise. In Wilamowitz-Möllendorff's 32-page polemic *Zukunftsphilologie! Eine*

*Erwidrung auf Friedrich Nietzsches "Geburt der Tragödie"* (*Philology of the Future! A Response to Friedrich Nietzsche's "Birth of Tragedy,"* 1872), Nietzsche's ideas are spurned as "nonsense, stupidity, fairy tales, hallucinations, distortions," and Nietzsche is accused of "childish naivety" and ignorance about **Homer**, Euripides, and **Greek tragedy** in general. This attack occasioned an impassioned defense from **Richard Wagner** in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* (open letter of 23 June 1872) and, after publication difficulties, from **Erwin Rohde**, in turn provoking Wilamowitz-Möllendorff to return to the attack in February 1873 with his even shorter *Zukunftphilologie! Zweites Stück. Eine Erwidrung auf die Rettungsversuche für Fr. Nietzsches "Geburt der Tragödie"* (*Philology of the Future! Part Two: A Response to the Attempts to Rescue Friedrich Nietzsche's "Birth of Tragedy"*).

**WILL TO POWER (DER WILLE ZUR MACHT).** Concept first mentioned in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* within a psychological and organic context. The will to **power** is the driving element in all **life**: "Where I found a living creature, there I found the will to power" (*Za* II: "On Self-Overcoming"). **Arthur Schopenhauer** had posited the will as a "thing in itself" that manifested itself in the individual as the "will to life," over which that person had no control. Nietzsche sought to go beyond Schopenhauer's **pessimistic metaphysics**. In the **higher man**, the will is contingent on **affirmation** of life, *amor fati*, and acquires added significance through its link to **eternal return**. The higher man is fit to hear Zarathustra's teachings on the *Übermensch*:

To redeem the past and to transform every "it was" into an "I wanted it thus!"—that alone do I call redemption! Will—that is what the liberator and bringer of joy is called: thus have I taught you, my friends! (*Za*, II: "Of Redemption")

In *Daybreak*, Nietzsche paved the way for his concept of the will to power by describing the human condition as a worship of **force**: "we must assess to what extent precisely force (*Kraft*) has been overcome by something higher, in the service of which it now stands as means and instrument!" (*D*, V: 548). Here, he suggests that force can be measured in rational terms; it excels when it is employed "for its own constraint," as the genius or great man has already grasped. In posit-

ing a “victory over force” (*Sieg über Kraft*; *D*, V: 548), Nietzsche uses the **language** of contest so dear to him from his study of **Greek culture**. There are echoes of this in *Human, All Too Human*: “There exists a *defiance of oneself* of which many forms of **asceticism** are among the most sublimated expressions” (*HH*, I: “The Religious Life,” 142).

R. J. Hollingdale points out that between *The Gay Science* and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche arrived at the hypothesis that all actions are motivated by the desire for power. Hitherto, power has been expressed through **morality**; now Nietzsche wants to posit “a possible reality deprived of all metaphysical support” (R. J. Hollingdale, *Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy*, 1999). The hardest task is to exercise power over one’s self; the man of strong will, though dangerous, is preferable to the man of weak will, who is only half alive. The *Übermensch* has overcome most obstacles in overcoming himself; he is the epitome of the will to power. Volker Gerhardt argues that in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, “the will to power provides, simultaneously, the internal and external conditions that make the idea of the *Übermensch* possible” (Volker Gerhardt, “*Wille zur Macht*,” in *Nietzsche-Handbuch*, 2000). For Keith Ansell-Pearson, the *Übermensch* has yet to emerge: “There has never been an *Übermensch*, Zarathustra says, for man has yet to learn *how* to go under” (Keith Ansell-Pearson, *Nietzsche as Political Thinker*, 1994).

In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, the will to power is discussed in connection with the emergence of **master** and **slave morality** through the influence of the **ascetic ideal**. The latter harnesses it in a corrupting sense and thus denigrates life instead of affirming it. Nietzsche insists on an affirmative use of the will and on a **revaluation of all values**. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche criticizes the subject who merely confuses cause and effect, as though willing is sufficient to produce action, with the result: “L’effet, c’est moi” (*BGE*, I: 19). At the same time, he is keen to correct the teleological argument that the basic drive in organic beings is self-preservation: “A living thing desires above all to vent its strength—life as such is will to power—” (*BGE*, I: 13). This encourages Nietzsche to use the vocabulary of physics (force, energy, and dynamism) for something that can be thought only from a human perspective. The notion is put succinctly in *The Anti-Christ*:

What is good?—All that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man. What is bad?—All that proceeds from weakness. What is happiness?—The feeling that power *increases*—that resistance is overcome. (A-C, 2)

Several passages in *The Will to Power* pursue this interpretation: “The will to power can manifest itself only against resistances; therefore it seeks that which resists it” (WP, III: 656); the idea is then expanded and reinforced:

The will to power manifests itself as will to nourishment, to property, to tools, to servants (those who obey) and masters: the **body** as an example.—The stronger will directs the weaker. There is absolutely no other kind of causality than that of will upon will. (WP, III: 658)

See also DYNAMITE.

**THE WILL TO POWER (DER WILLE ZUR MACHT).** Title of the compilation from Nietzsche’s unpublished notebooks prepared for print by Nietzsche’s sister **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** and her team at the *Nietzsche-Archiv* (Heinrich Köselitz alias **Peter Gast**, Ernst and August Horneffer). The work was first published posthumously in 1901 as volume 15 of the *Grossoktavausgabe* and was divided into 483 sections. Elisabeth and Gast brought out an expanded version in 1906 with 1,067 sections, in volumes 9 and 10 of the pocket edition, and the latter is the source for the Kaufmann/Hollingdale translation cited in this Dictionary. Many of the expansions were achieved by dividing up longer sections from the 1901 version, while some of the material from the 1901 version was axed. Some of the source material from the notebooks found its way into Elisabeth’s two-volume biography of her brother, *Das Leben Friedrich Nietzsches* (1895–1904), without annotation. The bibliographical nightmare has not yet been satisfactorily resolved.

Although Nietzsche announced his intentions at the end of *On the Genealogy of Morality*—“I refer you to a work I am writing, *The Will to Power: Attempt at a Revaluation of all Values*” (OGM, III: 27)—he never actually wrote the work, though he continued to fill many notebooks with jottings on random themes (among shopping lists and the like); frequently, whole pages were crossed out. This mass of chaotic notes is the material that was “laundered” to produce the work we now refer to as *The Will to Power*, creating the impression that Nietzsche

had left behind a coherent text. Technically, it is possible to say that Nietzsche *did* write the material for *The Will to Power*, as long as it is understood that the neat compilation by that name is a manufactured text. Many scholars dislike quoting from it for these reasons. Subsequently, there were editions by **Alfred Baeumler** (1930), Friedrich Würzbach (1940), and Karl Schlechta (1956).

Nietzsche had made 25 outlines for his new venture; Elizabeth selected one of these, dated 17 March 1887, which divided the *Will to Power* into four main sections with the following headings:

Book I: **European Nihilism**

Book II: Critique of the Highest Values Hitherto

Book III: Principles of a New Evaluation

Book IV: Discipline and Breeding [*Zucht*]

The first publication in 1901 carried the subtitle *Versuch einer Umwerthung aller Werte* (*Attempt at a Revaluation of all Values*). Elisabeth then muddied the waters by claiming, in *Das Nietzsche-Archiv. Seine Freund und Feinde* (*The Nietzsche-Archiv: Its Friends and Foes*, 1907), that Nietzsche meant by “*Umwerthung aller Werte*” a quite separate, vast work of which *The Anti-Christ* was to be the first of four parts. To be fair to Elisabeth, Nietzsche, having used up much of the available material in preparing *The Anti-Christ*, had given a similar impression to **Paul Deussen** in a letter dated 26 November 1888. It is assumed that Nietzsche abandoned his plans for a book called *The Will to Power* in the autumn of 1888.

Because of the nature of the raw material, *The Will to Power* can manifest only an *apparent* coherence; however, **Martin Heidegger** was convinced that Nietzsche’s best work lay in the *Nachlaß*; it influenced his seminal work on **metaphysics**, *Being and Time* (1927). In his seminal *Nietzsche* (1961), Heidegger made frequent reference to the source material we now know as *The Will to Power*. Heidegger influenced the **poststructuralist** “**New Nietzsche**” readings by such writers as **Gilles Deleuze** and **Jacques Derrida**, who in turn influenced a distinct trend in **postmodern** American Nietzsche criticism. The current trend is to mine the *Will to Power* for Nietzsche’s references to the **natural sciences**.

Nietzsche had introduced the concept of **will to power** in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* within the context of the emergence of the *Über-*

*mensch*. The latter receives scant attention in *The Will to Power*, while **eternal recurrence** is treated in only 16 of the sections, with half a dozen more perfunctory mentions. Apart from the passages that concern the **concept** of the will to power, *The Will to Power* has major sections on **nihilism**, **pessimism**, *décadence*, **Christianity** and the death of **God**, **truth**, appearance and reality, good and evil, and **master**, **slave**, and **herd morality** as well as other topics that can be aligned with the published versions of Nietzsche's works. Its aphoristic status, together with familiar subject matter in reasonably chosen compartments and the seemingly obligatory insults directed at **women**—"weak, typically sick, changeable, inconstant" (*WP*, IV: 864)—all create the impression that *The Will to Power* must have been a manuscript ready for publication when Nietzsche went insane, whereas the contrary is true. Refer to "Bibliographical Note on *The Will to Power*" at the end of section 1 ("Nietzsche's Works") in the bibliography.

**WILLE, BRUNO (1860–1928)**. German man of letters. From a theological background, Wille was at first active for the *Sozialistische Partei Deutschlands* (SPD) before heading *Die Jungen*, a group of dissidents within the Socialist Party in the early 1890s. The group rejected the **Marxist** theory of collectivity and insisted on Nietzschean individualism, summed up by Wille as a "stirring of the will" and exemplified in his play *Die Jugend* (*Youth*, 1891). *Die Jungen* founded a periodical, *Der Sozialist*. In the ensuing struggle between Marxists and anarchists for the soul of *Der Sozialist*, victory went to the anarchists, among whom Wille was now numbered. His *Philosophie der Befreiung durch das reine Mittel. Beiträge zur Pädagogik des Menschengeschlechts* (*Philosophy of Liberation by Pure Means: Contributions on Human Pedagogy*, 1894) contains liberal mention of Nietzsche, though Wille probably knew only the first three parts of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Wille agreed with Nietzsche's denigration of the stultifying **morality** of bourgeois society and saw himself as the "modern **Zarathustra**" (R. Hinton Thomas, *Nietzsche in German Politics and Society 1890–1918*, 1980). His poems reveal a strong social conscience, while his novel *Offenbarungen des Wacholderbaums* (*Revelations of the Juniper Tree*, 1901–1903) portrays the type of synthesis of man with the **natural** world (as propounded by **Wilhelm**

is found in the poems written from 1914 on. A feature of Yeats's life was his unsuccessful attempt, over several decades, to persuade the Irish nationalist Maud Gonne to marry him. An early disseminator of Nietzsche's ideas in English, Yeats was fascinated by the distinction between **Apollo** and **Dionysus** and appears to have fully understood Nietzsche's complexities since he began to use the image of the **mask** as a favorite device: Apollo's dream-state recognition of the world, or his adoption of the mask, contrasts with Dionysian ecstasy and abandonment. In "Among Schoolchildren" (1928), Dionysian abandonment (*Rausch*) is endorsed: "O **body** swayed to **music**, O brightening glance / How can we know the **dancer** from the dance?" In "The Hour Glass" (1903), Yeats gives his version of what **eternal return** might mean in terms of an hourglass, which, if constantly reversed, can run on forever, a vision taught by **Zarathustra** and parroted by his **animals**:

You teach that there is a great year of becoming, a colossus of a year:  
this year must, like an hour-glass, turn itself over again and again, so that  
it may run down and run out anew. (*Za*, III: "The Convalescent," 2)

However, it would be wrong to think that Yeats took the whole notion of eternal return from Nietzsche. Already in his poems of the late 1880s, there are allusions to the myth, showing that he and Nietzsche were probably using common sources: Pythagoras, **Heraclitus**, and possibly Orphism. The clearest celebration of eternal return is found in Yeats's poem "Dialogue of Self and Soul" (1933), where the "Self" declares, "I am content to live it all again / And yet again." Yeats gradually drew away from Nietzsche, possibly influenced by his wife, who was a spiritualist medium and whom he married in 1917. He returned to Nietzsche's ambit in 1928, so that a Nietzschean trace can be found in the last collections of poems *The Tower* (1928), *The Winding Stair* (1933), and *Last Poems* (1935). Refer to Otto Bohlmann, *Yeats and Nietzsche: An Exploration of Major Nietzschean Echoes in the Writings of William Butler Yeats* (1982).

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**ZARATHUSTRA/ZOROASTER.** Founder of the ancient Persian religion Zoroastrianism. Zoroastrians worship fire and revere the elements. The historical Zarathustra, born circa 660 B.C., taught that

the world is divided into two opposing realms of good and evil, or light and dark (personified as Ormuzd and Ahriman, respectively): he exhorted his followers to do good and to fight evil. Nietzsche's Zarathustra challenges such **moral** certainty by implying that we must first discover what is good and what is evil. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche was keener to debunk **Christianity** than to undermine the teachings of Zoroaster, hence Zarathustra's constantly provocative anti-Christian rhetoric: it is better to receive than to give; it is foolish to love one's neighbor; **pity** is harmful. "Man must grow better and more evil—thus do *I* teach" (*Za*, IV: "Of the Higher Man," 5). Zarathustra's age (he is 30, like Christ when crucified) and his invitation to his followers to liberate their instincts in laughter and **dancing** now that "**God** has died" (*Za*, IV: "Of the Higher Man," 2) is further evidence of persiflage. Nietzsche's Zarathustra exults in the individualistic ecstasy of **life affirmation**, as in the sublime moment in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* when Zarathustra awaits the rising sun (*Za*, III: "Before Sunrise") in what is surely an attempt to pay poetic tribute to the ancient prophet Zarathustra.

**ZARATHUSTRA, THUS SPOKE (ALSO SPRACH ZARATHUSTRA, 1883–1885).** (Subtitled *A Book for All or None*). Although in many ways *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is Nietzsche's hardest book to read, it represents the high point of his artistic endeavor, written in a **dithyrambic** style, with extensive use of **metaphor** and **symbolic** imagery (as, for example, the **child** and **animals**). In spite of the poetic manner, this is perhaps Nietzsche's most deeply philosophical work; in it, Nietzsche sets out the theory of the **will to power** for the first time and elaborates on the doctrine of **eternal return**, introduced briefly in *The Gay Science* under the description of "the **heaviest** burden" (*GS*, IV: 341), after which Zarathustra is introduced in a passage identical to the one at the beginning of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (*GS*, IV: 342).

Although Zarathustra makes much of eternal return, Nietzsche scarcely mentions the **concept** afterward in his published works, though it occurs frequently in his notebooks dating from 1883 to 1885, familiar now as part of *The Will to Power*. The same is true of the **Übermensch**, rarely mentioned in the later works, while the main reference in *The Will to Power* is, significantly, a note dated 1884

(when Nietzsche was at work on part 4 of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*): “Not ‘man’ but *overman* is the goal!” (WP, IV: 1001).

Zarathustra’s definition of the will to power is deceptively simple: it is in every living creature. Wherever things are perishable, there is a will to power. Zarathustra states, “Where there is perishing and the falling of leaves, behold, there sacrifices **life** itself—for the sake of **power!**” (*Za*, II: “Of Self-Overcoming”). As he developed this theory, Nietzsche made it sound more complex and abstract, but he never repudiated Zarathustra’s initial statement that the will to power resides in all things that have life: “Only where life is, there is also will, not will to life, but—so I teach you—will to power!” (*Za*, II: “Of Self-Overcoming”). Moreover, “willing liberates,” as Zarathustra declares twice (*Za*, II: “Of Redemption”; *Za*, III: “Of Old and New Tablets,” 16). As such, it is a creative act. By seizing his destiny, by loving fate (Nietzsche’s *amor fati*), man creates his own life.

The *Übermensch* unites eternal return and life **affirmation** because, as Zarathustra remarks, “all joy wants the eternity of all things” (*Za*, IV: “The Intoxicated Song,” 11). The main point is not what eternal return is but rather what the attitude of the *Übermensch* toward it should be. The *Übermensch*—who remains a prototype—must judge by a new set of values in the wake of the death of **God**. Aware that atheism can lead to a life-denying **nihilism**, Nietzsche wishes to substitute new, life-affirming values in a world without the tyranny of God; the *Übermensch* must shake off the repression of outworn moral codes and retrieve the life of the instincts that has hitherto been denied.

As Zarathustra makes clear, man is a bridge between **animal** and *Übermensch* (*Za*, “Zarathustra’s Prologue”: 4), but nothing is simple, for man is also an animal. From the outset, Zarathustra declares that man must pass through three metamorphoses until his spirit can be liberated: from camel to lion to **child** (*Za*, I: “Of the Three Metamorphoses”). Zarathustra has retained the fearless innocence of the child; he prefers to speak to his animals, the snake and the eagle, rather than to men. He laments the presence of the **herd** who cannot think for themselves; he even feels horror at the thought of eternal return because he will be obliged to will the return of herd man: “The greatest all too small!—that was my disgust at man! And eternal recurrence

even for the smallest! That was my disgust at all existence!” (*Za*, III: “The Convalescent,” 2). Just as, according to Christian doctrine, Christ reluctantly shouldered man’s burden of sin, Zarathustra recoils from what he must now do. It is typical of Nietzsche’s narrative strategy that his eagle and snake give the most lucid summary of eternal return:

Behold, we know what you teach: that all things recur eternally and we ourselves with them, and that we have already existed an infinite number of times before and all beings with us. (*Za*, III: “The Convalescent,” 2)

Under Zarathustra’s tuition (in the controversial part 4), eight **higher men** learn how to become the *Übermensch*. They assemble in Zarathustra’s cave for Zarathustra’s “last supper”: men Zarathustra would deride if he did not **pity** them. No certainty as to the identities of these inauspicious personages can be established; they include (probably) **Richard Wagner**, **Arthur Schopenhauer**, and **Charles Darwin**. The point is that they are so ridiculously in need of something to worship that they even start to worship the ass in Zarathustra’s cave (*Za*, IV: “The Awakening,” 1–2; here, Nietzsche satirizes the radical neo-**Pietism** of his day, which insisted on conversion or “awakening”). In spite of their atavistic stupidity, Zarathustra finds the higher men amusing and gives them prolonged instruction on how to emerge as *Übermenschen*. Much of this consists of doing the opposite of what **Christian morality** would demand. Nietzsche delights in rewriting passages from the Bible for satirical effect: for example, “man does not live by bread alone, but also by the flesh of good lambs” (*Za*, IV: “The Last Supper”) is a parable of Christ’s riposte to Satan (Matthew 21:2), where Christ is referring to Deuteronomy 8:3.

Readers of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* are often shocked by what Zarathustra has to say about **women**. In the autumn of 1882, **Lou Andreas-Salomé** abandoned Nietzsche in favor of **Paul Rée**; Nietzsche never saw either of these two friends again. It was a devastating experience. This—and a growing realization of the gulf between himself and his sister, who was planning marriage to **Bernhard Förster**—no doubt sharpened his misogyny. Zarathustra’s remark, “Everything about woman is a riddle, and everything about woman has one solution: it is called pregnancy” (*Za*, I: “Of Old and Young Women”), is

echoed in *Ecce Homo* (EH, “Why I Write Such Good Books”: 5). However, the common perception that Zarathustra takes a **whip** to woman is only partially true. The old crone to whom Zarathustra has been bragging is a match for him and answers Zarathustra by telling him, “Are you going to women? Don’t forget the whip” (*Gehst Du zu Frauen? Vergiß die Peitsche nicht; Za, I: “Of Old and Young Women”*), leaving a yawning ambiguity over who actually possesses the whip.

Nietzsche’s sister **Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche** was shocked at the content of part 4 of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* but was not able to suppress it, as it was already in the public domain. The work went on to become Nietzsche’s best-known (though probably least understood) work. The *Übermensch* heralded by Zarathustra caught the imagination of an era, making *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* a cult book from the late 1890s to this day. In the first decade of the 20th century, no German work of literature, **art**, or **music** was complete unless it displayed a reaction to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*; the examples in this Dictionary are legion. Moreover, the influence of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* was Europe-wide, as in such random examples as **Fredrick Delius** and **August Strindberg**. The only thing that could sway a German creative artist away from enthusiastic Zarathustrianism would be an even greater enthusiasm for Dionysianism in *The Birth of Tragedy*; this would particularly apply to the *Kosmiker*.

The famous myth that every German soldier had a copy of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* when he went to the trenches in World War I is a myth, but many did buy the cheap edition specially printed for the purpose. There were over a quarter of a million copies in circulation by the end of the war. Nietzsche’s sister Elisabeth did much to tarnish Nietzsche’s reputation during that war by writing articles liberally citing a bellicose Zarathustra as though he were identical to Nietzsche, selecting such warlike comments as “Man should be trained for war and woman for the recreation of the warriors: all else is folly” (*Za, I: “Of Old and Young Women”*). One could just as easily pick a less bellicose reference to illustrate Zarathustra’s vision: “This is how I would have man and woman: the one fit for war and the other fit for bearing children, but both fit for dancing with head and heels” (*Za, III: “Of Old and New Tablets,” 13*). See also ZARATHUSTRA/ZOROASTER.

*Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*, edited by Levy in 18 volumes, which appeared in London from 1909 to 1913. *See also* DYNAMITE.

**DIE ZUCHT/ZÜCHTUNG (BREEDING).** Term used by Nietzsche in a non-Darwinian sense to discuss how humankind in general can be improved through the emergence of a new type of **aristocratic** man, the *Übermensch*, as he explains in *The Anti-Christ*:

The problem I raise here is not what ought to succeed mankind in the sequence of the species . . . but what type of human being one ought to *breed*, ought to *will*, as more valuable, more worthy of **life**, more certain of the future. (A-C, 3)

Nietzsche linked the question of breeding to **woman's** function as child bearer, arguing that society would only become more decadent if women abandoned this role in order to pursue **education** and seek careers of their own. For this reason he bitterly opposed **feminism**. Nietzsche could not know that the **science** of genetics would be discovered around the turn of the century, thereafter placing his ideas within a context of racist social engineering that he had not intended. For example, those most active in the *Neue Ethik* movement claimed inspiration from Nietzsche, while in Britain, members of the **eugenics movement** insisted on placing a Darwinian construction on Nietzsche's **will to power**. Refer to Gerd Schank, *Rasse und Züchtung bei Nietzsche* (2000).



## Glossary of Terms Used by Nietzsche

Some of the terms Nietzsche used, such as the “will to power,” have come to have the status of slogans, and some are now used incorrectly, such as the “blond beast.” Some defy correct translation and have been kept in the original, whether that is Latin (*amor fati*), French (*le ressentiment*), or German (*der Geist; der Übermensch*). The glossary is provided for convenience, but the definitions are not comprehensive, and the full entry should be checked in the dictionary for a proper understanding of the term.

***amor fati***: Love of destiny, often linked to the notion of living dangerously.

**become who you are**: Nietzsche often used this phrase from Pindar to encourage his friends to break free from social norms. “*What does your conscience say? Become who you are!*” (*GS*, III: 270).

**blond beast (*die blonde Bestie*)**: Proud warrior to be found among the ancient Greeks as well as early Germanic tribes and Nietzsche’s explanation for why Germans were feared in the world.

**Christianity**: Chief source of man’s estrangement from his own instincts through the ascetic priests’ inculcation of bad conscience.

**cognition**: Mental process by which knowledge is acquired.

**democracy**: Ruinous to culture because of the leveling down it brings in its wake.

**“*Deutschland, Deutschland über alles*”**: “Germany, Germany above all”: refrain of the German national anthem and Nietzsche’s shorthand for his dislike of German chauvinism.

**Dionysus**: In Nietzsche’s early work, the symbol for man’s primeval instinctual drives; in his later work, a symbol of creativity combined with suffering.

**eternal feminine (*das Ewig-Weibliche*)**: Nietzsche’s code for the shallow concerns of society women. The term is borrowed from Goethe,

who introduced it at the end of *Faust* to denote woman's power to save man from his baser desires and actions.

**eternal return** (*ewige Wiederkunft*): The repeated return of one's fate at any moment, in the same format, *ad infinitum*. Willing acceptance of this doctrine will mark out the *Übermensch*.

**feminism**: Anathema to the elitist Nietzsche because of the feminists' demands for equal rights.

**der Geist**: Mind/spirit in the dynamically creative sense. Nietzsche often used the term in relation to Germany, with a tone of despair at his country's cultural decline.

**God**: Dead, according to Nietzsche; killed by man's intelligent reflection.

**herd** (*die Herde*): Group of people who can neither create nor suffer in a dynamic fashion, preferring to be led.

**higher man** (*der höhere Mensch*): Any person responsive to Zarathustra's command that the instinctual life must be obeyed.

**knowledge** (*die Kenntnis*): Knowledge at a personal level, often self-knowledge.

**last man** (*der letzte Mensch*): Any complacent person who believes him- or herself to be content.

**life-affirmation**: An active, creative, and instinctual attitude to life. Although claimed as forerunner of the *Lebensphilosophie* movement in German philosophy, Nietzsche did not share the interest in the occult that came to be one of its characteristic features.

**master morality** (*die Herrenmoral*): Acceptance of order of rank through the acknowledgment of aristocratic values and the noble ideal.

**metaphor**: The true vehicle of language, enabling man to comprehend his condition in a meaningful way.

**morality** (*die Moral*): A set of false values peddled by the priest in any religion, in contrast to the new morality of ethical independence to be acquired by the *Übermensch*.

**nausea** (*der Ekel*): Disgust at the petty and degrading concerns of (herd) man.

**nihilism**: a positive concept, liberating man from the shackles of a belief in an afterlife.

**pathos of distance** (*das Pathos der Distanz*): Feeling of superiority within the hierarchical order in human relations.

- perspectivism:** Acceptance that there are no absolute truths, so we should concentrate on seeing in a life-affirming way, as we cannot see “the whole” correctly.
- pessimism:** Philosophical doctrine that pain is the essence of life, as expounded by Schopenhauer.
- rationalism:** Austere and misleading belief that we can use reason to search out “the truth.”
- ressentiment (resentment):** At one level, any poisonous jealousy as opposed to the healthy form of envy that can inspire competition. Specifically used to designate Christianity’s fraudulent morality, where the poor and weak are promised rewards in a heaven *that does not exist*.
- reevaluation of all values (die Umwertung aller Werte):** Process necessary to overturn the false values of morality as taught by the life-denying ascetic priest.
- science (die Wissenschaft):** Form of knowledge or wisdom that omits a deeper recognition of man’s needs; “scientific” knowledge should be more “cheerful.”
- slave morality (die Sklavenmoral):** Humble and unthinking obedience to a religious code or ascetic ideal.
- truth (die Wahrheit):** Never an absolute with Nietzsche but instead dependent on the perspective of the subject and often masked.
- der Übermensch:** A hypothetical “supra-human being” who, through conquering himself (*selbstüberwindung*), will sublimate the will to power.
- will to power (der Wille zur Macht):** The basic drive in all living things.
- woman (das Weib):** Sometimes refers to “real” women, at other times is a trope for elusive truth.
- Zarathustra:** The great “yea-sayer” to life, whose teaching anticipates the *Übermensch*.
- die Zucht:** Breeding along aristocratic rather than racial principles as recommended by Nietzsche.